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THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW

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PHILOSOPHY AND COMMON SENSE.[1]

I.

PHILOSOPHY and common sense have often waged an internecine warfare. Embittered feeling has moved both parties to the conflict. "There are two things which I must deprecate," writes Kant toward the close of the *Prolegomena*, "first, trifling about probability and conjecture . . . ; and, secondly, decision by the magic wand of so-called common sense." And more than seventy years earlier Berkeley had made a similar demand, half evading, half disdaining the comparison of his theory with the judgment of mankind. "Though we should grant a notion to be never so universally and steadfastly adhered to"—so he urges in the *Principles of Human Knowledge* (§ 55)—"yet this is but a weak argument of its truth. . . ." And common sense repays the debt of scorn with interest added. Philosophy is abstruse and valueless, the common man believes—is prone to believe to-day more generally and more firmly than in many other periods of the world. The philosophers form an amiable company, he concedes. For he thinks of us as enthusiasts, rather more amiable and considerably more absurd than the social reformers, to whom, in certain points of variation from the average of mankind, we show not a little of resemblance. Philosophy is abstract and hence unpractical. The solution of

[1] Delivered as the presidential address before the fifteenth annual meeting of the American Philosophical Association, at the University of Pennsylvania, December 28, 1915.

its problems has been shown impossible by the controversies of the past. It may supply intellectual exercise for minds of a certain order. But the man of common sense finds no profit in it, nor will he waste his time in attention to its claims.

Quotations on either side of the dispute might be multiplied without end. But it would be idle to labor the proof. Let me rather bring to your notice certain features of the situation which seem remarkable in view of the length and the acerbity of the conflict. That popular opinion should misconstrue philosophy is easily understood. For it is the task of philosophy to interpret common thought in terms of ultimate symbols. That—with the exception of certain schools—philosophers should refuse to submit their reasoned conclusions to unreflective judgment, this again is one of the fixed elements of the case. Greater surprise is warranted by the discovery that each side on occasion forgets the relations—relations normal, and even necessary, in themselves—in which it stands to the other. When philosophy overlooks the fact that common experience supplies it with primary data for its own activity; when it forgets that its explanatory force with reference to experience forms a principal criterion of its value; and, on the other hand, when common sense denies the metaphysics implicit in its own convictions; that there should be no realization of the contributions which philosophy makes to common sense; above all, that men should lack the knowledge —or reject it—that common sense is a variable function—such errors are as noteworthy in themselves as they are deplorable because of the results to which they lead.

II.

In view of current doctrines these conclusions require explanation and defence. And in order to explain, as to support, we shall need to make distinctions. Kant's criticism was directed not at common sense itself, but at the school which appealed to common sense in settlement of metaphysical questions. With Berkeley it was a protest against the submission of philosophical principles to a tribunal deemed generally fallible. The two cases differ widely. The Kantian discussion moves entirely within

the philosophical field. As the Scottish philosophers had made normal human judgment the court of metaphysical appeal, Kant retorted that this procedure reduced transcendent questions to the level of the street. More particularly, he argued that common sense deals with the application of rules to concrete cases in experience, whereas metaphysics has to do with the conditions on which experience itself depends. The former is a useful instrument in face of the exigencies of daily life. But the final questions fall without its scope. To employ prudential maxims in the attack on metaphysical problems is to confuse practical sagacity with speculative insight. In its own time this debate merited general attention. Now the subject hardly requires long consideration. For the issue has passed from the circle of living questions. Historically, the work of the philosophers of common sense is ended. Kantianism remains established in the center of our modern thought. It might be doubted, indeed, whether the Koenigsberger ever did entire justice to the Scotsmen and their Teutonic followers. Nevertheless, this controversy over common sense has for the most part passed away.

Berkeley's argument suggests problems of more permanent interest. The gravamen of his objection lies in the charge of mutability and error. The reader is warned to doubt concurrent human testimony because "a vast number of prejudices and false opinions are everywhere embraced . . . by the unreflecting (which are by far the greater) part of mankind." It would have been of advantage if Berkeley had used his wonted insight to elucidate these errors further. He mentions disbelief in the antipodes and in the motion of the earth as typical examples. But mistaken views in astronomy and physics are one thing. The fundamental human judgments, though they are also subject to reflective challenge, require a different kind of evidence for their disproof. If his position precludes the philosopher from yielding to naïve opinion, he still must reckon with the spontaneous metaphysics of common experience. Or, as it was stated at the outset, a principal part of the philosopher's task consists in the explanation of this experience. And there is

always danger—as the immaterialist himself discovers—in interpreting explanation to mean explaining away.

At very least, the endeavor must be made to ascertain the several elements out of which common sense is composed. And this, whether common sense be considered in its static, or its dynamic phase. It is indispensable also to recognize the fact that common sense is dynamic, that the sum total of the opinions which men "take for granted in the common concerns of life" is not fixed, as it appears to be, but that it undergoes demonstrable change; in short, that common sense is a developing and, as we hope, a progressive thing. This view conflicts, indeed, with customary opinion, with the judgment of common sense about itself. For it is of the essence of the function to represent the body of doctrine which to any given age appears established. It sums up the beliefs which have been adopted with so much confidence and which have become so thoroughly familiar that they have entered into the common stock of thought. And since they are not recognized until they reach this level, the way is forgotten by which acceptance has been gained.

At times, moreover, these principles display remarkable vitality in face of opposition. The conclusion which has just been drawn suggests that common sense and doubt are mutually exclusive. Exclusive, it must be added, when they are contrasted in the same sense. If, on the contrary, the levels of comparison do not meet, popular belief may tolerate a surprising amount of contradiction. When a principle has been adopted into the current creed, it is often held superior to reflective criticism. New discoveries in science or new views in philosophy are counted 'theories'—and theories the sagacious man will disregard in favor of the practical wisdom by which, in common with his fellows, he guides his life. In this way the process of development is retarded. The evolution of common sense proves neither so rapid nor so continuous as might antecedently have been expected. But in time the light breaks through. Insensibly the theories which approve themselves undermine received conventional opinion. The 'man in the street' overlooks the change which is in progress; the defenders of untechnical

thinking may deny that change is possible at all: in the end, the movement finds its term and the incorporation of the new principle is accomplished. It may even be that the new is substituted for the old. That which before was common sense is replaced by fresh ideas, and these are accepted with the same assurance as their predecessors, although they differ from them in point of content. At length it becomes patent that common sense has evolved a further stage.

III.

Some examples will illustrate the process of development. Consider, first, the characteristic modern doctrine of the uniformity of nature. This principle has been variously described. And under differing names it has gained widespread influence. Taught earlier as fundamental to induction, it proves on examination essential to deductive reasoning as well. Discussed as a postulate of science or as implicit in popular thinking, it leads on to the final questions of epistemology, to the presuppositions on which knowledge of every kind depends.

And yet the clearest inference suggested by the history of the principle is the fact of its development. It is evident that during the modern era, and especially within these later centuries, this principle has been definitively added to the common stock of thought. And its beginnings may be traced much farther back. Even in the ancient world, as antiquity moved toward its decline, the Stoics based their code of rational conduct on the order predetermined by the reason of the world. When mediævalism gave way to modern culture, the new science of nature abandoned the teleological for the mechanical principle of explanation. As our age advanced beyond its primary stages, the successes of science increasingly impressed the idea of law upon the modern mind. At length in these last centuries—I had almost said within the memory of men now living—the doctrine has been welded into the framework of the common creed. In this evolution, moreover, intellectual progress has been matched by victories of service. The idea of law has led to the idea of system, as law has been joined to law and subordinate conclu-

sions grouped as deductions from some single principle or ordered under its normative control. Science has been linked with science until unities of broader scope have appeared, nay, until pregnant hints are given of the unity of the whole. Meanwhile, intellectual progress has supplied the basis for important practical gains. Never before has man advanced so fast in his interpretation of nature; never has his mastery over nature been so extensive. Modern life depends upon the natural sciences as modern thought has felt their imperious domination. Thought and life together have entrenched the principle of uniformity in the spirit of the age.

A second illustration is furnished by the dualistic phase of modern thinking. This, as the historians tell us, derives from a long ancestry. Plato, by his ideal theory, impressed it on the consciousness of the European world. The Christian faith found in dualism welcome metaphysical support. Nominalism and terminism, the differentiation of the primary and the secondary qualities, helped subjectivize the world of inner experience. The mechanical interpretation of nature furthered the process of distinction. At length Descartes—true to his method of clear and distinct ideas—brought the movement to a climax, as he gave definitive formulation to the dualism of the age. To every student of history the result is evident, and the divergence which it marks from the beliefs of primitive times. For in this theory we have a second crucial instance. Here is a principle inculcated by metaphysicians and adopted as the basis of scientific inquiry, one which has entered also into the body of doctrine unhesitatingly accepted by 'the man in the street'—this principle, indeed, has grown so familiar that we look on it as 'natural,' and hear it defended by capable authorities, even now that it is questioned alike by speculation and by empirical inquiry. And yet this principle has not always formed an element in common sense. The fact is demonstrably the opposite. It has attained its later rank through a long course of intellectual development.

Many thinkers to-day press the inference further. It is not alone specific beliefs—like those which Berkeley criticized—that

are considered subject to change; nor these together with principles of content, like the doctrine of uniformity and the dualistic theory. The fundamental forms of thought are also held to have originated by evolution. Space and time and substance and cause—the concepts which we term the categories and the primary judgments—these have been developed as well as the interpretations of concrete experience which they underlie. This conclusion receives support from the evolutionary movement of our time. It is favored by the prevailing tendency toward empirical explanation. It is congruous with recent formulations of psychological theory, and the philosophy which grounds all thought in practice sees in it a final illustration of its thesis. For axioms, we are told, are postulates, along with the other achievements of man's mind. First hit upon by happy chance, they have proved their worth in the intellectual toil of life as the lever and the crowbar—likewise discovered by some fortunate primitive man—have become established as instruments of physical endeavor. All thinking depends upon hypotheses and proof is verification: so the categories are shown true, rather they are 'made' true by working, like every other intellectual possession which man has securely gained.

Manifestly, the case for the evolution of integral common sense is formidable. It represents the coefficient of the spirit of the age. I must ask indulgence, therefore, if I venture to doubt whether the evidence is so coercive as partisans maintain. For though it is easy to argue, in the mass, that the primary human judgments have been reached by experimental testing, closer examination lays bare the difficulties of the position which is thus assumed. If axioms are postulates established by verification, it is pertinent to inquire concerning the factors in this important process. Are these biological merely, so that the evolution of the categories reduces to a function of organic growth? Or does the development of the forms of thought imply participation on the part of thought itself? And if reason is involved in the establishment of its own norms, by what procedure, apart from reason, does it carry on the work? Or if the fact of evolution be conceded in the sense of temporal succession,

the traditional question recurs, whether succession and derivation can be logically equated. Finally, even if intellectual evolution were definitely proven, would not the process of development presuppose the existence of an objective rational order, the venue in the cause of rationalism and empiricism being changed without essential detriment to the former's case?

But however we resolve the problem of the categories, in the remaining phases of common sense development is sure. Decision here in no wise depends upon the balance of contrasted ultimates: the facts lie open to definite historical inquiry. Although in this field also principles are accepted with conviction, the proof is complete that they arise by gradual process, that they change from age to age, that one principle may give ground before its opposite, even that the common sense of one period may include elements which at a later time seem essentially absurd. To the analysis and interpretation of these humbler forms of thinking the inquiry may now profitably turn.

IV.

The initial problem here is the problem of analysis. This has been partly solved by the historical review. Common sense may be divided into three subordinate phases. First in importance are the forms we call the categories, on which, however they are reached, all our thought depends. In the second rank belong the broad outlines of man's understanding of his world, or as they might collectively be termed, the popular metaphysics of the age. From this division two examples have been considered in our earlier argument. More loosely connected among themselves, more fluent also and less fixed, come ideas and judgments of a narrower type—ideas concerning the antipodes, as Berkeley cited them, about organic evolution or human progress or popular government or of some ethical case. Exception may be taken, it is true, to this analysis. The divisions are not exclusive, it may be urged—in particular, the line between ideas of the second and conceptions of the final class is of the vanishing kind. But the pertinence of the criticism may be conceded without abandoning the analysis; as I should also be disposed to

recognize a second limitation of its scope. For by no means all the beliefs referred to are common to mankind. Large sections of the race have not heard of certain of them; others are not universally accepted when they are understood. Again let the charge be granted. No endeavor will be made to deny the interconnection of the several elements into which, nevertheless, common sense may usefully be divided. And we shall not repeat the ancient fallacy of arguing the fiction of universal consent. On the contrary, as common sense changes with time, so its factors may vary in the extent of their acceptance. Races, nations, classes even of men differ as well as centuries in the convictions to which they yield allegiance. The one phenomenon, like the other, is implied in the fact of evolution. As students of philosophy we shall be most interested in the broader movements. But the less essential tendencies, the 'fringe' of common sense, will also need to be taken into account.

The inquiry grows more difficult as we approach the question of origins. If common sense evolves, what are the causes that explain its evolution? Are there laws of development here, which can be disentangled from the varying phenomena to describe and to elucidate the process of growth? It will lighten our task, if two phases of the causal problem are distinguished. For either the conditions may be sought which determine the admission of a principle to the rank of common sense; or the question may be raised concerning the agencies which prepare a principle to meet these tests.

The answer to the simpler query is suggested by the previous discussion. The conditions that determine which elements shall enter into the body of belief termed common sense are at once theoretical and practical, cognitive and of the active type. A principle may secure acceptance because of its explanatory service in relation to broad reaches of experience, or through its coherence with systems of knowledge antecedently established, or by conformity to any of the familiar criteria of belief. Or a conception may prove so effective in the furtherance of life that it is taken for granted in virtue of the reflex influence of practice. Or a third case is probably more frequent than either of the

former two. Thought and life, knowledge and practice are joined in the process by which a principle becomes accredited. I should like also to suggest that these factors may unite in varying proportions. It is not accurate to emphasize the significance of either one, while we tacitly or explicitly neglect its fellow. If the matter is tested by recorded cases in experience, even the side of practice may not justly be exalted. Did the Copernican astronomy gain credence because of the arts which benefited by its survey of the heavens, or as it furnished a more tenable account of the celestial movements? Descartes framed his dualism in defence of immortality, and his opposition of body and mind has often since been used for this ideal purpose. But it will scarcely be maintained that the dualism which has entered into the tissue of our modern thought has owed its favor merely to its support of the religious postulate. Or recall the principle of uniformity. No impartial student can overlook the influence of the applications of science in establishing this doctrine in the center of the modern creed. But it would be equal error to ignore the persuasive force of the intellectual victories which have been won under its guidance. Modern technical achievements show science furthering man's welfare. But scientific theory forms the intellectual distinction of the age. Both phases of the movement have contributed to its triumph. They have coöperated in the elevation of the principle to the rank of common sense.

Such examples throw light also on the deeper causal problem. The criteria of acceptance may be theoretical or practical or a fusion of the two. The productive or creative causes are those which fit a principle to pass these barrier tests. For philosophy the theoretical or intellectual aspects of the process have chief importance. And these may be arranged in different groups corresponding to the successive stages of reasoned thinking. A principle of common sense may take its rise in popular opinion or scientific discovery or speculative reflection. It may be generated by customary experience or empirical inquiry or rational construction. Or often, as you readily infer, the influence of more than one of these agencies contributes to its genesis.

Of the three, however, the second and the third most demand attention. And each is illustrated by the examples which have been considered. The power of science is shown in the belief in uniformity, the intensity of its influence in the circumstances under which this principle has gained acceptance. For the most remarkable fact about the doctrine is not that we all subscribe to it, but that it has developed and triumphed in a period of negative reflection. At the same time, it is evident that philosophy has been absent neither from the process of evolution nor from the achieved result. Witness the long discussion of the problem since Hume burned it into the consciousness of the modern world. It has been debated as a question of logical theory, it has been argued as a crux of epistemology, it has given rise to hard-fought battles in the field of ethics and the philosophy of religion. Therefore, although philosophers gladly recognize the services of science in the establishment of this principle, it would be abnegation for us to neglect the share which speculation has taken in the work.

The dualistic theory illustrates the genetic effect of philosophy on a larger scale. For if science and even popular opinion have tended to support the principle, its foremost modern defenders have been of the metaphysical type. In this way philosophical thinkers have enriched the spirit of the age. The speculative results of one generation have become the common inheritance of later times. A principle wrought out by the genius of the masters, and placed by them in the center of their systems, has passed over into the body of convictions which men hold in common, which they accept with unquestioning faith.

It will be noted, however, that the causal process is in neither of these cases pure. In the one science, in the other philosophy, has been the principal factor. In both contributory agencies have been associated with the chief generative force. A more complex balance still is found in a third modern instance, the principle of evolution when this is taken in its general sense. In the establishment of this principle Darwin and his co-workers played the leading part. It was through their labors and their success that the evolutionary theory won its place in the con-

sciousness of the age. Their subordinate ideas, moreover, have colored our conceptions of the world. Men talk freely now in terms of environment and the struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest, even—and this is the final test—when they betray little comprehension of what the phrases mean. Biology has affected all departments of our thinking. Every discipline has felt its power. There is scarcely one which has not responded to the summons, which has not adapted its conclusions to the evolutionary scheme.

How then can it be just to cite evolution as an instance of the coöperation of philosophy and science in the genesis of popular thought? Because, if biology acted as the principal force, it was only one of the tendencies which in later times have favored the evolutionary interpretation of the world. As science had been moving toward the doctrine before Darwin and Wallace announced their epoch-making theory, so genetic influences had earlier been at work in literature and in speculative thought. Lessing, Herder, the Idealists, with Hegel as the culmination of the school—before this audience I need only repeat the names which suggest the part, the great and significant part, which philosophy played in the establishment of genetic views. Or consider for a moment a few of the dates in the case. By 1822–23 the Hegelian system was complete. In the winter semester of that year the master read on the philosophy of history, the last division of his philosophy to be set forth. Now in 1823 Darwin was fourteen, Spencer barely three years of age. It was eight years still to the beginning of the voyage in the *Beagle;* and more than a generation was to pass before the *Origin of Species* broke upon the notice of a startled world. But the Hegelian system was instinct with the notion of development. And the results of its influence proved no less remarkable than its precedence in time. The impetus given to political and civil history was shown in the advance of German historical inquiry. The theory of the state and of law likewise benefited by genetic ideas. The effects of the doctrine were seen in the criticism of the Christian Scriptures, in the evolutionary accounts of religion at large, in the historical interpretation of philosophy. And

Hegelianism represented only the climax of the movement. In many respects it is easy to criticize the literary and speculative tradition, to contrast it unfavorably with science and the latter's splendid success. But it demonstrably shared in the genesis of the spirit of our time. Without Darwin the evolutionary thinking of the era would have been notably different—other in method, in type, in assured result. But without Darwin, prior to Darwinism, thought at large was responsive to genetic suggestions, it had already felt the influence of the evolutionary idea.

V.

Here is a situation which philosophers will do well to consider. Common sense is not independent of philosophy, for philosophy conditions it in manifold ways. Now speculation organizes and interprets the outcome of scientific inquiry. Now it forms the sole instrument or the principal agent in the genesis of popular conviction. Anon it coöperates with science, or joins with every-day experience, in the development of a principle and its confirmation. Many forces participate in the evolution of common sense. It is essential to note that in the creative process philosophy also is involved.

And this fact merits examination. At least, it deserves more, and more careful scrutiny than it has in the past received. The suggestions which philosophy has taken over from popular thought—suggestions of problems or suggestions of doctrine—have often been studied and discussed. The origin of philosophical conceptions in scientific, or medical, or religious ideas has been investigated, in particular with reference to the thought of Ancient Greece. Less attention has hitherto been given to the activity of philosophy in the formation of popular views. And yet the contributions of philosophy to common sense possess extraordinary significance. Since they are not detailed conceptions but general views, not superficial, but fundamental principles, when they enter into the popular mind they condition the spirit of the age. The principle of uniformity, the distinction between body and mind, the evolutionary theory—the discipline which has favored or created these has affected the course of

western civilization. For it has produced or modified the ideas on which our culture rests. Through them man's notion of the world has been renewed or altered. New principles of living in the world have been created. The outlook toward the world beyond has undergone revision. Modern thought, modern industry, modern politics, modern ethics, modern society, modern religion constitute the outcome. Philosophy has placed all under obligation, and it has assumed responsibility concerning them. For it has helped to rear the foundations on which they all are builded.

The inquiry proposed will therefore serve a useful purpose, as it exhibits philosophy at work. Philosophy is never practical, the criticism runs; it produces no attested or profitable results. But the record shows that philosophy is always practical. It determines the principles of common life itself. For the conclusion which we have reached holds good of other ages besides our own. Not the modern world alone, but in their measure various stages of human culture have felt the influence of reflective thinking—thought entering into the warp and woof of culture, speculation affecting civilization, the outreachings of the master's genius in the day of his creative power founding the spirit of the generation to which he hands his conclusions down.

In fine, the study of the origins of common sense will prove more than an investigation of the past: it will lead on to constructive work. The history will yield at once a record and a challenge, reasoned explanation and a summons to activity of a similar kind. A summons also, as I am happy to believe, which the philosophers of the present day will not leave unheeded. For we have a mission to fulfill—under the conditions of our time. And the more thoroughly we realize the part our discipline takes in the genesis of opinion, the more persistently we shall attack the tasks which devolve upon us. Thinkers of the closet we may not be, although it is our duty constantly to face the questions of the mind. Live in the region of ideas we must, or forfeit our right to the philosopher's name; but we shall not forget that ideas are forces also, sources of energy and direction and power in the common life of man. Our route will lie apart,

and those who travel there will always seem a little strange to the many whose life's journey follows a different course. But the same beacon guides us all. If it is our part to watch the light, as theirs to march their swiftest on, do not we contribute to their progress? Are we not responsible in measure for it, albeit they reject our leadership? If the argument set forth to-night is true in any sense, these queries carry their own answer. And if philosophy shares in the responsibility for common sense, the philosophers of to-day will be found faithful to their trust.

VI.

These several conclusions apply once more to popular conviction in its ethical phase. So far our illustrations have been taken from the region of theory. But common sense includes an ethical side as well. Popular views of truth are paralleled by ideas of duty. Theories of the world are supplemented by rules of conduct. Common sense, indeed, may be said to culminate in practical principles; and it is about these that conviction centers with the maximum of attachment and force. The duties which are required of us or which we demand from others, the obligations of society to the individual, realized as our age, with travail, seeks a more equitable social order, the laws incumbent upon states, as the slow course of moral evolution leads toward the recognition of morality in international affairs, and, lastly, the spiritual beliefs in which the sentiment of duty finds support—such are the elements of common sense which men cherish with passionate devotion. For these they give their lives, because in them life consists. Truths may pass, explanations alter—let them go! Indifference to the principles of conduct is treason. The man who neglects established views of duty is outlawed; for he is held recreant to his most sacred trust.

To these convictions, then, our former conclusions generally apply. Ethical common sense, like theoretical opinion, undergoes change. It develops by gradual process. It owes its genesis to various causes—though the balance of influence will here swing notably to the side of action. More particularly, popular experience and scientific inquiry and philosophical reflection

all share in the formative process. And for us it is important to notice that, despite the antagonism between popular opinion and our own mode of thinking, in spite also of the unconsciousness of obligation by which common sense is marked, philosophy is often foremost in the creative work. In ethics, too, the summons to renewed activity sounds clear for the thinkers of to-day—and their response is heard. For, with reference to the duty of philosophical inquirers in face of moral problems, it may be said that already we have put our hands to the work. It was hardly mere coincidence that the meeting of this Association a year ago was principally given to the discussion of such questions. It certainly was not chance that my predecessor in this office led our thinking toward them by his noble examination of the Ethics of States.

VII.

And such service brings its reward. Or rather it includes its reward, and this of a distinctive kind. The labor and the result both lie in a domain where the philosopher is citizen—they belong in the commonwealth of mind. The progress of morality, therefore, in particular the moralization of the social order and of the nations, may be expected to confirm the mission of philosophy. The creation of ethical values will enlarge the boundaries of reason's world.

In the first place, moral evolution may be expected to confirm the philosophical type of thinking. Compare for a moment the advantages which have accrued from the progress of scientific inquiry. Notwithstanding the occasional conflicts between science and philosophy, gain has resulted on many a hand. Old doubts have disappeared, old problems have retreated into the background, even when they have failed of definitive solution, because in the realm of physical nature thought has proved its efficacy by its results. Thus the rule of reason has been consolidated and advanced. And may not similar benefits be looked for, if the principles of practice shall be developed and established? For in this process also reflective thinking bears its part. As the moral life advances through the evolution of ethical

ideas, shall we not witness a reinforcement and enrichment of the spirit from which morality proceeds? Prophecy, I am aware, is forbidden us. Least of all does it become the historian of opinion to forecast the future. But suggestions may be hazarded when they are grounded in the nature of the case. Given moral progress, then, and with it social evolution, can these pass without a reinvigoration of the human spirit, a development in particular of the spirit of reflective thought?

These questions presuppose affirmative answers because of the nature of the evolutionary process. Progressive moral reflection implies the production of new spiritual fact. The same conclusion holds, indeed, of theoretical thought as well. And in this way the evolution of common sense throughout involves production and creation. But ethical progress furnishes a conspicuous illustration of the truth. There is an expressive phrase of Rudolf Eucken's which epitomizes the principle which I have here in mind. The German Idealist dwells with predilection on what he terms the substantiality of spirit; and he contends that this substantiality is progressively achieved. Now, you will dispense me from the task of following the philosopher of Jena as he endeavors to construe supersensible reality. But within the limits of the finite order, his discussion completes our own. As spiritual evolution proceeds—development which is spiritual in either the intellectual, or the ethical sense—not only is there progress made in the discovery of fact already in existence, but new spiritual reality is brought to the birth. The movement transcends discovery and recognition. It reveals the intellectual and moral order as this has been in the past. But it also expands the intellectual and moral order—broadening its scope, applying it to new phases of individual existence, extending its control over wider and wider groupings of the social units, knitting these to one another and to the whole by fresh bonds of intangible reality, creating spiritual links among the segments of man's world.

For the order of reason and the spirit is no mystical dream. That for which I now contend cannot be accounted a metaphysical abstraction in the reprehensible meaning of the term.

Intangible the things of the spirit are—intangible, but yet most real. And they are capable of verification in entirely concrete ways. On the social side, I do not even argue for some prescinded collective mind. For in such a mental entity I beg to disbelieve. But the forms of the commerce between mind and mind, the principles of conduct and conduct by them controlled, the order of human society, the aspirations of faith, these things and others similar, together with the systems and the institutions to which they lead, these are the constituent factors of human nature, the essential reality of man's world. In so far as philosophy fosters these it accomplishes its mission. As they progress, it gains in scope, in consistency, in power.

Such is the philosopher's reward. As thought develops, in particular with the progress of morality and of social organization, new spiritual reality is brought forth. The more rational the world becomes, the more evident it appears that matter is not all. And the larger the share which philosophy takes in this development, the nearer she approaches to her goal. Thus the achievement forms the substance of her recompense. The study of common sense suggests a renewal of the proper activity of reflective thinking. It shows that one of the principal functions of philosophy is to contribute to the humbler type of thought. But as she does this she enlarges her own borders. The humble duty points the way to important constructive work.

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THE PARMENIDES OF PLATO.

IF there ever was a problem that justified the proverb, *quot homines tot sententiæ*, it is the meaning of the *Parmenides*. The literature on the subject is vast, and is based on views not only divergent in various degrees but often mutually contradictory. I take it that the Platonist and the student of philosophy generally will at least be grateful for a classified survey of these interpretations, however he may feel disposed towards the new interpretation which I have the temerity to add to the list already disconcertingly long.

To begin with the extremists. There are those who see in this dialogue a frank and unreserved attack on the doctrine of Ideas, and who accordingly reject the work as spurious, on the ground, mainly, that Plato himself could not possibly have treated the central thesis of his philosophy in this manner. The first of the athetizers was Socher.[1] The other extreme is represented by Fouillée,[2] who takes the dialogue throughout as a positive argument *for* Ideas. Fouillée's position is briefly this: In the first discussion Parmenides shows that the union of contraries in the sensible world implies a similar union of contraries in the Ideas, and that the difficulties which concern the participation of sensible things in Ideas have their solution in the participation of Ideas among themselves. Hence the second part takes up this point, and demonstrates that whatever hypothesis you start with, it always involves the primitive union of contraries, the radical union of the one and the many. Thus, whatever pair of Ideas you may consider, positive and negative, you will always find a mediating term in some third Idea, so that all Ideas, even those mutually contradictory, enter into one another and are reconciled in the supreme Unity.[3]

To these two extremes should be added Grote's cavalier denial

[1] *Ueber Platon's Schriften*, 1820.
[2] *La philosophie de Platon.*
[3] Vol. I, pp. 203, 4.

of any consistent meaning at all in Plato (*Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates*). He regards the theory of Ideas supported by Socrates in this dialogue as genuinely Platonic, and at the same time regards Parmenides's attack on the theory as "most powerful" in itself and as beyond the reach of Plato's answer. The whole dialogue has no other purpose than to clear the mind of false and hasty assumptions: "It is certainly well calculated to produce the effect intended—of hampering, perplexing, and putting to shame, the affirmative rashness of a novice in philosophy."[1]

Now these interpretations cannot all be right, and I think it would be easy to demonstrate that they are all wrong. As for the athetizers, it is sufficient to say that the dialogue bears on every page indubitable signs of the master's hand, and to ask who else could have written it. This intrinsic evidence is so convincing that almost all scholars now accept the work as authentic. Moreover, the objections lose their point as soon as we have found (as I think we shall find) an interpretation which gives the dialogue an important and integral place in the whole metaphysical discussion of Plato's later years. On the other hand, Fouillée quite overshoots the mark. Virtually to ignore, as he does, the validity of the arguments against Ideas is simply to read the book with closed mind. As for the second part, even Zeller, from whom he borrowed his Hegelianizing method, recognized that the nature of the antinomies here employed indicate an absolute gulf between true Being and the empirical world of time and space.[2]

Grote maintains his position with his usual cleverness and honesty, but I doubt if he has any followers to-day. To hold that Plato never attained a philosophical position of his own, and that the great bulk of his works contain no positive plan or conviction, is to fly in the face of common sense.

Those who take a middle ground between the extremes of Socher and Fouillée are so numerous that it would be intolerably tedious to deal with them individually. We can get the same

[1] Vol. II, p. 295.

[2] *Die Philosophie der Griechen*, Vol. II, i, p. 565.

result more commodiously by a rough classification of the points which, with negligible shades of difference, are variously combined in their theories. On one point they pretty well agree: they nearly all acknowledge the strength of the Parmenidean attack on the position held by Socrates in this dialogue. They differ in their methods of avoiding the disagreeable consequences of this admission. They all make Parmenides the mouthpiece of Plato in this part of the dialogue, but to some of them the "young" Socrates is vainly attempting to support an embryonic theory of Ideas which Plato had now outgrown, whereas to others Socrates is arguing for a theory of Ideas (as entities separate from the world of phenomena) which was advanced by enemies of Plato, whether frankly as their own or in Plato's name, or was erroneously supposed to be Plato's by inconsiderate pupils of the Academy. By exploding this false doctrine Plato, either directly or inferentially, is enforcing the genuine doctrine of Ideas as pure conceptions of the mind or as "the basis of potentiality," or "scientific laws," or "the methodic foundation of experience."

Now the first difficulty in these explanations is the supposition that in a question vital to his whole philosophy Plato would have chosen Socrates as the mouthpiece of the doctrine he wished to combat. The difficulty is not quite so overwhelming, I admit, if we assume that the "young" Socrates is arguing for a genuine Platonism now outgrown rather than for a pseudo-Platonism. But this assumption throws us into another insurmountable difficulty. No doubt in the course of his growth Plato changed somewhat in his attitude towards Ideas; it could hardly be otherwise. But there is nothing in his writings to indicate such a complete break as must be assumed by this explanation of the *Parmenides*, whereas, on the contrary, there are passages in his latest works (*e. g.*, *Timæus* 28A, *Laws* 965C) which speak strongly for the essential continuity of his philosophy in this respect.

Against those who would see in Socrates the champion of pseudo-Platonism, there are two further objections. On the one hand, the conceptualist doctrine of Ideas which they regard

as genuinely Platonic is clearly embraced (132B) among the various explanations set up by Socrates and knocked down by Parmenides. On the other hand, in this very dialogue, it is shown that the rejection of Ideas as existing apart in a sphere above our own involves the rejection also of the divine government and knowledge of the world—a conclusion so abhorrent to Plato that he could not have accepted the premise. And I hold it demonstrable (though to prove the point would require a separate essay) that the whole recent movement to deprive Ideas of some sort of independent reality for the imagination and to reduce Plato to a scientific rationalist is, on the bare face of it, a perversion of the simple facts, for the conscious or unconscious purpose of confirming the tendency of present-day thought by the authority of a revered name of the past.

When they come to the second part of the dialogue these mediators take different and contradictory grounds. Some of them hold that Parmenides remains the spokesman for Plato throughout, and, having exploded the false doctrine of Ideas, now demonstrates the true doctrine. To these the same reply must be made as was made to Fouillée: this second part of the dialogue, unless violently distorted, is, like the first, negative from beginning to end, and to discover in it a positive exposition of any doctrine is a wanton reading of what is not written. Others hold that Plato first uses Parmenides as his own mouthpiece to destroy the pseudo-doctrine foisted upon him by the Eleatics, and then, in a super-refined spirit of revenge, turns the table by making Parmenides exhibit the fallacies of his own Eleatic philosophy of the One. This explanation contains, as we shall see, a half truth; but it over-reaches itself in taking Parmenides now as the exponent of Platonic truth and then as the exponent of Eleatic untruth. Plato was subtle enough, in all conscience, but he was not quite so disconcertingly double-faced as that. And, further, though a minor result of the second discussion may be to expose the untenability of the Eleatic unity in its absolute, exclusive form, the primary intention and achievement of Parmenides will turn out to be of an entirely different nature.

So much for the interpretations which run counter to common sense or to plain statements in the dialogue itself or to the whole tenor of Plato's philosophy. A few scholars have partly or wholly avoided these errors, and have left explanations which are rather inadequate than false. Among these is the author of *Griechische Denker* (3d ed.), with whom, considering his general attitude towards Greek philosophy, I find myself rather unwillingly yoked. Gomperz thinks that the *Parmenides* was written at a time when Plato's mind was in a state of fermentation. Attacks from the Megarians, or new Eleatics, had united with his own deepened reflection to disturb him with difficulties in regard to the very basis of his metaphysical theory of Ideas. He could not at this time answer these difficulties, neither could he surrender his whole philosophy. In his zeal for the truth, therefore, he brings together all the arguments against Ideas, making no discrimination between those that are answerable and those that are not. In this way he delivers himself, so to speak, and is free to pass on. He piles up all sorts of arguments against the metaphysical school from which had proceeded the sharpest attacks on the theory of Ideas (II, 437, 8). After the *Parmenides* we see two things: Plato's searching analysis of hostile doctrines brings out by way of indirect proof the inevitability of the doctrine of Ideas, and the trial through which he has passed leads him to modify his own principles (p. 440).

One thing is thus seen by Gomperz, which ought to be clear to any one who reads the dialogue with open mind: the logic against Ideas is conducted with relentless rigor, and is not directed against a particular form of the doctrine, but against all its forms, including conceptualism. (132B: "Perhaps," says Socrates, "each of these Ideas is only an act of cognition, and is nowhere present except in the mind.")[1]

[1] Only in one place does Parmenides leave the position of Socrates unassailed. Socrates proposes a simile by which he thinks that possibly the indivisible integrity of the Idea may be reconciled with its presence in the multiplicity of objects which partake of its nature: "Just as day, being one and the same, is simultaneously present in many places yet is separate from itself [*i. e.*, does not lose its integrity by being among the events of time], so each Idea might be in all things yet remain one and the same." Instead of replying fairly to this argument, Parmenides shifts the com-

But another thing is clear. Plato did not for a moment admit that this logic, however rigorously conducted, rendered the doctrine of Ideas in itself untenable. As we have seen, he continued to adhere to the doctrine in his later works, and, more than that, this very dialogue contains direct statements of his adherence. The strongest of these is in the words of Parmenides himself, where, at the close of the discussion which has driven Socrates point by point to a complete nonplus, he asks what is to be done about philosophy if we surrender our belief in Ideas, or whither we shall turn our minds, or, indeed, how we shall be able to converse at all (135B).

Such a passage ought to be sufficient in itself to refute those who find in the *Parmenides* any surrender of the distinctly Platonic doctrine of Ideas, but its force and emphasis are doubled when we remember that it does not stand alone, but is a repetition of, rather a brief reference to, Plato's constant argument against the anti-idealists of the Heraclitean and Protagorean school. This point is important enough in itself and in its bearing on the place of the *Parmenides* in the whole drift of Plato's metaphysical period to warrant us in pausing a moment to consider such a passage as the close of the *Cratylus*. The bulk of this dialogue is given up to a series of linguistic puzzles which have been one of the bugbears of Platonic students. Many of the derivations suggested by Plato are so absurdly extravagant as to force the conclusion that he was ridiculing the pretensions of certain etymologists of the age; yet others, again, seem to be advanced quite soberly by him, and the reader is left with no criterion to distinguish between satire and serious exposition. This bewildering medley of fun and earnestness is not absent in other dialogues; is indeed one of the marks of the Platonic method. But whatever Plato's attitude may have been towards the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the current etymological science

parison to a tent spread over a number of men; in which case not the whole tent but only a portion of it should properly be said to be over each man. Did Plato himself fail to see that by shifting the simile from time to a material piece of canvas he was leaving the real point untouched, or did he perceive the difficulty of determining the nature of time itself, whether it has any objective reality, and so shrink from a discussion which would have been out of all proportion to the scope of the dialogue?

of the day, he seems to have felt that the Heraclitean notion of the flux was natural to the unreflecting mass of men and was deeply imbedded in the elementary substance of language. Any seeker for the truth, therefore, must free his mind from the implications of common speech and train himself to look at things as they are. The fact is, says Socrates at the close of his discussion with the "young" Cratylus, that those who gave this color to language did so, not because our world is a huge perpetual flux, but because their own minds were revolving dizzily in a sort of whirl, into which they had fallen and are dragging us after them. The only escape for us is not to consider individual objects which may be good or beautiful, and the like, and which appear to us to be continually changing, but to fix our minds on Ideas, such as the good itself, the beautiful itself. For how can we even give a name to a thing which is now this and now that, always altering, and slipping away from us at the very moment we are speaking of it? There is no knowledge of such a thing; for just when you are going to know it, off it goes into something else, so that you have no chance to learn what it is or what qualities it has. There isn't any knowledge—nothing to be known and no one to know, if all things are in this state of unceasing flux. Granted the faculty of knowledge in us, then there must be something for it to know; then there must be those Ideas of goodness itself and beauty itself, and the like, which do not belong to the cosmic stream and whirl. It may be hard to decide between the truth of these Ideas and what the Heracliteans and Protagoreans and all the rest of them believe, but certainly he is a pretty poor creature who will permit the life of his soul to be determined by the mere implications of common speech, and will ignorantly assert that there is nothing sound in the universe but that the whole thing is a sort of leaky vessel continually at drip. How would he differ from a man who was suffering from a rheum, and was convinced accordingly that the whole world was in a state of rheumy fluction? You at least, Cratylus, are still young, and ought not to accept these current theories out of hand, but should investigate them bravely and honestly (439C ff).

Now there can be no doubt that the brief exhortation to the "young" Socrates was written in the same tone and to the same general end as that to the "young" Cratylus. The interpretation of the *Parmenides* thus depends on the solution of this crux: we have the whole doctrine of Ideas subjected to a process of destructive logic to which Plato makes no direct answer either here or anywhere else in his writings, and by the side of this we have an unwavering statement of the reality and vital importance of Ideas. Given this dilemma, the only way of escape would seem to be through holding that Ideas do not come to us by a process of metaphysical logic, but by means of some direct experience independent of such logic, and that the method of reasoning employed against them by Parmenides, while perfectly sound in itself, is all *in vacuo*, so to speak, and has no bearing upon their existence or non-existence. No other interpretation would appear to be tenable, and as a matter of fact the second, and larger, part of the dialogue is directed to exhibiting the limitations, and the usefulness within these limitations, of what I have called the process of metaphysical logic. To understand this point we must look a little more closely into the antecedents and structure of the dialogue.

Parmenides, the principal speaker of the dialogue which bears his name, was the pre-Socratic philosopher from whom more than from any other, unless it be Pythagoras, Plato's thoughts received their color. His name sounded to Plato out of antiquity with peculiar authority, and even when disagreeing from him the younger man could not forget his veneration. Against all the other philosophers, from Homer down, who had seen in the world only the play of flux and perpetual mutation, Parmenides stood forth in lonely grandeur, a man, in the Homeric phrase, "reverend and dreadful," a sage able to impress Socrates with "the noble depth of his mind" (*Theætetus* 183E). In Elea of Magna Graecia he had set up a school in direct opposition—so it seemed at least to Plato and the later men—to that of Heraclitus. In his cosmic poem he represents himself as carried by the Sun-maidens up to the Gate of Night and Day, which is opened to him by the Goddess Dikê (Right, Justice), and there

in the realm of heavenly light he is instructed in the difference between truth and deceptive opinion. The whole vision was to be taken over by Plato in the *Republic* when searching for the nature of justice, and worked up into his sublime comparison of the supreme good in the moral sphere with the light-giving sun in the physical sky. And the truth as Parmenides saw it was one aspect, incomplete and therefore partly false, of what Plato was to hold. Our opinion of the world of change and appearance is a mere deception; rather, such a world *is not*, for the reality of being is the reality of thought, or knowledge, one and indivisible, without beginning or end, without growth or decay, finite in itself and with nothing beyond it, with no color or motion or quality of perception. The universe of Parmenides was the pantheism of his predecessor Xenophanes, but as an intuitive philosopher would express it instead of a religious dreamer.

Now it was inevitable that this one-sided perception, or intuition of the unity underlying all things should have been met with ridicule on the part of those who could see nothing but the world of flux, and it became necessary for the Eleatic pupils of Parmenides to support their master by means of whatever logical instrument they could lay hands on. The shrewdest of these defenders was Zeno, who sought to discomfit the enemy by bringing confusion into their own camp. The Heracliteans had undertaken to dispose of the Eleatic unity by showing the absurdity of a theory which, by its maintenance of indivisibility, involved the denial of our common perceptions of motion and change, and which, by its demand of absolute uniformity, involved the denial of all qualities to things, thus reducing the mind to a state of complete negation. Zeno did not, indeed could not, answer these criticisms directly, but he did undertake to strengthen the Parmenidean position by setting forth the equal absurdities that followed if we rejected unity and made multiplicity the essence of all things. One of his arguments was the famous riddle of Achilles and the tortoise. Suppose Achilles, who runs ten times faster than the tortoise, tries to catch a tortoise that has a start of ten feet. By the time he has traversed

these ten feet, the tortoise will be one foot in advance. When he has traversed this foot, the tortoise will be a tenth of a foot in advance; and so on *ad infinitum*. That is to say, on the assumption that time and space are divisible this division will proceed without end, and Achilles can never overtake the tortoise; which is absurd on the face of it. Another argument of Zeno's turned on the contradictions that must arise from the ascription of qualities to things. For instance, if you say that A is like B, this will imply that A is unlike something else, so that you are driven to the paradox of holding that A is at the same time like and unlike; which, again, is absurd.

All this, of course, might be waved aside as an amusing play of logomachy, but in fact it introduced a real evil into the life of a people who were already prone by nature to lose themselves in linguistic subtleties and to prize sheer cleverness above simple veracity. Instead of throwing up the whole game the Heracliteans answered Zeno in kind, while on the other hand the Megarian school of Euclides took up the cudgels for the Eleatics and carried their logic to the extreme of fatuity. Hence arose that art of eristic which threatened for a while to reduce the whole of Greek philosophy to a vain babble of contentious words. The very essence of eristic, it will be seen, lies in the unbridled use of reason, or logic, without regard for, or in flat contradiction to, the facts of experience and intuition. Reason in itself is the faculty of combining and dividing (*συναγωγή* and *διαίρεσις*). When properly employed it restricts itself to following the perception of actual similarities and differences; it becomes eristic when it disregards these facts and attempts by its own naked force to build up a theory of the world as an abstract unity or an abstract multiplicity. By the time of Plato's maturity these successors of the sophists were expending their strength in ever vainer and more perplexing enigmas, while of the sincere aspiration after the truth it might be said, "Naked and poor thou goest, Philosophy!" The wrangle had spread until it embraced Plato's own doctrine of Ideas, which hitherto he had held rather as a matter of intuition and as an unquestioned necessity of the imagination than as a reasoned conviction, and was forcing

him in self-defence into what may be called his metaphysical period.

One of his aims at this time, perhaps his chief aim, was to expose the vanity of the new form of sophistry—for it was at bottom precisely the same spirit as that which he had opposed in his earlier dialogues, but disguised now in the sober garb of metaphysics—and in its place to establish the true dialectic, that is to say, the generalizing ascent of the reason without losing from sight, indeed, by using as its firm stepping-stones, those innate perceptions of moral and æsthetic consequences which he had hypostatized as Ideas. Already, in the *Republic* (454A), he had expressed his scorn of those who, in their inability to distinguish Ideas, gave themselves up to the pursuit of verbal oppositions, thinking they were practising dialectic, or true philosophic discourse, when in fact they were indulging in mere eristic. In his systematic exposition of this evil, the first task would be to bring into the light the lurking absurdities of the Heraclitean metaphysic of the flux; this he had done in the *Cratylus*, *Euthydemus*, and *Theætetus*, with a drastic power in comparison with which the campaign of Zeno and the other Eleatics was mere child's play. Now, in the *Parmenides*, he would employ the same weapon, only with greater respect for the persons concerned, against the Eleatics and Megarians, and at the same time would investigate the validity and scope of the whole metaphysical, eristic method.

For this purpose he took advantage of the occasion when the aged Parmenides had visited Athens with his pupil Zeno, and had there met and talked with Socrates, then a "very young man." There are, I know, difficulties in the way of accepting this meeting as historical, but Plato mentions it so often, in other dialogues besides the *Parmenides*, and in such a manner, that we are almost bound to regard it not only as an actual fact, but as one to which Socrates was fond of alluding. That, however, is unessential. Whether as a fact or fiction, we are told in the *Parmenides* that Zeno has been reading those treatises of his in which, as I have said, he undertook to support the Parmenidean unity by showing that the multiplicity assumed in its

place by the Heracliteans led to even greater paradoxes. Socrates listens attentively, grasps the point of the argument, but has a modest question to ask. I see, he says, that material phenomena are at the same time both one and many; for instance I, as I stand here, am one if I am taken as a separate integral member of this group of men, but I am many if you consider me as composed of parts, right and left, upper and lower. I can understand how your logic by laying hold of these contraries will reduce our reason to a paradoxical *impasse*. That seems easy enough if you start with material phenomena. But I should like to hear how you would apply this process to Ideas. What, exclaims Parmenides, with concealed pleasure, wishing to bring out his clever young questioner, do you believe in these Ideas as real things having an existence apart from phenomena? Whereupon follows the famous attack on the doctrine, which turns on the difficulty of comprehending how an Idea can be immanent in the many particular phenomena which bear its name without losing its integral unity, or how phenomena can participate in the Idea without foregoing their character of changing multiplicity. Socrates is completely blocked in all his efforts to explain away this difficulty—indeed neither Plato nor anyone else has ever found a positive solution of the paradox—and is ready to throw up his position as untenable; when Parmenides checks him. No, says the old warrior, you cannot do that, for without Ideas you are confronted by a still more disastrous nonplus; unless these generalizations of the mind correspond to things in some way really existent there can be no philosophy, no knowledge, no meaning at all in conversation. You yourself have declared that the logic of Zeno did not touch the simple fact of experience which presents phenomena to us as at the same time both one and many, and you need only carry the method out to its legitimate end to discover that it will leave you in possession also of your intuitive belief in the parallel existence of Ideas and phenomena. Then, after some hesitation, Parmenides is persuaded to give an illustration of this self-denying use of eristic. Now it should be observed here that this interpretation of the first part of the dialogue—in itself the only one which does not

do violence to the plain sense of the text—avoids the absurdity of supposing that Plato would have selected Socrates for the spokesman of a theory he meant to denounce. To represent Socrates, when "very young," as not yet competent to maintain his position with the full mastery of dialectic is quite another matter, and is in perfect conformity with Plato's own transition, not from one philosophy to another, but from what may be called his purely intuitional period to the years of metaphysical examination into his creed.[1]

As for Parmenides's eristical exhibition, which forms the second part of the dialogue, it is just one of the terrible things of philosophy; nobody need be surprised that students have found in it what they brought to it in their own minds. Heaven forbid that I should ask my reader "to swim through such and so great a sea of words." But without a glance at the main points of the discussion we cannot assure ourselves of the general purport of this dialogue or understand the drift of the dialogues that follow.

Parmenides, then, condescends to submit his own doctrine of the One as a *corpus vile* to be tried out by this eristical method. He will first take the statement that the One is and trace the consequences, and will afterwards deal in the same way with the contrary statement that the One is not. The argument thus drags its awful length through these eight hypotheses (I alter their order as noted):

A (This stands first in the dialogue): The One is posited as absolute and indivisible. It follows from this hypothesis that the One is devoid of all qualities, incapable of being known or in any way considered or named or uttered.

B (Second in the dialogue): But by the very hypothesis that the One *is* we attribute being to it. Thus the One is presented as a duality of unity and being; this duality is subject to further

[1] Burnet's view that in all the early dialogues, through and including the *Republic*, Plato was merely as a dramatist reproducing the philosophy of Socrates without any admixture of his own thought, and that in the *Parmenides* he marks his break with the Socratic doctrine of Ideas, must be disregarded as fantastic and incredible.

division, and the One becomes endlessly divisible and possessed of infinite qualities. But to say that it possesses every possible pair of contrary qualities is the same as to say that it has no qualities; and we are reduced to a similar *impasse*.

Now let us consider the consequences of this hypothesis for the Many (τὰ ἄλλα, *i. e.*, the Others, all things conceivable besides the One).

C (Fourth in the dialogue): If the Many are taken as having no participation in the One, *i. e.*, as absolute multiplicity, it follows that, like the One of A, they will have no qualities at all, and are utterly inconceivable.

D (Third in the dialogue): If the Many participate in the One, then, like the One of B, they will have all contrary qualities, which is equally repugnant to reason.

So far we have been arguing on the supposition that the One is; now let us take the contrary supposition that the One is not.

E (Sixth in the dialogue): If the One is not, regarded absolutely, we get the same total negation as in A.

F (Fifth in the dialogue): But by the very hypothesis that the One *is* not we associate being with it. To say that the One is not is a different thing from saying that the Not-One is not, and in this way altereity, the property of difference, is brought into the Not-One, and it becomes possessed, corresponding to hypothesis B, with all different qualities.

(This, it should be noted, is in metaphysical form the old thesis which Plato had wrestled with in earlier dialogues and was to discuss at length in the *Sophist*, that there is no such thing as a false statement, for the reason that it is impossible to speak what is not.)

G (Eighth in the dialogue): If we take the One as not being absolutely, it follows that the Many will have no qualities at all and there is nothing.

H (Seventh in the dialogue): If the One is not but the Many are, it follows that, by seeming to be composed of units, the Many will have all contrary qualities.

Now, there are two ways of looking at these hypotheses. According to most of the interpreters, one set (A, C, E, G) is meant to show the impossibility of positing an absolute One apart from the Many, whereas another set (B, D, F, H) demonstrates the reconciliation of the One and the Many. Thus hypothesis A leads to a total negation, whereas hypothesis B, by reconciling the One and the Many, leads to the possibility of predication and corresponds with actual experience. The whole argument, in a word, is a continuation of the assault on the doctrine of Ideas as entities of real existence apart from phenomena (χωριστά), and a proof that, by some theory of conceptualism or the like, they are in and of the Many.

The other way of interpretating the argument is to accept all the hypotheses as resulting equally in an *impasse*, since it is just as absurd to say that a thesis leads to the simultaneous possession of all contrary qualities as to say that it leads to the total negation of qualities. And this in my judgment, as my wording of the summaries above will have made evident, is the only interpretation the language of Plato will bear. Of course, if you care to do violence to the text, you may get any meaning out of it you choose; and that capable scholars are not above using violence can be shown from a shining example. After deducing from the second hypothesis the possibility of attributing all qualities to the One, Plato adds a corollary in which, by a subtle analysis of the time element, he shows how this is the same as saying that the One would have no qualities. Very good. But how does Burnet in his summary of the hypotheses deal with this double-edged argument? He states the conclusion of the hypothesis proper thus:

"Therefore One partakes of past, present, and future; it was, it is, it will be; it has become, is becoming, and will become. It can be the object of knowledge, judgment, and sensation; it can be named and spoken of" (*Greek Philosophy*, Part I, p. 268).

That is as close to the Greek as need be; but turn now to his statement of the conclusion of the corollary:

"It is the instantaneous which makes all changes from one opposite to another possible, and it is in the instant of change

that what changes has neither the one nor the other of its opposite qualities" (*Ibid.*).

Compare this with the Greek, which is literally as follows:

"By the same token it [the One], passing from one to many and from many to one, is neither one nor many, is neither divided nor combined. And, passing from like to unlike and from unlike to like, it is neither like nor unlike, neither made like nor made unlike; and, passing from small to large and to equal and to the opposites, it would be neither small nor large nor equal, neither increased nor diminished nor made equal."

Now, is it too much to say that, by transposing this statement from its negative to a positive form, Burnet has come pretty close to betraying his author? The case is still worse with a critic like Natorp, who out of an argument ending thus in complete negation draws a positive meaning such as this:

"By the instrumentality of continuity, to speak briefly, the way is prepared for a reconciliation between the absolute position (the thesis) and the relative (the antithesis). The possibility is opened for the passage of the absolute position into relativity, that is to say, for the passage of the Idea, first conceived as pure thought, the *a priori*, into experience, which signifies the realm of relativity. The first foundation is laid for the possibility of experience as methodically assured knowledge" (*Platos Ideenlehre*, p. 256).

There is not a hint of all this in Plato; it is Kant or Hegel or Natorp. The conclusions of the second hypothesis and of its corollary ought to be enough in themselves to show that no such inference can be drawn. But to clinch the fact, the whole dialogue ends sharply with this formidable summary: "Thus, it seems, whether One is or is not, both it and the Many, regarded both in themselves and in relation to each other, all in every way both are and are not, both have appearance and have not." How a scholar can have this consummation before his eyes and yet fail to see that all the eight hypotheses must be taken without distinction as reductions to the absurd, is beyond my comprehension.

Certain owlish persons who are aware of this consequence

have worried themselves over the method by which it was obtained. It is full of fallacies and false reasoning, exclaims Apelt ("wahres Arsenal von Erschleichungen und Sophismen," *Beiträge*, p. 32), and will waive the whole thing as a piece of youthful indiscretion. Fallacies, quotha! It is indeed an arsenal of fallacies; rather, it is the fundamental fallacy of metaphysics from the beginning until now, stripped of its garb of irrelevant truths and laid bare to the gaze of any who will see. For I take it that any metaphysic which attempts to give an account of the ultimate nature of things, the *rerum natura*, by the process of pure reason will impale itself on one or the other horn of this dilemma: either it will cling honestly to the absolute One or the absolute Many, and so move about in the void, with no content of meaning; or it will surreptitiously merge the absolute One with the concrete or the absolute Many with the concrete, and so fall into a dishonest mixture, or 'reconciliation,' of contraries. This is not the place to support such a charge by detailed illustrations, but I think it would not be hard to show how perfectly the error of Spinoza's system is exposed by Plato's second hypothesis (B). Compare with the working out of that hypothesis Spinoza's effort to deduce all the contrary qualities of phenomenal existence from the absolute One, as stated in his *Ethics* (II, Praef.): "Transeo iam ad ea explicanda, quae ex Dei sive entis æterni et infiniti essentia necessario debuerunt sequi: non quidem omnia (infinita enim infinitis modis ex ipsa debere sequi)." In like manner the scientific conception of a 'block universe,' as an absolute closed system, falls under the third hypothesis (D), or, in the Spencerian form of the Unknowable and the Knowable, under the fourth hypothesis (C). On the other side, the various forms of Pragmatism, all the systems that accept only the absolute flux, including the much-bruited metaphysic of M. Bergson, will come within the scope of one or another of the four hypotheses that assume the One as not being.

I would not insist on this modern application; but at least I do not see how the second part of the dialogue can be understood otherwise than as an endeavor to deal in such a manner with the metaphysic, or eristic, which had sprung up by the side of

true philosophy in Plato's own day. And the results obtained are of a double nature. The first four of the hypotheses discover the embarrassment into which those of the Megarian school were driven who, in fanatical opposition to Platonic Ideas and the Heraclitean flux, ran to an uncompromising idealism of the One, as the exclusive reality. I do not believe that Plato meant to direct his argument against the Parmenidean unity itself (Cf. 128A); that unity, as the Idea of the Good, was so deeply imbedded in his own teleological philosophy that it is impossible to think of him as trying to eradicate it. Rather, his aim must have been to tear away from this unity the scaffolding which had been raised about it by the later Eleatics and Megarians, and so to leave it in the form of an obscure intuition, such as it appeared to Parmenides himself, untouched by the rationalism which would petrify it into a logical negation of experience. Even so, it is notable that Plato treats this error with a certain respect; at least his exposition is conducted without any admixture of that contemptuous buffoonery which he had employed in the *Euthydemus*, when 'dusting the jackets' of the two shameless Protagoreans. He was himself a spiritual child of the ancient sage, and thought it almost an act of parricide to lay hands on "father Parmenides" (*Sophist* 241D). In this way we can understand the propriety of making Parmenides the instrument of attack on his Megarian successors.

But this freeing of the Parmenidean unity from its eristical supergrowth was by the way, so to speak; the main intention was to bring relief to Plato's own doctrine of Ideas. At the conclusion of the first part of the dialogue we found ourselves confronted by this dilemma: one by one the arguments set up to explain the relation between Ideas and phenomena had been knocked down, yet it was declared impossible to surrender Ideas. The situation was very much like that taken by Dr. Johnson (the great Socratic of the modern world) in regard to a question of equal ethical importance: "All theory is against the freedom of the will, all experience for it." By demonstrating that the eristical method led to the same absurdity (and so destroyed itself) whether we posited the One as existing or as not

existing, Parmenides would intimate to his young friend that to guard himself against a rationalism which brought out the contradictions involved in positing the existence of Ideas he should have retorted by forcing his antagonist to admit the contradictions involved in positing the non-existence of Ideas. Thus he would have made himself free to accept the reality of Ideas as a necessity of inner experience, just as he had seen that the double eristic of Zeno and the Heracliteans left him free to accept the reality of phenomena as known to perception.

This interpretation of the *Parmenides*, I submit, avoids the violences to the text to which other interpretations are bound to have recourse. It justifies the choice of speakers, and does away with the arbitrary assumption of a radical break in Plato's philosophy. It has also the advantage of finding a single purpose running through the two parts of the discussion, and of establishing an integral relation between this dialogue and the others in which Plato turned his attention from the sophistry of rhetoric to the sophistry of metaphysic.

If any further confirmation of this thesis is needed, it may be found in the natural interpretation of a much-disputed passage of the dialogue which is commonly, and rightly, I think, regarded as supplementary to the *Parmenides*. In the central part of the *Sophist*, Plato considers in turn three classes of philosophers. First, by an argument essentially the same as that employed in the *Parmenides*, he reduces the Eleatics and Megarians to confusion (242C ff). He next deals with the opposite school, not the mere Heracliteans in this case, but the gross materialists who cling to brute sensations and wage war upon the idealists of all colors, a veritable *gigantomachia* (246A). These, or their kindred at least, he had already made the subject of biting ridicule; now he is content with what is really little more than a reference to the proofs he has elsewhere given at length. They will admit that there is a soul, or life-giving principle in us; that there is a difference between the just and the unjust soul; that this difference is due to the possession and presence of justice or its contrary in the soul, and that, therefore, justice itself exists as an invisible, impalpable entity—that is to say,

as an Idea (247B). After dismissing these two opposed sects, he turns to the "friends of Ideas" (248A); and here the interpreters run amuck. Campbell, in his note, thus states the various positions held:

"Four possible suppositions remain, if we believe the dialogues to be the work of Plato. The 'friends of forms' are either (1) Megarians (since Schleiermacher this has been the most general impression); or (2) Plato himself at an earlier stage; or (3) Platonists who have imperfectly understood Plato. The fourth hypothesis combines (2) and (3)."

Now, in the name of conscience, why should not an unsophisticated reader take these friends of forms, or Ideas, to be just Plato and his true followers, without any beating about the bush? In the first place, as we have seen above, Plato, in his contention against the materialists, assumes the existence of Ideas in precisely the manner (ἕξει καὶ παρουσίᾳ) of his early dialogues. The *Sophist*, therefore, can scarcely contain a rejection of Ideas, or any radical change in the way of regarding them. What follows? Plato subjects these idealists to the antinomies of reason, thus (I borrow Campbell's own summary):

"Perfect Being [the realm of Ideas] cannot be in a state of mere negative repose, a sacred form without thought, or life, or soul, or motion. . . . But, on the other hand, thought is equally impossible without a principle of permanence and rest. Hence the philosopher, with whom thought is the highest being, can listen wholly neither to the advocates of rest nor of motion, but must say with the children, that 'both are best,' when he is defining the nature of Being."

We have, then, in this section of the *Sophist* an exact repetition in brief of the method of the *Parmenides*, applied now directly to the doctrine of Ideas. And note that the conclusion is in no sense of the word a 'reconciliation' of rest and motion, the One and the Many, nor is it in any sense a determination of the relationship of Ideas to phenomena, but a sheer statement that Ideas are and that in some unknown way they are connected with the realm of multiplicity and change.

The result of the *Parmenides* and the *Sophist* (the part of it

here considered) might be expressed as a laborious demonstration of two theses which Plato took over from his master and which are woven all through his philosophy. The first of these is the scepticism of Socrates, acknowledged so frankly in the *Apology* where he rests his claim to superior wisdom on the sole fact that he was aware of his ignorance, whereas other men thought they knew what they did not know. In the *Sophist* we are told that the absence of this scepticism, the state of thinking we know when we do not know, is the cause of falsehood in the mind (229C) and the source of ugliness in the soul (228D), for which the right purgation is just the process of dragging into the light the antinomies of reason and thus forcing the soul to confess its ignorance (230B).

The other Socratic thesis is what may be called his spiritual affirmation, that ringing asseveration of the *Apology*—"To do wrong or to disobey our superior, this I do know to be an evil and shameful thing!"—which in various forms sounds so often through the early dialogues. Nor is there any real hostility between this scepticism and this affirmation, but rather one is the complement of the other. It is on the very basis of scepticism that Socrates declares his resolution to suffer even death, if need be, for the sake of what he knows to be his duty. "For the fear of death," he said, "is only another form of appearing wise when we are foolish and of seeming to know what we do not know."

The destruction of eristic in the *Parmenides* and the unwavering affirmation of the reality of moral Ideas is Plato's philosophical justification of his master's life and faith.

But candor forbids us to stop here. Though this is the significant outcome of Plato's later thought, it is clear also that he never quite freed his mind of the hope of attaining to some positive dialectical proof for those Ideas whose existence could only not be disproved by the false conclusions of eristic, some rational explanation of the inherence of Ideas in phenomena which he was obliged to assume by the necessity of experience. Such a proof, if it could be found, would have succeeded in raising the third of the Socratic theses—the identification of knowledge

and virtue—into a philosophical reconciliation of the other two theses, which, as they stood, seemed to be irrational complements the one of the other. There are tentative efforts to create this positive metaphysic in the *Sophist* and the *Philebus*, but it should appear that the full working out of the plan was left for the projected dialogue on the *Philosopher* (Cf. *Sophist* 253C). The absence of that dialogue from the Platonic canon means, I conjecture, simply this, that Plato became conscious of his inability to achieve what, indeed, no philosopher has ever achieved; since it lies beyond the scope of the human intelligence.

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PRINCETON, N. J.

REASON AND FEELING IN ETHICS.

I.

THE present discussion will set out from Mr. Moore's critical analysis of the concept 'good.'[1] And I may admit at once that I find his thesis, that the content of the idea is ultimate and *sui generis*, and incapable of any definition, one which I should be inclined to adopt only as a kind of last resort after all other possibilities have failed. I do indeed understand what may be meant by an ultimate and unanalyzable quality. I agree that sense qualities are such; and when I am called upon to define the meaning of yellowness, for example, all I can say is that yellow is yellow. But for some reason this does not work so well, for me, in the case of goodness. When I try to think the proposition that good is just indefinable goodness, I confess that presently my head begins to swim. The trouble is that the conditions do not seem to be the same in the two instances. In the case of an elementary sense-content the matter is plain enough. It is a perfectly concrete and imaginable bit of stuff. So also in the case of a relationship. I know what I mean by 'difference'; it is just difference, and nothing more. But goodness, as ultimate, is not, as I understand it, held to be a relationship; it is rather analogous to a sense quality; and with Hume, I find it extremely perplexing to be called upon to allow a definite qualitative content for which there is in no sense that is intelligible to me an original impression. Certainly there is nothing that makes an impression on my sense organs; and if I am not allowed to identify the original with some concrete feeling content, I find myself very doubtful whether I am talking about anything in particular at all, and may not be only using words. If there is no other recourse, I am willing to waive this, and trust that I may come to see it more clearly in the future; but it makes me much inclined to try other alternatives first.

[1] G. E. Moore, *Principia Ethica*, 1903.

It will be simpler if I propose a definition in particular, and then examine it in more detail with reference to the points which it aims to cover. Let us say, accordingly, that good is that which reveals a capacity, on reflection, for calling forth my approval; and that the only thing which I find common to the various objects of approval is the ability to give satisfaction, or pleasure. This is a double-jointed definition; and my point will be that the definition of goodness needs this twofold point of view if it is to correspond to what experience actually finds.

There are two senses in which you can ask about the meaning of good. The first has to do with the definite objective content of the thought, meaning by this the character of the thing which evokes the judgment. Certain things do, when I think of them, call forth my approval; that is my starting point. Such judgments are intuitive, in the sense that I cannot anticipate or force them, but have to wait to see what they turn out to be; and also in the sense that they are recognized as immediate judgments simply by looking into my own mind and finding them there. And when I set out to reflect upon and understand them, I seem to find that the reason why in all cases I call them good is that they give rise to satisfaction. It is to be noted that this is not a description of the nature of approval; it is the *reason* for approval. And for myself I can discover no other reason; nor can I conceive the possibility of my calling anything good except for this reason. In the last analysis, satisfying experience is the only sort of thing that arouses in me the judgment of approval; though it is not necessarily true that every form of satisfaction is thus approved, since there may be some counteracting cause.

It is also to be noticed that, as implied in the definition, good is a characteristic attributed to an object of thought, and not a mere feeling as an existent. An experience may *be* good, may have the quality, that is, which causes us to pronounce the judgment; but we have not sufficiently covered the case by simply 'feeling good.' When we are merely feeling pleasure, we are not in the state of mind which calls it good; that is a later experience. We must stand off and approve it, make it the object of an approving

judgment, before the word has any appropriateness; it does not seem to represent an immediate description of feeling quality, like pleasantness, but a reflective quality. Accordingly the statement, 'pleasure is good,' goes beyond the statement, 'pleasure is pleasant,' in that it adds to the quality of pleasantness recognized as the essence of the experience itself another fact, namely, that it arouses pleasant or approving thoughts. Unless I am deceiving myself, this offers a way of escape from Mr. Moore's main criticism. When I say that pleasure (or any other substitute that may be proposed) is good, I am not, in the first instance, to be understood as meaning that pleasure is a *definition* of good, but that pleasure is a *case* of good; the further meaning then will be that, over and above its pleasantness, it is the object of a judgment of approval. We have no disposition to say in turn that the *approval* is good, in the sense in which we say that pleasure is good. We do not for the moment think of the approval, or its pleasantness, at all. We do think of the original pleasantness as good, but we are able to do so only because we are in a certain attitude of mind to it which is not its own object, but only, if at all, the object of a subsequent thought; and this last is not itself a case of value judgment, but one of plain matter of fact. But now for a real definition, naturally we should turn the sentence around, and make 'good' its subject. Good then will be defined, not as some particular object of approval, or as our approval of it, but as *any*thing which we approve,—the abstract character, that is, of calling forth approval. 'Is this good?', Mr. Moore says, is a different state of mind from 'Is this pleasant, or desired, or approved?' Now, of the first two terms, I have myself maintained that this is true. 'Is this good?' *is* a different state of mind from, 'Is this pleasant or desired?'; for it involves not only the pleasantness, or relation to desire, but also the way I judge this. So, too, in both cases, though I may hold that I should never make the judgment apart from such a quality in the object, I also grant that not in every case does the presence of the quality call forth the judgment; and this again gives point to the distinction between the two forms of question. But I cannot feel that 'approved' stands on just the same footing. When I ask what I *mean* by

calling a thing good, other than this fact of its ability to constrain my approving judgment, I am unable to discover any answer. I may desire a thing, and at the same moment refuse to call it good; but I do not see how I can *approve* a thing, and at the same moment refuse to call it good. There is indeed still a possible meaning to the question, 'Is this thing which I approve *really* good?'; but it is a different, and, I think, not a relevant one. The meaning is: On continued reflection, and further experience, shall I find it *retaining* my approval? But this only calls attention to the fact that my judgments of good no more than my judgments of truth are infallible; they may need to be corrected. But I could not correct them if I did not know in terms of my present attitude of assent what good means. The very question implies that *so long* as I approve a thing, it is for me good; and if the name ever ceases to apply, it will be because my attitude has changed.[1]

[1] Here it may be worth while repeating what I said above in the text, that when I declare that goodness is the quality of exciting approval, I do *not* mean that the meaning of good can be reduced to a particular fact of approval. Mr. Moore devotes some time to showing that *what* we think, when we think a thing good, is not *that* we prefer, or approve it. With this I am entirely in accord. When I think about an object's goodness, I am thinking precisely about that goodness, and not about my thought of it. So I agree that it is false to say that we should never know a thing was good unless we *knew* that we approved it, though I doubt very much whether in that case we should ever be able to *understand* our judgment philosophically. But when Mr. Moore goes on to call it still more 'utterly false' to suppose that we cannot distinguish the fact that a thing is good from the fact that we prefer (or, as I should rather substitute, approve) it, he would appear to be obscuring a distinction of some importance. I cannot of course expect to define goodness except by glancing back at actual value judgments; and when I do this, I discover, as I think, that they did involve approval. But in defining good in terms of approval, I am not identifying it with a particular psychological feeling of approval; I am defining it through the abstract content I find in the approval situation. Distinguish this abstract intellectual content from the psychological existence of a particular judging experience, and it seems to me that we can say, indeed are bound to say, that in the former sense the general notion of good cannot be separated from the notion of approval, though it can be distinguished from a particular case of approval, about which last I intend to pass no judgment at all. I can distinguish the content of my judgment from the existence of my judgment; but *I* cannot distinguish the content of the judgment, when I try to understand it, from an abstract reference to approval, except in the sense that this is something which I discover by a later analysis, instead of its being present to the intellectual consciousness in the original act. But if I am compelled to leave out of a description everything that I discover through reflection, I hardly see how psychology, at any rate, can stay in business.

Consider, then, a little further, the two statements, 'Good is that which is capable of satisfying desire,' and 'Good is that which calls forth my approval'; just what is there in the second statement not present in the first, that can be supposed to affect the meaning of 'good'? While, as I hold, nothing could justify its title to the name which did not satisfy desire, it does not seem to be the case that everything which satisfies desire is good. Apparently I may condemn an act even at the moment when I recognize that I am impelled to it by desire. And yet after all, so far as I can determine, approval adds nothing to the objective content of the thought. This still seems to be capable of being put adequately in terms of desire-satisfaction. Accordingly, the only alternative I see is this, that the additional ingredient in goodness is the peculiar tang or flavor which comes from the way in which satisfaction appeals to me, not when I feel it, but when I *think* it, and which must be located therefore in that 'pleasantness of the thought' which constitutes approval. I say that this is no new objective content, for the approval-pleasure does not exist as a quality of the object. And yet I feel that if I separate it altogether from my idea of goodness, something fundamental has been lost. When I envisage the full meaning of the word 'good,' I find myself demanding that it should have this feeling effect upon me. It is not enough to recognize intellectually the fact of satisfaction; the fact must somehow appeal to me favorably, when I recognize it, if it is to have *value*. And I refuse to admit that this denies objectivity to goodness, and identifies it with bare feeling. It is not, in the first place, mere approval, but the approval of *something*; and this something has an objective content which is open to testing. The mere fact that I approve it does not show therefore that it ought to be approved. The judgment that a thing is good, presupposes that it will satisfy desire, which rests not with my approval merely, but with the nature of things; so that I can ask intelligibly whether it is after all *really* good,—will actually have, that is, the effect which I suppose when I give it my approval. More particularly, does this possibility rest upon one special presupposition,—the existence of a certain determinate character to

human nature. When we ask whether a given approval is justified, almost always there is in the background of our mind the reference to a standard human constitution as the basis of all possible satisfaction; believing this to exist in some form, and to act as a steadier and corrector of our judgments, we may condemn another man's approval of the moment because we have reason to think that in the long run its object will not turn out really satisfying. But more than this can be said. I think we feel also that justified approval somehow stands for a character to reality not limited to the mere correctness of our anticipation of psychological consequences in the form of pleasure; it implies a confidence that the way things appeal to human nature is fundamental and central in reality, and can be counted on, when followed cautiously, not to lead us astray. But this estimation of the significance of the feeling in the scheme of things, or any other explanation, does not do away with the feeling itself; good would not have the same meaning in our lives, if it were a mere intellectual judgment, which it has by being a judgment plus a feeling attitude toward the object of the judgment.

Possibly my position may be made clearer by comparison with another and related concept. 'True,' if I may be allowed to presuppose without justification the definition which appears to me valid, may be taken to have a certain objective meaning, —the correspondence between idea and reality. But here also there seems to be something which the definition leaves out, and that is the fact of *belief;* to try to get the full significance of the word 'true' without a reference to that experience of assent, and confidence, and a mind at rest, which primarily is a state of feeling, seems as impossible as to get the full sense of the word 'good' without reference to approval. It appears to me that the parallel is a close one; that as the objective content of true, or correspondence, is to the feeling of belief, so the objective content of good, or capacity for desire-satisfaction, is to the feeling of approval. And as approval postulates implicitly confidence in a community between reality and the way we feel about it, so belief postulates a community between reality and the way we think about it. The important difference is, that mere corre-

spondence between idea and reality does not constitute the satisfaction of a desire, and so we do not, directly and necessarily, approve of it and call it good; and I should hesitate therefore to call the true a form of the good. Truth *seeking* may be good for further reasons, or the pleasure of speculative activity may be good immediately; but trueness by itself satisfies no desire, and what we recognize as true may either be approved, or disliked, or an object of complete indifference.

Now if I have made at all clear what I mean so far, I may go on to a further problem. I have already left myself a way of distinguishing between desires which are good, and desires which, quite conceivably, may be bad. Since good requires not simply the satisfaction of desire, but also that this gratification be approved, it is not at all impossible, even though satisfaction *per se* be always good, that there may be further reasons to lead me, when I come to think about some satisfaction in particular, to disapprove it. Such a complication is involved in the claim that good is in its intention objective; it is not enough that we do approve, but there are certain things which we *ought* to approve whether we do or not. Just what are we to make of this?

Let me say first that I shall proceed on the assumption that the point of the query has changed, and that instead of asking, What is goodness?, we are now asking, What is *the* good? It is only here, so far as I see, that we come within the ethical sphere in the narrower sense. The ethical problem has to do, not merely with the recognition of the quality of goodness, but with a comparison of various claimants to the title of the good; it involves, that is, the notion not merely of 'good,' but of 'better.' A man enjoys a simple experience of pleasure, say the pleasure of taste. I do not see but that he can look back upon this, approve it, and call it good, without any reference to a better at all. It is because he can judge, not only that various things are good, but that there are different degrees of goodness, that the ethical problem arises. What is then the content of the word 'better'?

As I see it, there are three possibilities. One is, that 'better' means simply 'more of it,' and that the ethical question is therefore purely a quantitative one. Another is, that there is a

difference also of quality, and that this difference is a new intellectual content *sui generis;* this would appear to make necessary some revision of the definition of good if it is to meet ethical needs. The third is, that quality is something real, and distinguishable from quantity, but that it can be understood without adding anything essentially new to our previous results.

Now, to take the first alternative, while quantitative differences are undoubtedly highly important for us practically, I cannot see that by themselves they are competent to raise the strictly ethical question. We doubtless do as a matter of fact prefer more good to less; but I do not see, on the purely quantitative basis, why we *ought* to prefer it, or why such a preference is morally right. The most clearsighted attempt to connect the idea of obligation with quantitative good is that of Professor Sidgwick, whose ethical theory is based on the self evidence of certain propositions which are quantitative in their nature. But consider such a proposition as that more good is always better than less good. The statement *might* mean only this, that more good contains a larger quantity of good than less good. This is of course an identical proposition; but it is not such a purely quantitative meaning that it is supposed to have. What we really need to mean is, that more good is better in the sense that it ought always to be aimed at. But to this I should raise two difficulties. First, I am not at all sure that it is always true. Suppose I have a choice between a weaker and an intenser pleasure,—say between eating an orange which I like, and an apricot which I don't greatly care for. I am not arguing that I will take the apricot, for clearly that is not the case; I only say that I do not see that I am in the slightest degree under obligations to take the orange, though by failing to do so I am reducing by so much the content of good in the universe.[1] What the proposition ought to mean, in order to escape the charge of being a merely analytic one, is that to *choose* a greater good is better than to choose a lesser one,—that is, we ought always to do it. As I say, I do not see that this is always true; but even

[1] If it is a matter of choosing a less instead of a greater good for some one else, there may be a question whether the same thing holds; but this simply calls attention to the fact that it is not the self-evident quantitative statement which is involved.

if it were true it would not serve our purpose. For to say that it is better, is to imply just the qualitative difference which we are trying to avoid; it is not that there is more good produced, but that the man who chooses the greater quantity is qualitatively a better sort of man than the other.

The question comes down, therefore, to the meaning to be assigned to *qualitative* differences. Now the claim that quality is an intellectual content *sui generis*, affects me in much the same way as the similar claim made for good itself; I cannot seem to get concretely any real sense of its meaning. The clearest thing I seem able to say about qualitative superiority is that, even though I do not prefer it, I *ought* to; and consequently it might be maintained, with Mr. Rashdall, that better means simply 'what we ought to prefer.' But while I might admit that 'ought' represents an irreducible *feeling*, I cannot see that it represents an irreducible intellectual content. To say that the better is that in which I perceive intellectually the quality of 'oughtness' or 'rightness,' appears to me, I must confess, a purely verbal statement; it conveys to me no sense at all of what the quality may be.

Where shall we look, then, for a more positive account of what is involved in the perception of the better, or of qualitative superiority? In spite of the obloquy that has fallen on the head of Mill, it nevertheless seems to me that he is on the road to a true answer when he makes quality dependent somehow on the mere fact of the preference of experts. Consider for a moment the sentence: "It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied." One can easily imagine that the life of a well-cared-for, healthy pig,—granted that his nervous system is sufficiently delicate to make his pleasures genuinely pleasant to him,—is a distinctly enviable one from the standpoint of an undiscriminating pleasure philosophy. It perhaps comes as near being one continuous round of enjoyment, unhampered by mental or spiritual cares, as it is easy to conceive. And yet I imagine it very doubtful whether the unhappiest of human beings ever genuinely desired to be the most fortunate and contented of pigs. He may unhesitatingly choose to die to escape his troubles;

but that he still would not choose death if he had the alternative of being turned into a pig, even an educated and happy pig, I imagine would be hard to disprove satisfactorily. Or take a less extreme case. Many men think, perhaps truly, that childhood was the happiest part of their lives, and they express the sentimental wish that they might once more be transported back into those more felicitous days. But if they actually had the choice, how many would be likely to avail themselves of it? Again, it might perhaps be a question whether artistic development is always accompanied by an increase in the bulk of pleasure one gets from æsthetic objects. A very crude taste may be the source of a very intense pleasure, whereas it often seems as if the growth of critical ability were apt to be marked by a diminution in the genuineness of enjoyment, and the substitution of a rather cold and passionless pleasure of the intellect. But even if he were convinced that there was thus a loss of freshness and vigor in the life of feeling, no critic would be willing to give up his hardly acquired sophistication, and regain intensity of feeling at the expense of having to go back to an uncultivated taste for what he now regards as artistic atrocities.

The ground for this seems evident. It is not that we simply want pleasure, of any and every sort, or even intense and long-continued pleasure, but we want certain *kinds* of pleasure; and what these are is largely settled for us by the requirements of our constitution. Men, most men that is, are not constituted like pigs, and therefore they cannot really wish themselves into pigs. If they really *were* pigs they might actually have a pleasanter time of it; but that implies that they already are different from what they are. In deciding whether they want a pig's happiness, on the contrary, it is assumed that the motives on which they judge are the motives of their actual present nature; in imagining themselves changed, they have to imagine in terms of what appeals to them now; and if a pig's happiness does not awake in them a responsive chord, but rather a sense of degradation and disgust, they cannot really wish themselves enjoying it. For them now, as they judge, it wouldn't really be enjoyment. In a general way they want happiness, and if they do not stop

to analyze it may seem to them that any happiness will do; but when they come to specify, as they have to do when the time for practical decision arrives, they discover that what they want is their *own kind* of happiness, not that of some other being; the happiness they really crave is the particular brand which meets their organic needs, and not abstract pleasure in general.

II.

The conclusion of the previous discussion was this: that the only reason discoverable to start from as a basis for the recognition of qualitative differences, in the sense that certain things which meet the abstract definition of good in that they are pleasurable, or objects of desire, are nevertheless considered as lower in quality, or even positively bad, is the facts of the human constitution, which determines what kinds of pleasure are really preferred. We may indeed say that pleasure as such is always and necessarily good, meaning that if we could abstract the feeling from all the circumstances of its appearance, we should find it calling forth the recognition of goodness. But practically we do not, and perhaps cannot, think of it thus abstractly. I do not think of pure feeling tone in the pig, which could never stand alone; I think of guzzling and wallowing; and in view of what I have discovered about the capacities of human enjoyment, this fills me with something of disgust, and I say that although I approve of pleasure, I do not approve of that kind of pleasure, which wouldn't really be pleasure for me as a human being. Assuming, then, that the source of the recognition of 'higher' is something in the makeup of human nature which affects our feelings of approval and disapproval, it remains to ask whether we can say anything further as to what this is.

Suppose we start with a case in particular. It would, I imagine, be pretty generally held that man's intellectual nature is higher than his sensual nature, and that if he doesn't prefer intelligent to merely sensual pleasures, at least he ought to, and it is the worse for him. How are we to justify such a judgment?

One answer might be that intelligence is a power peculiar to man, whereas the senses are what he shares with the brutes.

And it is pretty clear that such a consideration does not uncommonly influence human judgments about higher and lower. We tend to prize things in proportion as we do not share them with others, and what is less esoteric we incline in comparison to despise. But it does not seem to be at all clear that this judgment is capable of being justified on reflection. After all, it would not be difficult to make out a case for the thesis that only that which is widely shared is properly human; and the contrary judgment is in detail on so many occasions due so obviously to a narrow and snobbish spirit, that it casts doubt on the principle itself. Even if it has an element of truth, at least it needs a much exacter statement before it can be accepted.

A more defensible claim would probably be that we regard that as higher in human nature which is more inclusive. This would lend itself readily enough to the preference for intellect over sense. It seems to me very doubtful whether this last means that we judge a life devoted to thought to be higher necessarily than one of intelligence brought to bear more directly on the material of the sense world. As a personal ideal, some would prefer it, and some would not; and I am inclined to think there would be the same lack of agreement in judgments about its intrinsic merits. But if you ask about the difference between a merely sensuous or passionate, and an intelligent, pursuit of any course whatever, there would hardly be much difference of opinion; and it is at least plausible to interpret this in terms of the wider range of life which intelligence opens up, and the added possibilities of enjoyment and achievement.

That this consideration has some part to play in our judgment is clear; but whether it settles the main problem is debatable. It is, it may be noticed first, still a quantitative judgment, a matter of more or less, and so shares in any doubt that may be raised about the moral obligatoriness of the quantitatively greater. We might, and frequently do, merely prefer the more to the less, while nevertheless approving the latter so far as it goes. Furthermore, it does not seem perfectly clear how far such a form of judgment will carry us. There are situations where we seem bound to raise the question of higher and lower that cannot

easily be reduced to quantitative ones. Take the former illustration: if we set out to compare the life of sense enjoyment with the life of speculative thought in the narrower sense, which is the higher? In quantitative terms,—terms, say, of 'fulness of life,'—the advantage is at least not so obviously now on the side of intellect; if the life of the sensualist is narrow, so also, in other directions, is that of the scholar. And I am not certain that by everybody the latter ideal would be really approved in comparison. If then, as seems to be the case in spite of the quantitative uncertainty, the commoner judgment would still be that the scholar represents the higher qualities, we might be led to look for something other than 'fulness of life' to account for this. But now take a different case, and compare the life of the intellect with that of simple goodness. It clearly is true, again, that *intelligent* goodness is judged better by everybody than mere good feeling and good intentions; but is the man of mere intellect, who also is selfish and unfeeling, judged higher than the simple-minded man with a good heart? I cannot feel at all sure that there would be any approach to unanimity here, or even that a given man will be entirely clear about it in his own mind. But if we talk in quantitative terms, there will not be very much doubt perhaps that the former is in some real sense the 'bigger' man.

Now this suggests another formula that might be advanced, perhaps an addition to, perhaps only a correction of the previous one. It might be said that 'better' is equivalent to a thing's cosmic significance,—the part it plays, and the extent of its influence on the affairs of the world. This represents an actual and more or less useful form of judgment. We do rank men by their 'bigness.' When we are comparing men in the same general line of life, it is possible to do this with approximate accuracy. One man is a greater poet, a greater thinker, a greater general than another; he has, that is, a greater ability in a given direction, the ability being tested by results actual or possible. When it comes to comparing men in different lines, judgment is decidedly more tentative. Which was the greater man, Napoleon or Beethoven, Kant or Gladstone?—it is not obvious that the

question is a very fruitful one. But in so far as it can be answered at all, its meaning would seem to be in terms of the extent and importance of the effects of the man upon the world. It is intelligible to ask whether the results of Gladstone's work were as far-reaching and significant as those of Kant, though in view of the very complex nature of the question it is not certain that a man would show good sense in raising it.

But what I wish to maintain is, that while this is so, and while relative greatness or bigness,—the ability to do things beyond the ordinary,—in so far calls forth our admiration for its qualities, this is still not ethical admiration, and the judgment is not one of the qualitatively higher. Otherwise I should have to say that in so far the bigger or more able man is ethically the better man, which I do not think we tend to say at all. However much I admire the superior ability which brings about greater results, I do not feel that I, who have less ability, or ability in a different direction, ought to aim at these results; and when I see another man with modest talents who does his best, ethically I honor him equally with his more gifted competitor, though my intellect recognizes that he is intrinsically a smaller man.

The only positive suggestion I have to make with reference to specifically moral quality is this: that we cannot say we ought to do a certain thing, or that it is qualitatively better, or right, unless our attitude toward the alternative choice is one of actual disapproval. For the peculiarity of the judgment of 'better' in the qualitative sense, with the feeling of oughtness that accompanies it, I am able to discover no general reason except the bare fact that there is aroused in me in connection with it some feeling of repugnance. So far as I can see, this represents the difference between quantitative and qualitative judgments. If I do not feel a positive dislike to the thought of the alternative, then I simply like the other more; and while this means that I prefer it, it does not mean that I feel that I ought necessarily to prefer it. And for this repugnance I find no single cause, but rather several. Why, for example, do I feel that sensuality is lower than intellect, or that piggishness is not a human virtue? Primarily, so far as I can judge, out of an æsthetic disgust.

With a certain refinement of taste, which I find is so generally capable of being developed under proper conditions that it justifies its place in my conception of human nature, piggishness arouses an immediate feeling of dislike. If another man does not feel this, I still say that he ought to, and that I am right and he wrong. I mean, probably, at least in part, that there is that latent in him which, if only it could get a chance to develop, would lead him to feel the same way that I do. Of course in a sense this is a matter of faith, based on my knowledge of the possibilities of human culture, and my readiness to assume that all beings in the likeness of a man can be trusted to have in fundamentals much the same make-up. If on the contrary any such being really had the instincts of a pig, as is always conceivable, I should cease to say that he ought to feel differently, just as, if I am sensible, I do not blame the real pig for his preferences, but leave him to his own conscience and his Maker. But I still say that sensuality is low, because it is *my* understanding of what human nature is that determines my notion of higher and lower; and I still believe that my preference here represents essential man, and that he who has only the instinctive possibilities of an animal is a man only in outward semblance.

There is a second form of emotional revolt which may enter into my feeling judgments of qualitative difference, and that is the instinctive objection to injustice or cruelty, or what may be called moral indignation. It is this which in particular seems to me to cast doubt upon the supreme rank of intellectual eminence, or of culture, as a form of human good. In comparing this with the virtues of simple human kindliness, when each stands by itself without the other, I think I find myself in doubt about the outcome, until I begin to take notice of its obtuseness to the righting of human wrongs outside the field of what effects its special interests; and then I find myself tending to pronounce the judgment that, if I am forced to assign a relative rank to pure intellect, and the humane virtues, the latter are the higher. I recognize that here it is still less certain that everybody will pronounce the same judgment; but in case of difference, I find an explanation in the relatively weaker character of the emotion

of resentment in the man who dissents from my judgment, or his failure to take stock intellectually of the whole relevant situation. In so far as the latter is the case, I reinforce my own judgment by thinking that he also will come round to it when he enlarges his survey; in the former case I simply say, again, that my attitude is the more truly human one, and has the future on its side.

There is a third form of repugnance which I seem to be able to distinguish from both of these. It is more peculiarly an intellectual emotion, and might be called the dislike of, or contempt for, that which is petty and unworthy of human powers. That we should be able to make judgments about relative importance, is easy to understand; indeed, this is just the quantitative judgment which I was speaking of previously. What I am at present calling attention to is the possibility that this may lend itself also to a judgment of qualitative difference, by the addition, to the mere judgment of more or less, of an active feeling of dislike toward the idea of the quantitatively inferior. As a matter of fact, I think that this frequently coöperates with other repugnances, and sometimes acts alone, to produce a judgment of moral quality. It is indeed a very unsafe feeling to follow blindly, since it so readily allies itself with our natural inclination to be snobs. But the feeling of contempt for the narrow and petty is in itself surely not incapable of justification. So a part of the objection to sensualism is, doubtless, a recognition of the insignificant character of its objects of ambition, in view of all the many interesting things that might be done in the world; the result does not look big enough to justify intellectually our practical claim for its supreme importance. So of self absorption in any form; when we consider it impartially, in a cool moment, then, in addition to the indignation to which some of its effects on other people may give rise, there is also a feeling of its trivialness as an end; what is the sense of my being wrought up about my private concerns in a universe which contains so many other things that dwarf them. Here is where I should be inclined to place Professor Sidgwick's principles. The intellectual judgment that the greater is more than the less, especially

when it is applied to the superiority of the general good over what is just mine, seems to me to get its ethical significance only as it calls up the judgment of triviality; and the trivial differs from the less precisely in the emotional feeling of dislike which accompanies it. Of the feeling, one not unimportant ingredient is in a special sense intellectual,—the dislike which a reasonable being has of falling below the standard of impartiality and intellectual fairness, as he would do were he to exalt the claims of one unit over the—in the eyes of reason—equal claims of others.[1]

If, therefore, I am asked to pronounce on the relative place of intellect and feeling in the ethical judgment, I should attempt to answer somewhat as follows: There is of course no ethical judgment without the exercise of the intellect; and our more complex and matured ones are shot through with intellectual elements. What I shall consider good in the concrete depends on my whole experience of life; my possibilities of appreciation, both positive and negative, represent a progressive refinement of taste which could not go on apart from more and more subtle intellectual distinctions also. Nevertheless, after I have made all these distinctions, there is something still which must not be left outside the picture; and that is the way in which the thing appeals to my feeling. Without this, the 'value' quality in the 'good' and the 'ought,' which distinguishes them from a mere judgment of fact or truth, would not be accounted for. And this emotional element goes back, apparently, not to intellect, but to our given constitution with its emotional possibilities; even the 'intellectual' elements which I have just noticed are in terms,

[1] I might add that this same condemnation of the petty may explain also why many forms which this very judgment itself takes are condemned. Why is it that the man who is over-ready to despise as petty other interests and standards than his own,—to condemn poetry, say, because it is not science, or the man of quiet tastes because he is not strenuous and eager to mix in 'big' affairs, or the student or artist because he isn't enthusiastic over uplift,—makes upon us the unsatisfactory impression that he does? For the reason, I think, that his own judgment shows narrowness and provincialism; the more our insight and our interests broaden, the more we are able to recognize the significance of things for which we may have ourselves no special bent, and the more we see how unintelligent therefore is the common disposition to think that no one understands how to live except ourselves.

not of specific intellectual truths perceived by the mind in the normal exercise of its functions, but of the emotional possibilities of our general intellectual constitution and its interests. I can quite readily conceive a being who should, intellectually, look upon an act of cruelty as I do, see what it means, and what are its consequences, and still have no repugnance to it; in that case I do not see what he could mean by calling it bad, or in saying that a life spent in cruelty is intrinsically worse than one spent in benevolence. Or, on the positive side, I can conceive a being contemplating artistic excellence, and feeling no sentiment of approval; in that case it would be meaningless to call it good. And since for all I know human beings might differ indefinitely in both their instinctive approvals and disapprovals, whereas it is less easy to conceive of them as differing in their judgments of intellectual truth when they have the same data before them, I am forced to say that the judgment of goodness is determined, in the end, not by the perception of an intellectual content or relationship, but by a certain feeling attitude toward a content, which possesses indeed many intellectual elements; and when this whole situation is reflected on, it gives me what I mean by good. Similarly of the ought: feeling seems to be necessary if we are to have that recognition of a qualitative difference which enables us to go beyond the good, and speak of the better, or the right. So far as I can at present see, the ought is reducible in the end to a sense of dislike which serves as an inhibitive force, and pulls us away from the thing to which desire may possibly be leading us,—a situation only made possible indeed by our ability as rational beings to free ourselves from the sway of momentary passion, and look at this in its wider bearings, but which yet would have no motive power were not the wider end itself backed by feeling. And it has its intellectual justification in the fact that we find it a persistent force in human nature, a sort of feeling which reflection, and further experience, tend to encourage us in; its objectivity consists in this recognition, plus the general faith which we have, also by natural endowment, that to the requirements of human nature the universe is somehow fitted.

But such a statement will fail to carry quite its right meaning,

unless we keep in mind a distinction at which I have already hinted. What this is, might be suggested by a certain peculiarity in connection with our judgment of the good. Not infrequently we have occasion to say that we approve a good while yet we do not desire it for ourselves; and if this is true, it might seem again to raise the question whether after all a quality which we approve without desire does not come nearer to an intellectual fact than an emotional. I think this may be met by noting that there are really two different kinds of judgment that we pass about the good, and that one of them is more purely intellectual than the other. Usually, I think, it is assumed that our conception of the totality of good, or of the Summum Bonum, is identical with our notion of the end which appeals to us as personally, our duty, or our ideal. But there are difficulties in such an assumption. Concretely, it must be evident that not every man's good, as his practical ideal and goal, can be identically the same; and if each man's different good is the Summum Bonum, there is no Summum Bonum. Or it may be asked whether I really want for myself, or regard as my duty, everything that I approve and admire as good; and it seems clear, again, that I do not.

To meet this, I may draw again on the distinction between the satisfactoriness of an experience, and the satisfactoriness of the approving judgment. Now I shall, other things being equal, naturally feel approval of that which satisfies my own desires; and if I were no more than an animal this is as far as my judgment of approval would go. But it is actually not limited to this; and the reason is, simply, that I among other things am also a rational being. And by this I mean something quite definite; I mean that I am capable of separating my intellect temporarily from the pursuit of other ends more personal to me, and of looking at things impartially, just for the sake of seeing them as they are. I can separate the idea of good, for example, from the particular things which seem good to me because I want them for myself, and, noting that satisfaction of desire is their common character, can generalize this, and talk of good, not as that which satisfies *my* desire, but as that which satisfies *desire*. Accordingly my

neighbor's satisfaction also will come under the head of the good, though what my neighbor wants may for me have no attraction whatsoever. It may perhaps be asked whether I am doing anything more here than classing this intellectually under the term good; am I really approving it also? And it is notorious that as a matter of fact mankind is not in its natural state greatly inclined to do this last. Sympathy with tastes other than one's own is rather the exception than the rule. But this is due, pretty plainly, to our provincialism and failure in impartiality; the more a man develops rationally, the more capacity he shows for putting himself in the place of others, and sympathizing with their differing modes of life. And so, since he recognizes the intrinsic goodness in satisfied desire, he will come to look with approval upon whatever satisfies desire; and he will do this primarily through a sympathetic enlargement of intellectual vision. But there will be one important limitation. Good in the large may not all of it be *his* good, but it can hardly be *inconsistent* with his good, and still call forth his approving judgment. For it is hardly rational for me to judge two things to be good which are mutually repellent. Consequently we are led to define the Summum Bonum as the sum of the interests and satisfactions of all sentient creatures, not in so far as they possess some one identical content, but in so far as they are *capable of living together harmoniously in the same world.* Unless there is a clash, I do not see that I am justified in condemning or despising the life interests of any being, in so far as I can assume that for him they represent the demands of his particular nature. Certainly to any one who has ever had a canine friend, the natural life even of the animal may be a constituent of the sum of good; and it seems a little snobbish to object even to the pig's happiness so long as it is a literal pig that is in question.

Now, if this is true, it would appear that there is a difference between the ideal of the individual, and the Summum Bonum; and this is a point which both theoretically and practically is worth considering. The Summum Bonum, or the greatest sum of good, does not represent the personal ideal, or what I ought individually to aim at. My duty is determined by my particular

constitution; to determine it, self-knowledge is what I need most of all. The tendency has always been to set up one single ideal, and to impose it upon everybody. The last lesson which the good man has to learn,—and it is not always that he learns it,—is that a personal ideal cannot be imposed apart from the particular wants and limitations of the individual concerned. And, on the side of *self*-imposed ideals, an enormous amount of distress and waste effort has been due to the feeling that we ought to aim at something which we may admire, apart from the question whether we are personally fitted for its attainment, or capable of taking real satisfaction in the life for which it calls. Objectively, I am bound in so far to admire the man more, and regard him as the bigger man, who is capable, we will say, of a double amount of work; but it does not follow that I ought myself to endeavor to work twice as hard. If I am a lesser man, if I only have energy enough to do half the amount with ease and satisfaction, and if to speed myself up would only make me worried and unhappy, I ought not to do this simply because I see that objectively it is more admirable. In other words, to discover my own duty I must study my own constitution and desires; and the only final test that I am succeeding is, not consistency with some concrete objective standard capable of being determined for everyone alike by reasoning it out, but my own satisfaction and assured content in the outcome. There may be individuals who find it a demand of their nature that they should aim directly at the sum total of good, and have this constantly as a motive in their minds. They are needed, probably, in order to keep one important aspect of the situation before us. But most people, it seems clear, will do better in the end to follow out their own particular interest because it is theirs, glancing only occasionally at the totality of things, and then usually to make sure that they are offering no obstruction, rather than with the view positively of enriching the general content. For not only do calculations in such vast terms quickly become unmanageable,—Mr. Moore, for example, from his own point of view, seems logical in his scepticism about the possibility of any rational conclusions in the realm of practical

ethics,—but the habit of doing things, not because they are interesting to do, but because they are needed to raise the total of good in the universe, is pretty certain to lead to priggishness and an undue sense of the importance of oneself and one's efforts; while the unwillingness to rest satisfied with cultivating one's own garden is apt also to make us too ready to interfere with other people who may want to cultivate theirs. It is at least arguable that the best way of increasing the sum of good in the world is to fix it so that nobody, not myself even, shall be able to bother seriously his neighbors, and then go off and leave each man to the task for which, as we judge from the satisfaction he takes in it, nature has designed him. I ought indeed, under penalty of being adjudged small and petty in my aims, and of growing myself dissatisfied with them, to be assured at the start that they offer some contribution to the general stock of good outside myself. A rational and objectively minded being can hardly be content with a life which does not take its significant place in the larger scheme of things. But having so justified myself, I shall commonly do better to take this largely for granted in the future, and occupy myself with the things I like to do, rather than indulge in quantitative calculations about the social importance of my efforts;[1] I shall find a sufficient field for positive and intentional contributions in particular if I make it a rule to keep my eyes open for chances to do an incidental kindness to the individuals with whom I happen to have personal dealings.

A personal ideal, then, is far more closely and immediately bound down to interest and desire than the Summum Bonum. On the positive and inclusive side, this last is, as I have said, primarily intellectual in its nature. The concept of totality is quantitative, and therefore a concept of reason; so also the notion of harmony is rational, and the process of determining how this harmony can be secured represents a rational problem. But

[1] To find a life which shall possess weight and significance through its contribution to the larger life of the world, and so escape self-condemnation on the ground of triviality, while at the same time, by being *my* end, and appealing to my natural likings, it gains motivation and vividness of interest, would seem to be about as far as we can go in setting forth the ideal in general terms.

even here we cannot overlook the feeling side; and this is especially evident when we come to the question of excluding that which breaks the harmony. Shut out either of the two contestants, and reason will tell you about the character of the result; but how is reason to decide which is to be excluded? No matter which you leave out, the resulting harmony would be equally intelligible. I see no answer except to say that when it does come to a conflict, each man must follow his own sense of approval; and I cannot see but that this is an ultimate fact of his nature, resting upon the assumption that the totality of good must not be incompatible with *his* ends. That good should go beyond the ends which he personally is concerned with securing, is what I have been saying. He may take an objective interest in a great many things which he is not called upon actively to further; it is just the nature of man as a rational being that he can find the world interesting even where he has no personal axe to grind. But it is not clear that he is likely to take more than a very lukewarm interest in these things except as they do *indirectly* contribute to the same sort of ends as those to which he is personally committed and if they actually interfere with these ends, I find myself unable to imagine him approving. Accordingly, the limit to the possibility of purely impartial and rational construction would seem to be found in the necessity for every man that harmony shall not sacrifice the particular interests which he finds his own nature demanding,—interests which are set by his constitution, and which, with the feeling of satisfaction that is their only attestation, are discovered by experience rather than determined by the perception of intellectual relationships.

And this leads to a final question: What do we mean, in terms of the individual, by the rational life, or the complete life, or the unified life, or the true life,—the life of the *real* self? If we intend to ask, What is this in detail?, then I am led to say again that that is something which is the outcome of experience, and cannot be determined by any exercise of the intellect, though in this experience all sorts of judgments about the world and about ourselves are involved; and that, furthermore, there is no one

rational life, but for each man the outcome will differ, slightly or greatly, in accordance with the difference of emphasis among his impulses and natural springs of desire. But if we mean to ask how we are to determine whether the true issue has been found, then a definite reply can be given; it is by the settled character of our satisfaction with it. All we can do is to experiment; and when we have found a plan of life which actually does leave us content, in which we feel that we are truly finding ourselves, are truly living, without sense of strain, or regret, or conflict, our question is answered in the only way I see how it can possibly be answered decisively. Of course it is to be understood that this is a result for the long run, and not simply for the present moment; and also it is understood that we should be in an open-minded and receptive mood, since otherwise we shall not give the more retiring side of our nature a fair chance. Normally this will mean, supposedly, a fairly inclusive life,—inclusive, that is, of the really fundamental and persistent impulses; since otherwise there is always the danger of a disruption of our settled life from the outbreak of desires for which satisfaction has not been provided. But in special cases it is quite conceivable that a man may be so constituted that a given impulse will not suffer governance, and will refuse to keep within safe channels; and then the only satisfaction may be to hold it under, and try to starve it out. In the nature of the case there can be no general rules to guide us infallibly to the ideal end. This does not mean that reason is wholly at a loss. From a wide acquaintance with human experience we can draw up a statement of probabilities, though this can only be an average statement, and will apply unchanged only as individual men approach the average man. Or we can get closer to the goal in proportion as we have concrete knowledge of an individual nature. But since we cannot know *all* about it, prior to an experience to which we can set no terminus, such an anticipation can only be a hypothesis, subject to indefinite correction. And the correction can only come from life itself. In two ways, therefore, the power of reason is limited. Its material comes from the given facts of man's constitution, which in different

individuals clearly differ at the start, and which cannot be changed, fundamentally, by thinking about them. Of course a rational treatment of our natural dispositions may modify them largely. But that there is a limit to this, the facts of experience seem to show plainly. And, in the second place, the only test of whether we have got the right answer is not strictly an intellectual test, or an appeal to the truth of intellectual or relational judgments, but a feeling test,—the sense of satisfaction which tells us that our action really meets our personal demands. This is not a calculus of pleasures, or any sort of construction through analysis, but a unitary state of being in which the different factors of our lives may experimentally be reduced to a harmony such as no speculative activity of thought can hope, in the practical realm, to achieve.

A. K. ROGERS.

YALE UNIVERSITY.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION; THE FIFTEENTH ANNUAL MEETING, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA, DECEMBER 28–30, 1915.

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY.

THE fifteenth annual meeting of the American Philosophical Association was held at the University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pa., on December 28, 29 and 30, 1915.

In the absence of the Secretary Professor Kemp Smith was appointed Secretary *pro tem.*

The Treasurer's report for the year ending December 31, 1915, was read and accepted, after being audited by Professors Bakewell and Bush. Report follows:

E. G. SPAULDING, SECRETARY AND TREASURER, IN ACCOUNT WITH THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION.

Debit.

Time account, January 1, 1915	$368.90
Check account, January 1, 1915	170.16
Dues received	196.00
Interest on time account to January 1, 1916	11.67
	$746.73

Credit.

Chicago meeting, entertainment	$ 10.40
Secretary's expenses in attending Chicago meeting	79.42
Clerical services	26.28
Stamps and stamped envelopes	23.22
Printing	34.04
Travelling expenses	11.36
Telegrams, etc.	6.86
Stationery	8.01
	$200.09
Total time account, January 1, 1916	380.57
Total check account, January 1, 1916	166.07
	$746.73
Total cash on hand	$546.64

Audited and found correct:

(Signed) C. M. BAKEWELL,
W. T. BUSH.

The following officers were elected for the ensuing year: *President*, Professor A. O. Lovejoy, of Johns Hopkins University; *Vice-President*, Professor E. A. Singer, Jr., of the University of Pennsylvania; *Secretary-Treasurer*, Professor E. G. Spaulding, Princeton University; *Members of the Executive Committee*, to serve two years, Professors A. K. Rogers, of Yale University, and J. B. Pratt, of Williams College.

Upon recommendation of the Executive Committee the following new members were elected: Dr. Albert Edward Avery, of Bryn Mawr College; Dr. Ralph M. Blake, of Princeton University; Professor Edgar Sheffield Brightman, of Wesleyan University; Dr. H. T. Costello, of Columbia University; Professor Ezra B. Crooks, of Randolph-Macon Woman's College; Professor J. Forsythe Crawford, of Beloit College; Professor Carll Whitman Doxsee, of Grove City College; Dr. James H. Dunham, of Hamilton Court, Philadelphia, Pa.; Professor Louis William Flaccus, of the University of Pennsylvania; Professor Herbert P. Patterson, of Dakota Wesleyan University; Dr. Edna Ashton Shearer, of Bryn Mawr College; Dr. Ray Addison Sigsbee, of Princeton University; Dr. Henry Slonimsky, of Johns Hopkins University; Dr. Henry Bradford Smith, of the University of Pennsylvania; Professor Ernest E. Southard, of the Harvard Medical School; Dr. Ernest L. Talbert, of the University of Cincinnati; Dr. Benjamin Van Riper, of Pennsylvania State College; Dr. N. Wiener, of Harvard University. Professor G. H. Howison, of the University of California, was elected an Honorary member.

The recommendation was made by the Executive Committee, and adopted by the association, that a special committee on Academic Tenure and Freedom, to consist of Professors Dewey, Hocking and Lovejoy, be appointed, with the suggestion to next year's committee of the association, that this special committee be made permanent on a tenure of three years under constitutional form; furthermore that this committee be authorized to draw on the treasury for secretarial and travelling expenses.

The recommendation was made by the Executive Committee, and adopted by the association, that a committee be appointed to prepare a minute on the death of Professor Ormond. Professors Creighton, Johnson and Urban were appointed. Professor Royce, further, was requested to present a minute on the death of Mr. C. S. Pearce.

The arrangements for the place and date of the next meeting were referred to the Executive Committee with power.

The appreciation and thanks of the association were expressed to the University of Pennsylvania, and especially to Professors Singer and Newbold, for the generous hospitality shown to visiting members at this meeting.

The papers of Tuesday afternoon and Wednesday morning were read in honor of Professor Josiah Royce, and will be published together in the May number of the PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. The following are abstracts of the other papers read at the meeting.

Respectfully submitted,

(Signed) E. G. SPAULDING,

Secretary.

An Epistemological Eirenicon. W. P. MONTAGUE.

The epistemological problem concerns the relation of the system of things, called objective in the sense that we believe in their reality, to the system of things, called subjective in the sense that they appear in consciousness. The three principal solutions of the problem may be termed, Objectivism, Subjectivism, and Dualism. All three of these solutions are incompatible with demonstrable facts and with one another, and yet they seem to exhaust the field. A way out of the resulting *impasse* can be found by splitting up each of the theories into a pair of propositions, the first members of which pairs are all true and compatible with one another, while the second members are false and incompatible with one another. By this device the epistemological problem can be eirenically solved and each of the three historically and dialectically opposed theories accepted in its revised version as a valid and exhaustive though not exclusive standpoint for viewing the knowledge relation.

Error and Unreality. W. H. SHELDON.

There are two problems in regard to error: the psychological and the metaphysical. The former has been satisfactorily treated; it traces the sources of error, the mental and physical processes that lead to it and constitute it. The latter is relatively independent of the former, and has seldom been squarely faced. It concerns the status of the illusory object. For, apparently, that object is unreal; yet an unreal thing is a *contradictio in adjecto*. It is, yet it is not. We have become so accustomed to this anomaly, however, that it excites no surprise; indeed, most thinkers believe that there is a great deal of unreality in the universe. Passing in review the several extant theories which try to solve this problem, we find only one or two which seem even to realize the paradox, and none which try to

resolve it. In these straits we propose our own solution. Illusory objects are *absolutely real.* They do not contradict the 'real' objects which they are believed to replace; for in the last analysis no *one* entity contradicts *another* entity, the only contradictions are denials; viz., 'A is B' never contradicts 'A is C,' but only 'It is not true that A is B.' The rest of the paper is occupied with the attempt to remove metaphysical prejudices against the view, with the application of the view to specific cases, and with a statement of the beneficial results to metaphysics which, the writer believes, would follow its adoption.

A Revised Causation and Its Implications. H. G. HARTMANN.

We may regard causation, historically, as an attempt to account rationally for (1) change, (2) sequence, (3) invariable sequence.

1. Analyzed, the *antecedent* of a change never consists of less than *two* objects; and, commonly, of many more than two; but *all* objects are never included in any specific change.

Further, if A, B, and C are the objects of a specific cause and E the effect, it remains to add that A, B, and C may also exist with the effect E never coming to pass. Wherein, then does the difference exist between these two manifestations of A, B, and C? My answer is brief: A, B, and C in one grouping are reciprocally 'effective' and in the other 'inert' or 'neutral.' *Why* one and the same group of objects acts thus, no one can tell; *that* they act thus is a commonplace. Causation (change), therefore, has its foundation in the inexplicable, non-sensational property of objects to interact differently or not to interact at all in their varied grouping. As a principle that is ultimate, it denotes an objective pluralism among objects. Change becomes a central problem; for to deny a reality to change, is to deny a reality to causation. The one-and-the-many problem in its bearing upon thinghood also becomes central. The outcome is an emancipation of Epistemology from the leading-strings of psychology and the 'egocentric predicament.'

2. Causation viewed in the light of a sequence presents another distinct problem. For cause and effect 'as a sequence' is one thing and of one foundation; 'cause' as an explanation of a change (an effect) quite another. To seek for a causal 'relation,' therefore, in something *between* the effect and the cause rather than in the multiple objects of a 'cause' is a misplaced effort. It is true that a 'cause' carries us on to its effect; but an 'effect' is also a mere sign for determining the existence of a connection in the objects of a 'cause,' and as such, characterizes the connection as of this or that kind,—chemical,

psychical, or what not. Moreover, the connection is objective. On the other hand, the relation *between* an effect and a cause may be a thing purely subjective in either a Humian or a Kantian conception of the matter. But even here, it can be shown that an objective principle of control enters; namely, the principle that a given set of objects produces but one result. A given effect, therefore, cannot be randomly associated with any object or objects. Hence, where *custom* (Hume) has established one kind of linkage, this principle may itself function to correct custom. And if, upon Kantian ground, we affirm a purely thought-basis for the linkage, the range of thought's dependence upon this empirical basis would still remain an open question.

3. Where causation is characterized as 'an invariable sequence,' the foundation thereof lies in the empirical fact that different objects are not merely unique in their reciprocal behavior, but, for a further inexplicable reason, regularly recurrent in the behavior.

Hindrances to the Teaching of Philosophy. B. C. EWER.

The aims of philosophy are those of guiding human life and of synthesizing facts and principles of science in a unitary view of the universe. The effort to perform these functions by curricular teaching is beset by several hindrances: first, the usual conditions of instruction —large classes, the lecture practice, the abstract form of textbook material—conditions which have been established by custom and by the mechanical necessities of college teaching but which tend to produce perfunctory, superficial work on the part of students; second, the shadow of authority, particularly ecclesiastical authority exerted through the college administration, in restraint of freedom of thought in dealing with philosophical problems; third, an opposing philosophy, mechanistic in character, which is the uncritical presupposition or outgrowth of science, and which is imparted by scientific teachers as ultimate truth. Philosophy as a subject of curricular instruction seems to need a more definite statement of problems, the discussion of these without esoteric technicalities, and a heroic spirit in ascertaining and presenting the truth.

Conscience as Reason and as Emotion. W. K. WRIGHT.

Since the publication of Spencer's *Data of Ethics* many writers have treated of the origin and development of moral conduct and of moral ideas from the evolutionary standpoint. This attitude has tended, especially of late, to view moral evolution in terms of instincts and emotions, as in Westermarck's *Origin and Development of the*

Moral Ideas and in McDougall's *Social Psychology*. Ethical writers of a more traditional type, many of whom call themselves 'rationalists,' vigorously oppose this standpoint. A particularly trenchant attack, which may be taken as typical, and which is directed specifically against McDougall and Westermarck, is furnished by Dr. Hastings Rashdall's *Is Conscience an Emotion?* Rashdall maintains that to make moral judgments emotional in their constitution is to make them irrational and subjective, so that right and wrong become a personal matter, like liking and disliking mustard. This leads to moral skepticism. On the contrary, the consciousness of our objective duty is the most fundamental of our convictions and must be derived from the intellectual part of our nature. It is a self-evident truth, irreducible to emotions, and as intellectually certain as the multiplication table.

In answer to criticisms of this sort it can be said: (1) 'Reason' as used with reference to moral conduct and moral judgments is really as much affective and conative as it is cognitive in its constitution; it is not an exclusively discursive process. (2) McDougall and Westermarck are really showing how 'reason' in the ethical sense arises, in their accounts of how emotions and instincts become rationally organized into sentiments. This reveals their 'objectivity' much better than Rashdall's sort of 'rationalism' can do. (3) For, since the anti-evolutionary rationalist can find no *a priori* maxims that apply without qualification to every moral situation, he can afford little concrete objectivity to his maxims; whereas the evolutionist, by indicating how virtues arise from instincts and emotions and to what extent they are and are not variable, gives them definite and concrete objectivity. (4) In answer to the objection that morality cannot be reduced to something that is not morality, like emotions, it can be said that this is not attempted, but that the evolutionist believes that real light is thrown upon the nature of morality by knowledge of the conditions under which it rises and can be maintained. In favor of the sort of ethics that traces the rational evolution of morality from instincts and emotions, it is claimed that it has the double advantage over Dr. Rashdall's kind of rationalism in both affording more substantial and intelligible objectivity and rationality to the moral consciousness, and of being able to make available for ethical science the latest developments of psychology and anthropology.

The Anti-Intellectualism of Kierkegaard. D. F. SWENSON.

Soren Kierkegaard (1813–1855), a Danish thinker of originality and power, represents an anti-intellectualistic position notable for

precision of terminology, consistency, and the wealth and variety of concrete life-problems which it is made to illuminate. He is perhaps the first modern thinker of rank to perceive that an anti-intellectualist philosophy is not complete without essential recognition of the negative element in communication. He has worked out a logic of communication consistent with his central position, and has given it artistic expression, in various ways, in the form and style of his writings.

The elementary proposition that Reality has characteristics which a knowledge of it cannot as such assimilate, receives further amplification and definition. The following propositions are characteristic:

1. The metaphysical and ontological have no existence; they are, but when they exist, they exist within the esthetic, the ethical, or the religious. No human being exists in metaphysical categories.

2. The static character of conception permeates the whole realm of logic; there are no actual logical transitions. All real transitions take place in the realm of the actual, by means of a leap, and constitute a breach of continuity.

3. The validity of thought in relation to existence does not mean its identity with existence. The particular as such cannot be thought, nor the contingent, nor the actual.

4. A scepticism which attacks the validity of thought can be escaped only through a new point of departure, by an act of will, a leap.

5. Truth, in the sense of positive objective knowledge, is unattainable. All such knowledge (sense-knowledge, history, metaphysics) is either an approximation or a hypothesis. It is not essential, for it does not express the knowing subject's essential condition in existence. Mathematics does not deal with reality, and the relation of the logical to reality is hypothetical.

6. Truth, as essential knowledge, is ethical and ethico-religious knowledge of the self; the only reality which the knower grasps directly is his own ethical reality; all other reality he knows only in the form of possibility, essentially, in the form of an impartial balancing of alternative possibilities.

7. The transition from the ideal (the possible) to the actual, the sense for the historical, is an act of will; it is belief or faith.

8. The Truth is a subjective condition of the individual; to know the Truth (objectively) is to be in error; to be the Truth (subjectively) is to know the Truth.

9. Existence (life) is essentially striving, transition; not for an

unattainable goal, but to realize the individual's own eternal self; at this goal he may constantly arrive, but in it he cannot remain, at rest, as long as he exists.

10. To exist is to solve contradictions, not once for all, or by means of speculative thought, but through passion and pathos. The subjective thinker's passionate interest in himself is the greatest possible antithesis to the objective thinker's lofty disinterestedness; at the same time, the latter, since he nevertheless exists, exists in distraction, and is therefore comical.

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REVIEWS OF BOOKS.

Second Characters, or The Language of Forms. By the Right Honourable ANTHONY, EARL OF SHAFTESBURY. Edited by BENJAMIN RAND. Cambridge: at the University Press, 1914.—pp. xxviii, 182.

It will be remembered that Dr. Rand was the first to follow up the suggestion of the late Professor Fowler, that the Shaftesbury Papers, now deposited in the Record Office at London, would repay a more careful investigation than he had been able to make in the preparation of his volume on Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, published in the popular 'English Philosophers' series. As a result there appeared in 1900 a volume entitled *The Life, Unpublished Letters, and Philosophical Regimen of Anthony, Earl of Shaftesbury*, edited by Dr. Rand. A critical notice of this volume by the present writer appeared in the PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW, Vol. XII, No. 4 (pp. 451 ff.). While the biographical material, though not all strictly new, seemed decidedly worth publishing, the reviewer had certain doubts about the *Philosophical Regimen* (Dr. Rand's translation of the author's title, ÀΣΚΉΜΑΤΑ). Though occupying 272 closely printed pages, this disconnected chain of neo-Stoical reflections cannot by any means be regarded as a treatise or as material throwing any essential light upon Shaftesbury's philosophy. (It should be stated that the work consists of thirty-four brief chapters, on such subjects as "Natural Affection," "Good and Ill," "Reputation," "Character," etc.) It can hardly be that one of the greatest moralists of his time, greater in his influence than in his actual achievement, took very seriously these exercises in the Stoic manner,—an undertaking that would ordinarily suggest that the writer must be a very young man. Both in literary form and in content, they are essentially imitative and not to be compared with the *Characteristics*, in which, underlying the artificial style and the pedantic attempts at sprightliness,—and even when the philosopher is not at his best,—there is much more originality than is likely to be recognized by one who is not familiar with the ethical literature of that time and the following generations. To say, as the editor does: "The Greek slave, the Roman emperor, and the English nobleman must abide the three great exponents of stoical philosophy" (p. xii), is not mere exaggeration; it seems to show a fundamental misconception as to what are the permanently important features of Shaftesbury's moral philosophy.

It is difficult to avoid taking a somewhat similar attitude toward the present undertaking. Dr. Rand has performed a labor of love with the most painstaking fidelity and his editorial work seems to have been even more competent than in the case of the earlier volume; but the newly printed work,—if the four loosely connected essays printed together, for the most part carefully edited reprints of material that had appeared before, can be so called,—does not represent the philosopher at his best. In truth, the only important addition to what had already been published consists wholly of notes and memoranda and was written when the author was practically a dying man. But this is not all. Shaftesbury the philosophical moralist, at any rate when he speaks for himself and does not attempt to reproduce Epictetus or Marcus Aurelius, must always be taken seriously by those who would understand the development of modern ethical theory; Shaftesbury the 'virtuoso' is a much less imposing figure. That the Beautiful and the Good have a profound relationship, one does not need to be a Platonist to admit or contend; to establish the true nature of that relationship, in any really philosophical sense, is a very different matter. Shaftesbury's genius lay in the direction of ethical appreciation and tentative construction; on the other hand, while his ideas of art were by no means wholly conventional, they were so circumscribed by the prevailing neo-classical misconceptions and so complicated with, if not fatally vitiated by, moralistic prepossessions that one is likely to feel, after reading his æsthetic writings, that the problem of the true relation between morality and art is as far as ever from being solved.

The precise relation between the essays included in the present volume and the *Characteristics* may best be stated in the editor's own words in the Introduction. After speaking of the discovery and publication of the *Philosophical Regimen*, he says: "At that time a manuscript volume was also found among the Shaftesbury Papers, containing the plan and fourth treatise of a work intended as a complement to the 'Characteristics,' which was entitled 'Second Characters.' This volume was mostly written in 1712. It appears that owing to declining health Shaftesbury had been compelled to leave England and spend the last year and a half of his life in Italy. . . . In spite of his contest with disease, and brief as was the period that remained to him of allotted life, his last months spent in Naples were nevertheless replete with large literary activity. Not only did he then complete for the press a second edition of the 'Characteristics' but he likewise carried forward the preparation for intended publication of an entirely new work.

"The book was to consist of four treatises. These were: I, 'A Letter concerning Design'; II, 'A Notion of the Historical Draught or Tablature of The Judgment of Hercules'; III, 'An Appendix concerning the Emblem of Cebes'; and IV, 'Plastics or the Original Progress and Power of Designatory Art.' The 'Letter concerning Design' was printed for the first time in 1732, in the fifth edition of the 'Characteristics.' The 'Judgment of Hercules' was first printed in French, in the *Journal des Sçavans* for November, 1712, a fact which has heretofore strangely escaped the attention of bibliographers. An 'original translation' of this treatise appeared in English, separately, in 1713, and was also included in the second edition of the 'Characteristics' in 1714. The 'Appendix concerning the Emblem of Cebes,' so far as known, remained to be written, and the 'Tablet' itself instead is here printed in a new translation. 'Plastics,' regarded by the author as the chief treatise of the four, has never previously been published. The definite grouping of these various treatises in the form of a single work, as intended when written, is also here first made known (p. xi)." Later in the Introduction the editor shows from Shaftesbury's letters that the philosopher probably did not intend to print the "Judgment of Hercules" or the "Letter concerning Design" as part of the *Characteristics* in the later editions; and he reminds the reader that "it [*i. e.*, the "Judgment of Hercules"], with the 'Letter of Design,' has been very properly omitted by Mr. J. M. Robertson in his excellent edition of that classic work" (p. xv).

From what Mr. Robertson says of these essays in the able Introduction to his really excellent and much needed edition of the *Characteristics* (1900), it may be surmised that their exclusion was not wholly determined by considerations of congruity and symmetry. (Of course they could easily have been included in an appendix.) He says: "It is with regret that I dissent from Professor Fowler's verdict that these papers, which were incongruously included in the later editions of the *Characteristics*, show him [Shaftesbury] to have had a good taste in the arts. They rather show him, I think, to have had no breadth of taste in architecture, since he despised St. Paul's as 'Gothic,' and to have held the typically Anglican view that painting is properly not a source of delight to the sense, but a vehicle of moral instruction. His æsthetic . . . was like his ethic Platonist and *a priori;* and when Baumgarten in the next generation began to lay the bases of a truly inductive æsthetic, he had to negate the principle on which Shaftesbury most insisted. Shaftesbury was in fact false to his own rules of *expertise*, for if he had consulted the

trained tastes, those of the artists, not even in England would he have found them in accord with his. In the closing paragraph of the *Notion* he expressly insists that painting 'has nothing more wide of its real aim, or more remote from its intention, than to make a show of colors, or from their mixture to raise a separate and flattering pleasure to the sense'; and though in a footnote he adds a possibly sounder plea that 'it is always the best when the colors are most subdued,' it is evident that he did not value a picture as a composition in color, but as a fingerpost to right conduct" (pp. xliii, xliv).

When the reader finally comes to "Treatise IV," "Plastics, or The Original Progress and Power of Designatory Art," he is bound to be grievously disappointed. In the first place, this 'treatise' was never written. On examining Dr. Rand's reprint of the manuscript, one finds that from start to finish there are few completed, to say nothing of consecutive, sentences. In other words, we find here only the author's plan of the book to be written, with many hints as to the way in which the framework was to be filled in. It would be idle to criticise the meagreness of what is here presented, for of course the author did not dream that these notes, intended only for his own eye, would ever be published. Solon said: "No man can be called happy till he is dead." It is to be feared that the modern practice hardly permits even such 'happiness' to the greater dead among literary men and philosophers; only mediocrity can be called 'happy,' in the sense that it is assured of merited oblivion. But since these notes have been published, something must be said of them. They are, on the whole, fairly systematic, though no attempt seems to have been made to keep to scale in the suggested treatment. Doubtless many far more important books than this could possibly have become have been written on the basis of less orderly notes. That is the worst of the matter: these orderly notes, while often unsatisfactory enough when arguments are vaguely suggested, are at least sufficient to convince the reader that the new treatise, if completed, could not possibly have raised Shaftesbury's reputation, but would inevitably have lowered it. The author's hopelessly bad health during the last two years of his life may partly account for the disagreeable tone of contemptuous impatience at the views of others (by no means always incorrect) that one finds throughout the outline; but the plain truth is that this essay, if it had been completed according to the outline here printed, would have shown, even more unmistakably than the author's other essays on æsthetic subjects, that this was not a field in which he could be regarded as a master. His actual acquaintance

with works of art was probably much greater than that of any of his philosophical contemporaries, though this was probably due to his unusual opportunities; but his appreciations seem almost fatally vitiated by his extreme neo-classical prepossessions, which naturally keep him from really appreciating ancient art. Blind worship is not appreciation, and it never seems to have occurred to Shaftesbury that the ancient Greeks were the most modern of the moderns of their day. Add to this Shaftesbury's thoroughgoing moralistic interpretation of art, and it is easy to see that he was headed in the wrong direction. 'Art for art's sake,' when the formula is taken in the absolute sense, represents such a palpable error that, in the long run, it can hardly do serious harm either to art or morality; art as the handmaid of morality is a much more dangerous (because more insidious) ideal, quite as dangerous for morality as for art. As Professor A. C. Bradley has pointed out, art may very well be *an* end in itself without being *the* end in itself.

The doubtful thesis that sculpture is "the mother art to painting" (p. 117), common enough in Shaftesbury's day, the philosopher himself seems to have taken in the grotesque sense that nothing living was fit to be taken for a model. One of his characteristic memoranda is: "Against Academy life-painting (as inferior to study of ancient forms and culture of ideas)" (p. 126 f.). While Raphael, interpreted as the modern incarnation of the classical ideal, is always treated with the most distinguished consideration and Michael Angelo is praised in terms that seem to suggest that he was almost wholly guiltless of the modern spirit, few of the artists of the Renaissance get off so easily. A highly characteristic memorandum (so labeled) is as follows: "Bernini wicked. Therefore sit the harder on him as on Spaniolet, Carvagio, etc., throwing in a word in behalf of M. Angelo and Salvator Rosa. This elsewhere not here" (p. 152, note). As for the moderns in general, they seem to be regarded as a bad lot. "Modern masters no learning. No converse till after raised and known by their pencil, and then too late. Illiberal. Dis-ingenuous. Sharks, rakes. What ideas, when thus vulgar! . . . What sense of poetic manners, characters, personages, moral truth! . . . Yet these give the clue and lead the great, who are cheated as well as misled by these mechanic knaves" (p. 129). When moral approbation and reprobation fall into the background, censure of the tendency to emphasize color in painting is likely to become correspondingly bitter. This is merely a sample: "Strange paradox! but leading maxim, viz. 'that in tablature and painting, colors are in themselves nothing, nor

have nothing to do.' For first all the perfect and true rejected as wholly false in the workmanship. The rest dirtied, deadened, mixed, confounded, and as it were annihilated. The slave of all" (p. 149). Such was Shaftesbury's ideal,—none the better because it was not original, but part and parcel of a wholly impossible and now wholly discredited conception of the function of painting. Curiously enough Rubens, barely mentioned, is not pilloried as the great transgressor. The following speaks for itself. "Remember Rubens' Mercury with the two cardinals and queen, as an instance of the monstrous mixture of machine [*i. e.*, supernatural intervention] and history . . . Luxembourg gallery, Paris" (p. 161). (*Cf.* St. Gaudens' statue of General Sherman in Central Park.) One of the final memoranda runs as follows: "The philosopher and virtuoso alone capable to prove, demonstrate. But the idiot, the vulgar man can feel, recognize. The eye has sense of its own, a practice method peculiar and distinct from common reason or argumentation. . . ." Not an exact statement, of course; but, taking it as it stands, is this not the reason why a science or philosophy of æsthetics is possible? But, to conclude,—and this is really the end of the manuscript,—"But the anti-virtuosi again says—Who is he?—Who but the same one and the same man from him who said he knew not what the καλόν was εἰ μὴ ἐπαινετόν? [unless it be praised?] Hence Hobbes, Locke, etc. still the same man, same genus at the bottom.—'Beauty is nothing.'—'Virtue is nothing.'—So 'perspective nothing.—Music nothing.'—But these are the greatest realities of things, especially the beauty and order of affections. These philosophers together with the anti-virtuosi may be called by one common name, viz. barbar. . . ." (pp. 177, 178).

After reading these pathetic last memoranda of a great man who had achieved his fame in a different (though perhaps related) field, one can hardly agree with the editor in his enthusiastic admiration of the "Plastics," which he persists in referring to always as a 'treatise.' Dr. Rand says: "The entire treatise of 'Plastics' confirms the statement which has been based upon the 'Judgment of Hercules,' that there can be applied to Shaftesbury what Lessing says of Raphael, 'that he would have been the greatest artistic genius even though unfortunately he had been born without hands'" (p. xxvi).

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Nietzsche and the Ideals of Modern Germany. By HERBERT LESLIE STEWART. Longmans, Green and Company, New York, 1915.—pp. xiv, 235.

This book does not pretend to be a thoroughgoing exposition and examination of Nietzsche's views; it confines itself "to those aspects of his work which may cast light upon the social policy and ideals of Germany as these have been revealed in the present war." "It is an effort to assist those who wish to correlate the moral outlook of Germany with one personal influence by which, beyond doubt, it has in part been directed." The author does not hold the prophet of Zarathustra responsible for the war; he thinks there has been a sinister aberration of thought on ethical questions, especially on the issues of international conduct in that country for the last thirty years, and he knows that Nietzsche is not the only writer who has given expression to revolutionary moral ideas. But he believes that this man "enforced with singular effectiveness just those doctrines of immoralism which Prussia has put into execution." Professor Stewart has not ignored those elements in Nietzsche's teaching which tended against racial aggressiveness and expressed contempt for German culture and German politics. He declares, however, that his points of agreement with militarism are far more significant than his points of dissent; he takes him "not as the originator of any policy, but as typical of a mood which has had fearful consequences for mankind." And he evidently believes that Nietzsche had a great deal to do with encouraging if not arousing this mood: "every one who knows Germany can testify what an idol Nietzsche is to a large and influential class"; "he is widely accepted as what he claims to be—the great ethical iconoclast who shattered forever the Christian values." Treitschke and Bernhardi, too, according to our author, exercised a great influence: the former was the historian of the Prussian government and "he has written what is received in Germany as the most discerning interpretation of his country's growth," while the latter minutely prophesied the precise grouping of the belligerents which has occurred and clearly foreshadowed Germany's tactics, three years before the war.

Professor Stewart puts his case cautiously and avoids the exaggerations into which many recent publicists have fallen in speaking of Nietzsche's share in the present European conflict. He admits that Nietzsche's message "may well have been a symptom quite as much as a cause of the militarist movement." There can be no doubt that some of the immoralist's ideas influenced some portions of the German

people; the only question is how potent this influence was, who were the persons affected by it, and what part of the teaching most appealed to them. (Professor Stewart thinks this influence has been potent in a circle which is not without power in public affairs,—the middle class "which passes through the closely associated training of the University and the military corps." I doubt this, though I would not acquit Nietzsche of having contributed to the spread of pagan ideals among his people.) The most important thing to be remembered,—and Professor Stewart does not forget it,—is that Nietzsche did not originate the kind of morality or immorality which is singled out as the predominating aspect of his doctrine. Individuals and nations had behaved in the Nietzschean spirit and thinkers had justified such behavior in theory long before this maker of aphorisms and paradoxes proclaimed the gospel of the will to power in books which at first nobody read. From the standpoint of private morality some of Frederick the Great's public acts were dastardly, and the principles determining Bismarck's politics, if practised in his individual dealings with his fellows, would have been pronounced reprehensible. Perhaps Nietzsche's immoralism "lent philosophical sanction to the selfishness and the unscrupulousness which had made his country successful in the past," as Professor Stewart thinks. It is true that any one can find justification for that type of conduct in Nietzsche's books: whatever may have been the writer's meaning, however we may try to refine it into something great and noble, there is no doubt that his philosophy can be made to justify the selfishness and unscrupulousness of any country. Nevertheless, Frederick and Bismarck and many others like them lived and have been glorified,—inside and outside of Germany,—long before this gentle Lutheran pastor's son thundered against Christianity and preached the superman. And *Realpolitik* is not a new thing in the world. The Germans did not originate it, even though their most admired Prussian king and their most admired Prussian statesman practised it with consummate skill. The German people learned to approve of the new politics because they succeeded and because they believed that the German states could never have been welded into an Empire by other methods than those employed by the man of "blood and iron," —a phrase, by the way, which has done quite as much to pervert political moral standards as the catchwords "manifest destiny" and "a place in the sun." No one who has lived in Germany needs to be told how deeply the new ideas sank into the German soul. Professor Th. Ziegler says in a book of his (*Die geistigen und sozialen Strömungen*

des 19. Jahrhunderts), after discussing the Schleswig-Holstein episode of 1864: "From these events we learned something else, something we had been able to learn only in a negative way in 1848: that in political affairs it is power that decides and not words and phrases, not agitations and revolutions. Bismarck, however, was such a man of power, action, will. In this sense, to be sure, the phrase "Might before right" was applicable to him. It is simply the truth, even though it is dangerous and may be sorely abused." Surely, there needed no Nietzsche to rise from his sickbed to preach the gospel of the will to power to influential circles in the fatherland: they had heard it long ago and had seen it put in practice with marvelous success;—and Frederick the Great already knew that pedants would not be wanting who would justify any practice of high politics on paper.

And it should be remembered also that Darwinism had a tremendous influence in Germany and that Nietzsche made this theory the basis of his new ethics, as General Bernhardi afterward made it the basis of his politics. The philosophy of selfishness and might has found in the theory of evolution a strong and useful ally, and the writers who have made use of it to "transvalue our values" are not confined to any one country. It is true, as Professor Stewart says, "the fault does not lie with Darwin; it lies with the smaller men who have caught up much of his language but little of his spirit." Still, the fact remains that the theory of evolution has been used to justify the blood-and-iron idea even in private morality, and that the principle of might has been applied in the business world and in political life, and often privately justified, by men who never read a page of Nietzsche. The remark attributed to President Roosevelt, that while Congress was debating the morality of the Panama Canal business, *he* took it, sounds suspiciously like Frederick the Great's phrase about the pedants; and the demand we frequently hear that the United States must eventually own all the territory down to the Panama Canal has the ring of the new or rather old politics. The opposition between the pagan ideal of power and the ideal of peace and good will is perhaps as old as the civilized race.

There can be no doubt on which side Nietzsche stood when he preached the superman. He cared more for the powerful individual than for the State because he regarded the State as a hindrance to the production of titanic personalities. But, in spite of his individualism and his opposition to a tutelary State, he glorified the great military conquerors; the ruthless warriors were his greatest individualists; his ideal was not civilization, which he thought to rest on

morality, but culture,—periods of history in which the great *Kraftmenschen* flourished and turned the old commonplace values on their heads. He did not believe in Germany's mission to be the teacher of all the peoples, as Fichte had taught; he had no more liking for her *Kultur* than for England's, looking upon France as the only cultivated nation of Europe; and he inclined to the notion of a European confederacy of States. But he believed in war, he glorified Napoleon, and there can be no doubt that he would have rejoiced in the coming of another such hero, whatever his nationality. He did not believe the Germans had the stuff in them or the social institutions necessary to produce that kind of man; he was not a chauvinist and he did not care who produced the superman; the superman is an end in himself and the value of a society is measured solely by its ability to give birth to such a being. He seems, however, to have had hopes of William II: "Our new Kaiser," he said in 1888, "pleases me more and more: his latest is that he has taken a very firm stand against Antisemitism and the Kreuzzeitung. . . . He would surely understand the will to power as a principle."

Nietzsche merely expressed in sensational form ideas that were not unknown either to theory or to practice. Little attention, however, was paid to him until 1888 when Professor Brandes of Copenhagen lectured on him; and Nietzsche never forgave his own countrymen for having passed him by. When the German professors began to study his books (after his mental breakdown), they certainly did not use him sparingly. They tried to deal justly with the valuable elements in his teaching: his impassioned opposition to hedonism, maudlin sympathy, and the dwarfing socialism that menaced the strong personalities; they praised his rigorism and his ideal of the development of the individual life, the very things which Professor Stewart with generous impartiality selects as worth while,—that is, not the new values but the true values which had always been prized by the sane thinkers of the race. But they strongly condemned his immoralism, his doctrine of the superman, his glorification of the blonde beast, his contempt for the common people, his antagonism to the modern State, and his hysterical attacks on Christianity. If any student left the University with any illusions as to the value of the Nietzschean thoughts, it was not the fault of the professors. A Nietzsche-cult did, however, gradually grow up outside of the universities, among young persons and among women, we are told. Professor Ziegler, in his book on Nietzsche, calls him the seductive ratcatcher of Hamelin of the youth, and declares that he influenced them through

his most paradoxical ideas: through his teaching of the superman in its most brutal form, and that Sudermann and Hauptmann, and even Wilbrandt and Spielhagen, had come under its spell.

These remarks are not urged in criticism of Professor Stewart's interesting and instructive book, but to emphasize some points which are often overlooked and the importance of which, I am sure, our author himself would be ready to admit. Professor Stewart is eminently fair both in his presentation of Nietzsche's views and in his estimate of them. He does not close his eyes to the valuable elements in the teaching, and his criticisms are invariably sensible and just. He cannot be accused of having cut the German immoralist's teaching to fit a desire to make out a bad case for Germany; he has simply tried to show that the *Herrenmoral* has been one of the causes of Germany's attitude in this war. Of this I am not sure; rather I am inclined to think that it would not have been different if there had been no Nietzsche.

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The Problem of Individuality. By HANS DRIESCH. New York, Macmillan & Co., 1914.—pp. vii, 84.

The four lectures which form this book epitomize Driesch's view of the biological, logical and metaphysical character of vitalism. They were delivered in England in 1913.

Biological science, Driesch says, must certainly allow the logical possibility that the unity and wholeness of an organism (its 'teleological' character) might be produced by purely mechanical processes, a mechanism being defined as "a given specific combination of specific chemical and physical agents" (p. 17). But this possibility is excluded by certain biological facts; *e. g.*, that in the blastula stage of the sea-urchin embryo a part of the embryo, cut at random, is capable of developing into a perfect adult. A random fragment of a true machine could not possibly be itself the complete machine. There certainly are "equipotential parts" in the early stage of the organism; but each develops differently in the actual ontogenesis, as may be required to realize the form of the adult. This selection of the appropriate, unity-forming development from among the several developments that were possible for a given part, can be shown not due to any simple difference of exterior local stimuli, nor to purely chemical processes inside the system. Some sort of non-mechanical "autonomy of life" is thus evidenced.

It is inconceivable, he continues, that a machine could be repeatedly

divided and subdivided, and still leave the original machine fully present in each part; but this would be required if the egg were the product of a simply mechanical process. There must be "an agent that arranges" the nuclear particles which seem to be the material conditions of inheritance. Physiology of actions also requires a vitalistic theory, for the response is made to the meaning of the situation as a whole, and is not fixed in any mechanical sense. Various biological facts thus show the existence of a non-physical-chemical, elementary agent or factor in nature. But they do not show that this agent is psychical. It may be called 'entelechy,' adopting the term Aristotle used with similar meaning. This entity "has only to do with the *arrangement* of a manifoldness" (p. 35), thus creating an organism. It is not measurable, and is therefore not a kind of energy. By excluding other hypotheses on the method of action of entelechy, one concludes that it "may suspend such kind of happening as would occur if not so suspended" (p. 38), and may then "relax its suspensory power." This is a kind of action absolutely *sui generis*, and may be non-energetic. "The principle of the conservation of energy . . . need not necessarily be violated by vitalism" (p. 36).

Driesch argues that the logic of natural science supports the vitalistic theory. The immediate content of consciousness is always chaotic, and is rationalized by the construction of a theory of nature. A necessary part of this rationalizing of experience is the postulate that the changes which occur in nature are connected "as if the logical relation of *reason* and *consequence* were realized or petrified, so to say, in them" (p. 46). But "in logic a reason can never have a consequence that is richer in content than itself" (p. 52); and a rational theory of causality must therefore introduce a new term in the antecedent to account for every apparent increase in the consequent. Some vital processes do show a peculiar kind of increase, namely an increase of complexity of arrangement of the material elements; the result is logically richer, as new concepts are required to comprehend it. "Unifying causality" is thus a biological fact, and requires the assumption of a special agent, a personal entelechy for the individual organism. A supra-personal entelechy might perhaps also be required, as the key to an understanding of "the apparent progressive complication in phylogeny," and even in human history, as well.

In his chapter on metaphysics, Driesch holds that the world of nature is a conceptual construction: it is the world of experience, a phenomenal world. A "monism of order" might be postulated for it, and a mechanistic theory might understand it as a sort of geometrical

wholeness. But a dualism seems a more workable theory of the world of nature, recognizing a factor of truly organic order, and also an essentially unordered and contingent factor, as Aristotle did in his doctrine of *eidos* and *hyle*. "There is the material world as the world of chance, but there is also the world of form or order that manifests itself in certain areas of the material world" (p. 74). One could gain a metaphysics, a knowledge of the character of an Absolute, only by inference from the character of the phenomenal world. Yet there is no basis for the assumption that all the qualities of the Absolute have correlatives in the space worid; a monistic mechanistic theory of the world of nature would give no basis for a metaphysical monsim. And indeed vitalistic biology finds there are "natural agents" which are non-spatial, *i. e.*, the entelechies. Certain concepts must evidently be admitted to have metaphysical validity if any metaphysics is to be possible; *e. g.*, this, such, relation, manifoldness, etc. Space and time might perhaps be taken as the sign of "a particular system of relations . . . in the Absolute"; but these relations themselves are unknown and unknowable. The metaphysical significance of the non-spatial factors, of entelechies personal supra-personal, is also obscure. Two theories remain equally tenable, and the choice is a matter of one's feeling; one may consider, as Bergson does, that the time world is the expression of an Absolute which is freely self-creating, a something 'qui se fait'; or one may consider, as Plotinus did, that the phenomenal world is the appearance of an essentially changeless Absolute.

Without attempting any comment on the strictly biological part of his argument, we may suggest some of the implications in Driesch's theory. In the first place, he does not consider vitalism a metaphysical doctrine; but his statement of it belies him. The entelechy is certainly not an experienceable object: it is no more a part of the world of nature than is the intervening and miracle-producing God of one type of theology. The real point raised by vitalism is just whether or not metaphysics should be introduced as an occasional supplement to the physical sciences.

If we suppose, first, that Driesch could show that biological facts require the inference of a non-physical agent in some parts of the world, it does not necessarily follow that he is entitled to assume a plurality of these non-physical agents. A single one might do the work for the entire world, as theologians and philosophers have often argued. A plurality of organisms is no proof of a plurality of entelechies.

If, however, Driesch prefers to assume many causes in place of one, his theory would involve more than he admits. Each living cell that exists within a complex individual, and that still manifests an apparent teleological specialization in its own development, should have an entelechy of its own. And his principle goes further still. Driesch argues that organisms exist as individuals in virtue of a peculiar type of complex order; a special arranging of their physical constituents is the process of their formation; their form of order is higher, since it is conceptually more complex, than any order required for the existence of their physical elements; and we must assume an ordering non-physical substance as both logical and temporal antecedent to such a complexly ordered individual. He emphasizes the fact that a "unifying causality" forms the individual in the case of living beings; but it seems that he does not fairly recognize that the organic is but one of the individual-constituting processes in nature. The inorganic shows also a progressive complication. A molecule exists as a certain complex unity of atoms; and we are coming to understand the atom itself as an ordered system of units. To apply Driesch's own logic of science, one should explain the formation of each higher unity by means of an antecedent entelechy. Even if the entelechy theory could be established for the organic, its principle would require us to extend the theory to the other forms of unifying order in nature. It is no answer to say that the mechanical theory does well enough in accounting for these infra-organic organizations; on the contrary, an admission of the adequacy of mechanism in this case should stand against the doctrine that mechanism could not account for the development of order of a higher form. A logic of science that would require the postulation of biological and historical entelechies would equally require chemical and physical entelechies. Driesch himself almost admits this in the passage in which he approves Aristotle's dualism of nature.

The argument employed to prove the entelechy preexistent to the organism would also prove it eternally preexistent. The entelechies have, it seems, been waiting their moment of entry, like the children's souls in the 'Blue Bird' scene. Nor does it appear a part of the vitalistic doctrine that an entelechy should ever cease to be. If each organism, past, present, and to come, has its own individual entelechy, and if we should even add entelechies for molecules and atoms, the world of the non-physical real acquires an impressively large population.

If we are to hold any entelechy-theory at all, we should either take

the whole of a World of discrete Ideas, or else some comprehensive single Form, such as an Aristotelian Reason. Driesch's form of vitalism seems an inadequate half-measure.

In his theory of rational causality Driesch has recognized one important fact about the logical relation between the temporally precedent and subsequent. It is true that the antecedent could not be completely known without knowing it as that which is to be followed by just its particular consequences. Any concept which is necessary to the comprehension of the result is then also necessary to the full comprehension of the antecedent. The logical meaning of the one must, as Driesch says, be as rich as that of the other. But he is not justified in transforming the concept into a non-material substance in the antecedent reality. Universal regularity we can postulate with good practical results for the increase of experimental science. It seems that we can even show this postulate is a necessary part of what we mean by considering our experience as objective. Yet Driesch's assumption of entelechy-causation would include the assertion that some physical processes have at least durations which could never possibly be brought under any formulation of regularity; physical science would have to assume that the organic is, in some points, essentially miraculous. But the assumption of anything physically miraculous in the world of nature is neither useful nor enlightening, however simple a solution it may at first seem for a difficulty. Driesch explicitly admits the logical possibility of the physical-chemical type of explanation of organic processes. The specific biological facts he brings against that theory might be admitted to prove (what would be granted readily enough) that there is no present chemical-mechanical explanation for many of the problems of biology; but even some of the vitalists' statements of fact have required correction by other biologists, and the chemical-physical theory seems left everywhere tenable in principle. If the two theories remain simply as competing hypotheses, then vitalism is the one to reject. We do not increase our knowledge by supposing the processes of the experienceable world are in part determined by inexperienceable entities, nor do we make our theory of objective knowledge more coherent.

Driesch's chapter on the metaphysics of vitalism would reduce to a reluctant admission that no metaphysical assertion is either verifiable or controvertable. This would dispose of the entelechy-doctrine itself, if we have rightly interpreted it. But so long as the entelechies are supposed to interfere with the regularity of some events in the material world, one must consider the vitalist supposition as at least contrary to the requirements of a theory of science.

One may make the thoroughgoing postulate that all the events of time are essentially nothing else than the development of one logical meaning, and so understand all the causation in nature as really a logical implication. One may also make the postulate that all these events are so determinate that invariable regularities are discoverable in the entire process. One may hold the first theory as a metaphysics, and the second as a theory of science, quite compatible with the metaphysics. But to do as Driesch does, to mix the two types of explanation for a process in the physical world, seems a confusion of two views that are not coordinate.

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Einleitung in die Philosophie. Von WILHELM WINDELBAND. Tübingen, Verlag von J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1914.—pp. xii, 441.

There is at the present time a fairly general recognition of the exceedingly important function of such books as properly bear the caption, "Introduction to Philosophy," or as might fitly appear under some such title. Such books have multiplied in recent years, particularly in Germany, America, and France, and their writing has challenged the efforts of a considerable number of outstanding philosophical thinkers. In our own country, the initial impetus to this direction of philosophical activity is traceable in no small measure to Professor Thilly's admirable translation of Paulsen's thoughtful and altogether captivating *Einleitung in die Philosophie.* The need for works of this sort seems to have been keenly felt, first of all, in Germany, where we find them as early as the beginning of the eighteenth century. Moreover, even during the past decade, such books seem to have enjoyed a larger place in the thought life of Germany than in that of any other country. The reason for this is to be found only partly in the lack of any fixed system or organization of philosophical courses in German universities. In greater part, perhaps, it is due to the more universal interest which the German people manifest in philosophy and to the greater need which they feel for a reasoned *Weltanschauung.*

The empiristic, materialistic, and pessimistic tendencies which dominated German thought subsequently to the reaction against Hegelianism, gave way, under the rapidly growing influence of science and of practical achievement, to a positivism which found its basis in the *Critique of Pure Reason.* The events of 1870, however, and the far-reaching results which they brought in their train, reacted in a

significant way upon the spiritual life-currents of the closing decades of the nineteenth century. Religion, art, and literature, all bear witness to these changes and to the emergence of new interests and demands. The powerful, though at first partly obscure and unconscious, impulse toward re-valuation and toward self-transcendence gradually engendered a very real and deeply felt sense of the need of a philosophical interpretation and basis, not merely of the methods and results of science, but of life generally. With the close of the nineteenth century, therefore, the undisputed dominance of the positivistic spirit approaches its end. More and more there come to be regnant an interest in broader, more ultimate issues, an earnest, self-conscious seeking for a general philosophy of life, and an endeavor to discover the meaning and the value of those overpowering tendencies by and in which individuals felt themselves to be borne along. A graphic portrayal of the spirit which gave birth to this deepened and enhanced interest in philosophy may be found in an address on "The Present Status and Task of Philosophy" which Windelband delivered in 1907 in the royal palace at Carlsruhe (*cf. Präludien*, fifth ed., 1915, Vol. II, pp. 1–23). The Prolegomena to the present volume again refers to these tendencies in a passage which not only throws light on the underlying motives of the *Einleitung*, but which is of absorbing interest from the standpoint of present history. I venture to quote the words in the original, for, though a translation might reproduce the vigor of expression, it could scarcely hope to embody those subtle qualities by virtue of which this passage furnishes such a remarkably vivid and accurate insight into the German spirit of the past decade: "Unser heutiges Leben ist, umstürmt, von einer Mannigfaltigkeit tief an die Wurzel des Lebens greifender Aufgaben. In unserem Volke ist etwas von dem Gefühl, über sich selber hinaus zu wachsen, eines Hinausstrebens in noch Unbestimmtes und Unbekanntes. Wir stehen in einem gärenden Kräftegewoge, das, wie alle grosze Erregungszustände der Menschheit, mit psychologischer Notwendigkeit von religiösen Motiven durchsetzt ist.—Wir haben das Bewusztsein, im Übergange zu stehen, und der Poet hat dafür die Formel von der Umwertung aller Werte gefunden. Es ist, ich möchte nicht sagen, wie zur Zeit der Romantik, sonder hoffnungsvoller: wie zur Zeit der Renaissance. Und wie damals, so waltet auch jetzt wieder das Bedürfnis nach einer Weltanschauung, in der die Kraft neuen Schaffens wurzeln soll. Dazu aber kommt die in der neueren Generation Deutschlands allmählich heraufdämmernde Erkenntnis, dasz es gerade eben noch Zeit ist, uns wieder auf die geistigen Grund-

lagen unseres nationalen Daseins zu besinnen, deren Schätzung teils in dem Rausch des äuszeren Erfolges, teils unter dem harten Druck der äuszeren Arbeit verloren zu gehen drohte. Eine Weltanschauung also verlangt man von der Philosophie" (p. 2).

Now, not all introductions to philosophy have sought to furnish a *Weltanschauung*. Some there are which are little more than a running account, with critical comments, of certain historical systems; others consist of an abstract statement of the divisions of philosophy together with an arid presentation of certain isolated problems and of the traditional lines of their solution; still others do, indeed, embody more than the mere skeletal remains of philosophical systems, and yet they are not so much introductions to philosophy as introductions to philosophizing—they discuss a number of selected problems in such a way that, under the stimulus and guidance of the text, the reader will be led himself, so far as possible, to think through the issues involved and thus to acquire something of the spirit and of the method of philosophical inquiry. But even when we turn from volumes of the just-mentioned sorts to those that seek to minister to the need for a *Weltanschauung*, we again find important differences. The *Einleitungen* of Fichte and Herbart, for example, are directed almost exclusively to the presentation and defence of the particular doctrines whose increased influence and more general acceptance constitute the fundamental aim of their authors. In significant contrast is the volume by Paulsen. In this case also, it is true, the author has a very definite philosophy whose validity he endeavors to bring home to the reader. Nevertheless, the various directions of philosophical thought are not only given consideration, but are analyzed with a spirit of objectivity and in the light of historical and scientific facts. Even more successful has Windelband been, both in singling out the possible alternatives of which philosophical questions permit, and in disclosing the limitations which are inherent in the very nature of the different solutions that have been proposed. Three further differentiæ of the present volume should be mentioned:—(1) There is no similar work, so far as the knowledge of the reviewer goes, which so skillfully and judiciously introduces, or so successfully utilizes, the analyses and results of the history of philosophy. The same lucidity, restraint, and strict regard for a logical development of the subject-matter which characterize the volume as a whole, are in evidence also in the use which is made of historical references. In no case is this material introduced uncritically, or as a substitute for personal thinking or for a direct grapple with difficult problems. So

true is this that one may even say, not merely that the historical references greatly enhance the value of the *Einleitung*, but also that the latter gives additional illumination to the significance of various philosophical movements and a deepened appreciation of the necessity of paying regard to the historical development of thought. (2) Windelband attempts, and with remarkable success, to exhibit the genesis of philosophical problems out of ordinary reflective experience and out of scientific thought, while nevertheless disclosing the organic interconnection that exists between philosophical problems as such. Philosophy is shown to represent not a group, merely, of problems, but a system of problems. Hence our author is not content with merely indicating the divergent theories that have as a matter of fact arisen; the latter, rather, are utilized in illustrating the various logical possibilities that are shown to exist. (3) Closely connected with what has just been said is the fact that the present work includes within its scheme and its limited compass an account of practically all (except the historical) tasks of philosophy. Attention is given not merely to the problems of logic, epistemology and metaphysics, but also, with a fine sense of proportion, to those of ethics, philosophy of history and of society, æsthetics, and philosophy of religion.

Entirely in the spirit of Kant, Windelband's conception of philosophy is based on a sharp distinction between the standpoint of fact and that of validity. Regardless of their specific nature—whether epistemological, ethical, æsthetic, or religious—philosophical issues are consistently represented as relating to the justifiability of a claim. What contents of experience may legitimately lay claim to the values of truth, goodness, beauty, or holiness?—about this question there are centered all the fundamental problems of philosophy. These values are held to differ radically from those of utility or expediency, for example, in that they are independent of subjective considerations and of the mutability of conditioning factors; they are genuinely objective, universally valid. In his discussion of the basis of this validity, Windelband introduces much more of realism into his philosophy than is sometimes done by idealists. He would deny, to give a specific illustration, that a logical category represents an *a priori* principle of synthesis. Such a conception is not only fraught with the danger of confusing a merely psychological function of apperception with a logical principle, but it is entirely too subjectivistic. Principles, for Windelband, are logical categories only when they synthesize elements in the manner in which the latter, by their own nature,

belong together. That is to say, the relations which the categories establish are in no sense imposed upon, but are, on the contrary, demanded by, the content of thought. The same is true of philosophical values generally. They refer, not to anything that is abstractly 'mental,' 'subjective,' or 'psychical,' but to the character and structure of the objects of experience in their concreteness. Windelband, therefore, is led very summarily to dismiss from philosophical discussion all purely relativistic theories, as well as those that either fail or refuse to distinguish between the logical and the psychological, and those that are so fettered to the factual and the descriptive that they never even raise the questions involved in the claims of experiences to universal validity or value. Difficult as may be the issues of philosophy, they are not to be disposed of ostrich-fashion, or by conversion into psychological, sociological, or historical discussions. We may cite a single illustration. Windelband criticizes pragmatism on the ground that, while it professes to give an account of 'knowledge,' it really deals with what has long been distinguished as 'opinion' or as 'belief'; its version of instrumentalism, moreover, and its subordination of truth to practice and to life, involve, logically considered, a "grotesque confusion of ends and means," and they "put in question one of the highest attainments of culture, the purity of the will to truth" (p. 202). In this particular case, many would doubtless protest against the severity and the sweeping character of the criticisms. It is obvious that Windelband was familiar with only the cruder expressions of pragmatism and had no suspicion that these were not typical of the movement as a whole. But, in spite of occasional failures of this sort, it will scarcely be questioned that the present volume is well adapted to reveal the dignity and the seriousness of the philosophical spirit. Moreover, it sets forth in clear terms a clean-cut and an historically established view of the nature, the tasks, and the method of philosophy.

In his Prolegomena, the author points out that the needs which a philosophy must satisfy are both theoretical and practical. Philosophy must be both *Weltweisheit* and *Lebensweisheit*. Now, thought and life are closely interrelated. Nevertheless, they are sufficiently distinct, Windelband believes, to warrant and to demand separate treatment. Following Aristotle, therefore, he distinguishes, at the outset, two sets of problems, the theoretical (or existential) and the practical (or axiological). Part I, entitled "Theoretical Problems (Questions Relating to Knowledge)," contains, in addition to a preliminary discussion of "Reality and Appearance," three divisions:

(1) "Ontological Problems," namely, "Substance," "The Quantity of the Existent," "The Qualitative Determinations of Reality"; (2) "Genetic Problems," which include "Process," "Causality," "Mechanism and Teleology," and "Psychophysical Processes"; (3) "Noetic Problems," treated under the headings, "Truth," "The Origin of Knowledge," "The Validity of Knowledge," and "The Object of Knowledge." Approximately the same amount of space as that devoted to the theoretical problems is reserved for Part II, which appears under the caption, "Axiological Problems (Questions Relating to Value)." Again there is a preliminary discussion (dealing, in this case, with the general question of "Value") and again the material is organized into three divisions: (1) "Ethical Problems," whose sections are entitled "The Principle of Morality," "Will-Communities," and "History"; (2) "Æsthetic Problems," likewise with three sub-divisions, "The Concept of the Æsthetic," "The Beautiful," and "Art"; (3) "Religious Problems," involving a consideration of "The Holy," "The Truth of Religion," and "Existence and Value."

One cannot but admire the author's architectonic skill, as well as his success in exhibiting the logical dependence of philosophical problems upon one another. It must be admitted, however, that the two distinctions which are fundamental to the entire procedure involve serious difficulties. The sharp distinction which is made between the logical and the psychological, and between objective and subjective values, precludes the author from realizing the ideal of a philosophy which shall interpret inclusively the totality of human experience. Certain experiences—those that are merely psychological or subjective—would seem to fall entirely outside the pale of that reality, at least, with which the author, as a philosopher, could seem to be concerned; even in the case of the included experiences, moreover, one remains at a loss to understand their relation as "psychological," which all experiences are presupposed to be, to their significance as "theoretical" or "axiological." The second fundamental distinction which Windelband's procedure obliges him to make is that between existence and value. Since these phases of reality are treated in independence of one another, the final problem of the *Einleitung*—indeed, the ultimate problem of the philosophy for which this volume contends—concerns the relation which they may be said, in last analysis, to sustain to each other. Windelband's conclusion, as might be anticipated, is that "the very nature of the problem renders it insoluble" (p. 431). The author's philosophical rivals would doubtless insist that this confession is sufficient evidence, without

further argument, to demonstrate the necessity of a different analysis of experience as well as a change in the formulation of philosophical problems. Windelband, however, would contend that our experience actually involves an antinomy which comes to expression in the divergence between existence and value. Whether one may improve upon the essentially Fichtean doctrine that the will and its activity presuppose such a divergence, and that the latter is intelligible by reference to the fact that it is self-conscious striving that is of supreme worth, is a problem that cannot here be entered upon. It is obvious, however, that Windelband has at best but sublimated the difficulties that are involved in the fundamental principles of Fichteanism.

Though Windelband's volume will generously repay all who give it careful study, it will prove somewhat disappointing to those who are interested not so much in the ever-recurring phases of philosophical problems as in their ever-changing nature. The specific issues involved in present-day controversies receive but the scantiest recognition. Recent realism, for example, and the newer movements in ethics are not even hinted at; the Bergsonian philosophy is but referred to incidentally in a single sentence; pragmatism, as already noted, is discussed with exceeding brevity and superficiality. Judged solely from the point of view of its adaptability for a first course in philosophy, the most serious defect of the volume is the fact that it is somewhat lacking in those constructive results and definite solutions which a beginner seeks and which, within limits and provisionally, it is good pedagogy to make possible for him. In conclusion, it should be stated that, scholarly and extremely valuable as the book is, the author makes no effort to furnish that interpretation and new philosophical basis of German political and social life of which the passage that we have quoted from the Prolegomena so explicitly recognizes the need; of the two demands upon philosophy, moreover, the one for *Weltweisheit* has been much more adequately met than that for *Lebensweisheit*.

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NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

Die mechanistischen Grundgesetze des Lebens. [Von ADOLF COHEN-KYSPER. Verlag Johann Ambrosius Barth, Leipzig, 1914.—pp. viii, 373.

This book is an attempt to explain the phenomena of life in terms of mechanics as formulated by Heinrich Hertz. It consists of an introduction and nine main subdivisions, of which seven are constructive, the others being devoted to a summary and a historical review.

Biology so far has, according to the author, proved itself incapable of meeting the problems of teleology—the capacity of living beings to maintain themselves under constantly altering conditions—and of development. The difficulty originates in the fact that the solutions have been attempted in terms of physics and chemistry, i. e., in terms of atoms and molecules, resulting in a search for the smallest material units which can act as bearers of life. The assumption is that since the alternate decomposition and rebuilding of cell material is a process peculiar to living tissue, the vital substance must consist of molecular units of peculiar structure and characteristics. Hence the end is to find laws of molecular dynamics which control the progress of life phenomena. Chemical procedure assumes the qualitative likeness of all parts of the system, any subdivision of which is capable of like effect with the whole. But the investigation of vital processes has tended to show they depend on a compounding of unlike molecular units. *Stoffwechsel* occurs on the basis of relationships involved in a higher system, the complete organ itself.

The failure of the materialistic school to solve the problems presented has led to vitalism. The task of the present work is to bring proof "that it is possible, without treading the ways of vitalism, and without remaining on the foundation of materialism, to handle life phenomena in an adequate fashion and to deal in a satisfactory way with the problems which conspicuously await their solution," etc. To do this, an attempt is made to subsume life phenomena under the laws of mechanics. The former are considered to represent the changes of position of a determined material system, the vital system, which take place on the basis of constant and regular *Zusammenhänge*. In Hertzian terms, when material points are so related that "from the knowledge of a part of the components of displacement of these points, a statement concerning the remaining components is possible" a *Zusammenhang* exists between them. The character of the *Zusammenhänge* of any particular system is a matter to be determined by experience. The sum of the regular *Zusammenhänge* is the dynamic of the system. The movements executed on this basis are the dynamic renderings of the system or its function, the initiating of which is known as acceleration. The smallest vital system or dynamic unity, i. e., the smallest system that can sustain life, is the cell. Organisms are merely integrated

systems, or more complex structures, whose functioning is dependent on the activity of all the cell elements and organs. The only difference between dead and living nature lies in the complexity of the integrated units found in the two spheres. Granted that the cells and organisms are the dynamic units of the vital systems, a mere description of their processes as given in experience should lead to an understanding of these as mechanical and show the underlying laws. These processes are to be divided into (1) those connected with development and regeneration, and (2) those in which the developed system acts on external stimuli.

Of the latter we note the functioning of an organ in response to external stimuli, where the strength of the function varies directly as the stimulus, and on the disappearance of the latter, the system returns to its initial condition. Also if any function is to be repeatedly realized, the totality of the inner relations of the system, its construction, must be maintained. We get thus the concept of the construction equilibrium which seems to mean that any given organism, if it is to function, must be so constituted as to be able to respond to the external influences to which it is normally subject without fundamental alteration. Changing outside conditions are generally met within the limits of a given construction by mutual regulation of the several functions of the parts of the system, though sometimes by an alteration of the structure itself. All these cases show that the reaction to the external stimulus is in the form of the maintenance of or a return to a condition of equilibrium. The author here notes a very significant fact. The physicist has no interest in the continued equilibrium of a system in the present sense, it being a matter of indifference whether the material system with which he is dealing persists or is transformed into another. But for vital mechanics the maintenance of the system is the fundamental problem, and its task is to find the general mechanical laws on the basis of which the phenomena of equilibrium can be explained. Does not this difference raise a suspicion that vital systems are quite different from dead?

We can distinguish three stages in the whole process, an acceleration due to an external force, a retarding of this acceleration by means of the inner relations of the organism known as the *Zwang* of the organism, and the final achievement of a state of equilibrium. The *Zwang* is to be considered as a case of Newton's first law. The achievement of equilibrium falls under the principle that the inner acceleration due to the *Zwang* of the system is at any moment the least which is compatible with bringing the disturbance to zero. We finally get the law that the equilibrium of a material system with an outer force is achieved in the shortest way consistent with the given conditions, which at least as far as vital systems are concerned is an assumption.

After showing with considerable success how these concepts apply to the dynamics of the cell, in the course of which presentation the unitary character of the latter in the carrying out of the various activities, especially cell division, is emphasized, the author attempts to grapple with the problem of consciousness. He recognizes that consciousness is primarily a tool for utilizing the

results of past experience as a means of adjustment to varying conditions. Viewing consciousness as a function of the nervous system, we can consider the latter as a mechanical system, and hence state the mind in terms of physics. This is of course a *petitio principii*, as is the assertion which is made elsewhere that living systems arise by a process of integration from dead. The author then gives a typically associationalistic and atomistic account of mental phenomena, in which memory, association, conception, judgment and even inference are regarded as forms of reaction built up in the establishing of a state of equilibrium with an obtruding world. Space forbids details, but the account is, as always happens, quite unsatisfactory.

Finally we come to development, both ontological and phylological. The fundamental fact about all development is that we always end with a system similar to the one with which we started. This has led to the idea of the continuity of the germ-plasm, *i. e.*, of material continuity. Ontological development is normally looked upon as a function of substances, not of an organized system. Here Cohen-Kysper sees in it, on the other hand, a process which represents the attempt of a certain organic unity (generally the germ cell), to restore its disturbed equilibrium. A system capable of developing an organism is an *Entwicklungspotential*. Its condition at any moment of the process is a phase. The specific character of the resultant organisms is to be accounted for on the basis of the fact that the nature of all germ cells is specific. By a further law, to the effect that when a system which has reached a certain stage in its development is removed from the conditions normally existing at this stage it returns to its initial phase from whence it completes the development, we can understand the phenomena of "Fortpflanzung durch Knospen, die Erscheinung des Generationswechsels, die Stockbildung niederer Tiere," regeneration and allied phenomena. This is the "*Gesetz der Rückkehr zur Ausgangsphase.*"

But how has any specific *Entwicklungspotential* come to be, *i. e.*, what is the process of evolution? Organisms themselves can only in a limited way be regarded as the carriers of the process, for they are constantly being destroyed while phylogenetic development is continuous. The bearer of the development is then the *Entwicklungspotential* of an organism and the organism only participates in so far as its changes influence the latter. Every alteration in evolution is to be regarded as a change in the *Entwicklungspotential* brought about either directly through external influences or through the reflecting back on the germ-plasm of alterations in the somatic parts of the organism itself. In the course of adjustment to the altering conditions, which is nothing but a method of restoring the disturbed equilibrium, the germ cells receive a permanent transformation, provided the change occurs often. New organs and their functions represent restored equilibrium in the presence of external stimuli. That the restoration of equilibrium should take place through integration is a specific property of the peculiar systems which are living beings.

One great point in favor of the views here advocated is to be noted—the abandonment of the attempt to understand life phenomena on the basis of the

material of which organisms are composed, and to substitute for this the study of living forms as structures or systems. Such a view may or may not lead to an explanation in terms of the ordinary concepts of physical science. But if this further consequence is not realized, still to understand the actual functions in terms of the complex structure itself seems the only method of rendering intelligible the whole field of animal behavior. Jennings seems to have come to some such conclusion. On the other hand, the attempt before us progresses but little in the direction of elucidating the vital processes. The application of certain concepts, like equilibrium, change of position, inertia, etc., in the latter is only significant provided it really renders the activities more intelligible in the sense that it gives us insight on the basis of which further definite facts may be anticipated and sought, and is not a mere transference of terms. The latter seems to be the case here. To call growth an attempt to restore equilibrium is valid enough in a sense, but it adds nothing to our concrete grasp of the details of the situation. And such hypotheses are sterile.

Many less important details could be added to our criticism. The account of mind is of course quite inadequate and hence vague. Also the apparent advocacy of the inheritance of acquired characteristics is at present quite unwarranted. And the whole work fails to show how on the basis adopted the differences between organisms which can learn and systems which can not, *i. e.*, how the results achieved by the study of animal behavior such as those of Jennings, are to be accounted for. Unwarranted assumptions are also frequent.

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The Theory of Relativity. By L. SILBERSTEIN. Macmillan and Co., London, 1914.—pp. viii, 295.

This scholarly and carefully written book is intended as an introduction to the recent development of physics known as the theory of relativity. The author presupposes on the part of the reader advanced knowledge of mathematics, such as vector analysis, and a considerable acquaintance with such branches of physics as electro-dynamics, etc. It is thus primarily a book for mathematical physicists. If the philosopher, however, is willing to descend from his architectonic heights and become a humble learner from a modest but competent and conscientious investigator, he is likely to receive much illumination concerning the meaning of such prevalent ideas as the laws of nature, time, space and causality. It is not that the author, like some other expositors of the newer theory of relativity, enters the lists in the fight against traditional ideas of physics. Dr. Silberstein is not inclined to emphasize the revolutionary character of the new ideas, but is rather concerned to show their intimate connection with the older ones. But, in spite of the fact that he is not concerned with the traditional problems of the philosophy of nature, anyone who follows his careful analysis of the ideas involved in the classical mechanics and their modification suggested by recent experimental work must realize

how vague and fanciful have been the classical philosophic data as to nature, motion, time, etc.

The first chapter is devoted to an exposition of the doctrine of relativity in the classical Newtonian mechanics. The dependence of the propositions which we know as the laws of nature, not only on our spatial system of reference, but also on the character of our time measurer, is brought out very clearly. Thus the classical physics is not concerned with absolute space or time, but gives only "sets of *simultaneous* states of motion of the various bodies, the time-keeper itself being included" (p. 6). Very instructive, also, is the way in which the principle or maxim of causality is explained in connection with the choice of clocks. The first and most general assumption of all physical investigation is "that our differential equations, representing the laws of physical and other phenomena, *should not contain the time*, the variable t, *explicitly*" (page 7). Or in the words of Maxwell, "the difference between one event and another does not depend on the mere difference of the times." When the laws of a physical system cannot be so expressed, every physicist will first of all try to throw the disturbance on some external agent rather than on his clock. If we find nothing in the nearest neighborhood, we look for further and deeper factors, and if we do not find real supplementary factors around us, we introduce *fictitious* supplements which may "turn out to be real afterwards, thus leading to new discoveries." Thus, a heated sphere losing its heat at a constant rate will be an example of an undisturbed system, but if the loss of heat varies at different times, we would introduce external factors, such as oxidization, etc., rather than assume that our clock varied. Though we always prefer to retain our traditional clock, it is possible to reduce our laws to the desired simplicity by reforming our clock. Thus, to get rid of one of the inequalities of the motion of the moon around the earth, astronomers have had recourse to the supposition that there is an actual slackening in the speed of the earth's rotation due to the tides. Further researches may oblige us to give up the kinetic time of astronomy for a better one, for example, electromagnetic time. "Thus, in the struggle for *completeness* of our physical universe, we shall have always to balance the mathematical theory of one of its fragments, or sides, against that of another. A great help in this struggle is to us the circumstance that, though, rigorously, all parts of what is called the universe interact with one another, yet we are not obliged to treat at once the whole universe, but can isolate from it relatively simple parts of fragments, which behave sensibly as complete systems, or are easily converted into such" (pp. 14–15).

The laws of classical mechanics of Galileo and Newton have no unique frame of reference, since if the Newtonian equations of motion are invariant relative to any system of reference, they are also invariant relative to any other framework having a uniform velocity of translation with reference to the latter. Nineteenth century physics tried to make the ether into a unique system of reference and thus replace absolute space. But all optical and electromagnetic experiments to detect "motion relative to the aether" have failed. The new theory of relativity shows that they must necessarily fail.

Chapters two to four trace the development of electromagnetic theory from Maxwell to Lorentz, showing how the dis-substantialization of the ether and the introduction of the notion of 'local time' gave rise to the investigation of Einstein as to the meaning of simultaneous events in different systems and the modern principle of relativity. The uniqueness of the latter consists in questioning the usual assumption that our clock is valid for all points of space, and that we know without further definition what we mean by simultaneous events in different places. The precise laws which enable us to pass from the time of one system to that of another moving with reference to it are known as the Lorentz transformations, and serve as the basis of the new non-Newtonian mechanics and of all that is valid in Maxwell's electro-magnetics. The remainder of the book (chapters five to ten) is devoted to working this out in detail.

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A History of Philosophy. By CLEMENT C. J. WEBB. New York, Henry Holt and Company; London, Williams and Norgate, n.d.—pp. 256.

This volume is No. 96 of the Home University Library. It covers the entire history of philosophy from Thales to the nineteenth century and accords at least a mention to nearly all the men whose names appear in the ordinary texts. To deal with such a subject matter in two hundred and fifty small pages calls for an extraordinary amount of compression, so much, in fact, that it is seriously questionable whether the result can justify the labor of the attempt. Some philosophical notables come off with a very scant treatment indeed. Hobbes, for example, receives only incidental mention chiefly in connection with Descartes, and Hume, aside from references in connection with Kant, is disposed of in two pages, less than is given to Heraclitus or Anaxagoras. Considering the requirements of the case, however, it is perhaps less surprising that the condensation has been violent than that it has not been more violent than it has. Whether even that part of the public which has the least interest in the technicalities of the subject can be expected to gain much understanding from an exposition so general, is another question. Since there are already a number of excellent short histories of philosophy in English, the need for the book is scarcely apparent. If the editors of the Library felt that completeness required them to furnish a history of philosophy, it would have been wiser to devote more than one volume to the subject, as they have done in the case of English political thought.

Assuming that the task had to be attempted in one volume, the author has done it well. The style is not only clear and free from technicalities, but is surprisingly lacking in unpleasant reminders of the condensation which the author has had to practice. If this effect is sometimes gained by devoting precious space to matters not strictly within the limits of philosophy, it is at least open to argument that a book of this kind gains more than it loses by this method. The interpretations follow, as might be expected, the traditional

paths, but they are accurate in spite of generality and remarkably few important matters fail altogether of mention. The most doubtful aspect of the author's work is the liberty which he takes with the chronological order. This is due, no doubt, to the necessity of grouping the material about thinkers of first class importance, but it seems as if this end might have been secured while keeping closer to the normal order, with some gain in the clearness of the development and no loss of space. For example, the author quite rightly considers the early Greek philosophers according to their relation to Plato, and to this end he distributes the accounts of them through his exposition of the latter. The order in which they appear, however, is extraordinary: The Milesians, Heraclitus, Socrates, the Sophists, Pythagoras, Parmenides, Zeno, and Anaxagoras. The Atomists do not appear at all until after Aristotle and in connection with the Epicureans. In a later chapter a similar inversion places the Renaissance after the Reformation.

GEORGE H. SABINE.

THE UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI.

L'intelligence sympathique. Par GUNDUMUR FINNBOGASON, docteur en philosophie. Traduit en collaboration avec l'auteur par André Courmont. Alcan, Paris, 1913.—16 mo, pp. 244.

This work, dedicated to Henri Bergson by an Icelandic disciple, contains an interesting development of the master's doctrine of intuition, applied by the author in an original manner to a specific problem. To comprehend another person intelligently as an individual one cannot merely regard him from the utilitarian point of view of one's own needs, or confine one's self to the abstract methods of science and classify him as a type. On the contrary, it is necessary to sympathize with him, and to share his feelings and emotions and modes of action, for it is these that make him an individual. The interpretation of the way in which it is possible for one to arrive at such a sympathetic understanding (*l'intelligence sympathique*) of the personality of another, gives the author his problem, and the title of his book.

The author's main contention is that this sympathetic understanding is gained through the psychological processes of imitation and suggestion. We can only understand the emotions of another by feeling them ourselves, and to do this we must consciously or unconsciously imitate his facial expression and other bodily manifestations of emotion, and so reproduce his emotions in ourselves. An emotion which we cannot thus reproduce we fail to understand. The same principle is involved in the interpretation of the individuality of persons whom we have never met,—whose acquaintance we form through their writings. We accommodate ourselves to their individuality by reproducing in ourselves their modes of feeling and action. The individual characters produced by poets and other artists, whether human beings, animals, plants, or personified inanimate objects, are created in accordance with similar principles. These laws also apply to the understanding and production of music, painting, architecture, history, biography, and all efforts to portray uniqueness

and individuality, in contrast to the scientific endeavor to secure abstract generalizations capable of repetition.

The author's thesis is strongly presented, and in the main convincing. The imitation of emotions is doubtless adequate in many instances to explain what is requisite to understand the passing mood of another, or to catch the spirit of a poem or a piece of music or a picture. And in order really to understand the individual character of another we can well believe that such imitation is always necessary; though for this, as it appears to me, something additional is also required. For the individuality of any human character is not a mere aggregate of feelings; it is a synthesis of sentiments, as McDougall and Shand have shown. Such a synthesis is always to some extent a logical, rational organization of impulses into an organic unity. To understand the character of another, a logical interpretation is necessary, and unfortunately this is impossible on the Bergsonian position, which restricts all logic to the logic of identity. A complete explanation of how we come to understand the individuality of others would require a cutting loose from Bergson, and the adoption, perhaps, of a neo-Hegelian logic, in the manner of Bosanquet. Although the author has, therefore, not told the whole story, he has, nevertheless, made a worthy contribution in his doctrine of *L'intelligence sympathique*, and he deserves consideration at the hands of students of the psychology of æsthetics and of ethics.

WILLIAM K. WRIGHT.

CORNELL UNIVERSITY.

The following books also have been received:

Artists and Thinkers. By L. W. FLACCUS. New York, Longmans, Green, and Co., 1916.—pp. 200. $1.25 net.

The Crowd in Peace and War. By SIR MARTIN CONWAY. New York, Longmans, Green, and Co., 1915.—pp. 332. $1.75 net.

A Beginner's Psychology. By EDWARD BRADFORD TITCHENER. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1915.—pp. xvi, 362. $1.00.

Who Is Insane? By STEPHEN SMITH. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1916.—pp. 285. $1.25.

Elizabethan Criticism of Poetry. By GUY ANDREW THOMPSON. Menasha, Wis., George Banta Publishing Company, 1914.—pp. 216.

An Introduction to Ethics. By G. A. JOHNSTON. London, Macmillan and Co., Limited, 1915.—pp. x, 254. 3 shillings net.

The Persian Systems of Philosophy. By A. WORSLEY. Isleworth, A. Worsley, 1915.—pp. ii, 35. 5 shillings net.

L'Intelligence et la Vie. Par CLODIUS PIAT. Paris, Felix Alcan, 1915.—pp. viii, 227.

De Bonald. Par HENRI MOULINIÉ. Paris, Felix Alcan, 1916.—pp. v, 464.

SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.

[ABBREVIATIONS.—*Am. J. Ps.* = *The American Journal of Psychology*; *Ar. de Ps.* = *Archives de Psychologie*; *Ar. f. G. Ph.* = *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*; *Ar. f. sys. Ph.* = *Archiv für systematische Philosophie*; *Br. J. Ps.* = *The British Journal of Psychology*; *Int. J. E.* = *International Journal of Ethics*; *J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth.* = *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*; *J. de Psych.* = *Journal de Psychologie*; *Psych. Bul.* = *Psychological Bulletin*; *Psych. Rev.* = *Psychological Review*; *Rev. de Mét.* = *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*; *Rev. Néo-Sc.* = *Revue Néo-Scolastique*; *Rev. Ph.* = *Revue Philosophique*; *Rev. de Ph.* = *Revue de Philosophie*; *R. d. Fil.* = *Rivista di Filosofia*; *V. f. w. Ph.* = *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie*; *Z. f. Ph. u. ph. Kr.* = *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*; *Z. f. Psych.* = *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane, I. Abtl.: Zeitschrift für Psychologie.* —Other titles are self-explanatory.]

The Self and Mental Phenomena. ROBERT MACDOUGALL. Psych. Rev., XXIII, 1, pp. 1–30.

The study of the mental life may be approached from three points of view: the practical, the scientific, and the philosophical. The first considers mind as an instrument in relation to practical ends and purposes. It views mind not as a direct object of study, but as a means to bringing about some change in the external world. The scientific view regards mind as a system in itself, without reference to its use as an instrument, or its absolute status in the universe. Taking the complex of mental phenomena, it views them in their rational order as making up a whole or system. But the mental life as given is not merely a process of events in time; it has a unity which is an immediate and indefeasible reality of our experience. This unity in its highest expression is the self. The self is the *summum genus* of the psychologist. The self is postulated in all experience. I can be aware of nothing without being aware, at the same time, of myself as knower. But the psychologist is not interested in the self as a unit of practical activity, nor as an element in the metaphysical interpretation of experience. What value then has the self as a term in the scientific study of mind? It has a specific meaning as denoting a particular phase of the mental life; the consciousness of self. This element in the neutral life is real, but not important. The self, again, may be used to denote in a material way the totality of mental phenomena with which psychology is concerned. But 'mind' is a better word in this connection, since it is free from secondary meanings. Finally, self may be used to denote the logical limit of reference postulated in the definition of the science itself. Whatever belongs to the field of study must have a unity of correlation with other mental phenomena, and a qualitative identity of content which may be characterized by saying that everything the psychologist touches must be conceived in terms

of individual subjective experience. The self thus marks the limit within which every inquiry falls.

D. T. HOWARD.

Der Schönheitsbegriff bei Kant und Lessing. G. ROSENTHAL. Kantstudien, XX, 2 u. 3, 174–186.

The author finds six points of similarity between the æsthetic theories of Kant and Lessing. (1) Kant recognizes the preëminence of dependent beauty, *i. e.*, that which perfectly fulfills a rational ideal, over free or merely formal beauty, as of flowers or landscape. Lessing speaks occasionally as if he were following Winkelmann in setting up the preëminence of form, but for the most part agrees on this point with Kant. (2) For both Kant and Lessing the æsthetic ideal is an expression of the moral dignity of man. (3) Both theorists distinguish between the ugly, which can be subordinated to design, and so used in beautiful art, and the loathesome, which must be entirely eliminated, until Death itself is represented by a beautiful spirit. (4) Both Kant and Lessing give poetry the preëminence among the arts, since "the painting of ideas" which is poetry, expands the imagination beyond the limits of the merely sensible. (5) Lessing uses "Malerei" as a generic term for all the plastic arts. Kant points out the fundamental significance of painting as drawing, and its superior ability among the plastic arts to penetrate into the region of ideas. (6) Both Kant and Lessing look upon the expression of moral beauty as the high and ultimate function of the beautiful arts. Whoever believes in the moral dignity of man will naturally subordinate all other values to it. But the detailed agreement between Kant and Lessing is more than the result of this common fundamental conviction. Kant mentions Lessing and Batteau as the only completely universal art critics. Kant's use in the *Critique of Judgment* (1790) not only of the *Laocoön* but also of Lessing's other work, especially of those parts of it published (1728) in the second edition of the *Laocoön*, can be in several instances almost verbally demonstrated.

MARION D. CRANE.

Los fundamentos biologicos de la moral. AUGUSTO BUNGE. Revista de Filosfia, I, 4, pp. 69–83.

The vital imperative imposes upon us its laws, of which the moral laws are only its subjective aspects. That duty which makes the human pair toil for its progeny is the subjective aspect of what makes the pair of sparrows toil for its progeny. The vital imperative cannot be categorical in animals, for it is actualized in their automatic instincts. Its execution is satisfaction, its hindrance suffering. An instinct is infallible in the operations for which it exists but it may be blind when confronted by the unforeseen, for its phases are interrelated like the movements of a watch, and it is therefore difficult to vary them. Instinct is memory made concrete in the anatomical structure. It represents the acquisitions from the experience of the preceding generations made indispensable to the life of the species. Its acts are apprehended by the

animal as the somnambulist apprehends his acts in the state of sleep. The attempts of the individual to solve a new situation may represent the painful beginning of a new racial experience. Instinct is specific, impersonal, infallible. Conscious intelligence, on the other hand, only arranges the fund of experience of a lifetime. It is personal, fallible, and variable. Instinct is conservative; conscious intelligence lives through innovation. The individual becomes personalized in the measure in which conscience extends in, and automatically opposes itself to, the impersonal experiences of the species. The vital imperative cannot, however, be actualized in the conscious intelligence as in instinctive acts which have become perfectly adapted by natural selection. Conscience therefore cannot be implicitly virtuous. Hence the necessity of morality, which tends to formulate explicitly those laws of the vital imperative which exist objectively and actuate us. Progress is the adaptation of customs and legislation to the new laws which the vital imperative dictates. It is worth while, then, to try to investigate these laws for the purpose of adaptation and to seek the means of making all individuals capable of conforming to them. The moral individual is one skilled in the art of living his life in conformity with his own imperative. Our imperative aspiration is, however, only an episode in the universal life the significance of which we ought first to comprehend.

ALLEN J. THOMAS.

The Relation of Idea to Object-matter as a Universal Mode of Cognition. CHARLES E. HOOPER. Mind, No. 96, pp. 498–515.

The thinker cannot escape the psychological conditions of thought, one of which is that thought is an essentially contemplative function, which, at least at the level of philosophic thinking, consciously detaches itself from object-matter. Only through thought can any non-intellectual elements of experience be known. In the perplexity of experience, thought is both a part and a necessary factor in ensuring that future shall differ from past or present in such ways as to come within the scope of human volition. Any of the states of consciousness, when conceived as actually passing, may be termed a *process-content: process* refers to a peculiar relation to the past course of life; *content*, to a general relation of sameness of quality. Empirical imagination of particular forms is the fundamental stratum of thought as experience; but this gives no data to science or to philosophy, except as it causes descriptive propositions containing general ideas. *Notion* may mean a distinguished content of thought or a particular process-content of intellectual experience. A notion, then, is a *specimen* of some idea. The thoughts actually experienced are always made up of notions as such, and never of ideas as such. Language is evidently a collective product and possession. All truly typical ideas and the ideal science of which they form elements belong to the life of humanity. The purpose of an idea, for science or for philosophy, is to be *true* to some reality. All truth involves an essentially duomodal relation—that of a true symbol to reality; but this does not mean a relation of categorical agreement. Graphic

ideas play an important part in building up knowledge; but discursive ideas are more widely and more intensively symbolic. Ideas are not cognisable in themselves until they are symbolised by terms and connected in propositions; even then the relation of idea to object-matter is obscure. It is by means of ideas of all sorts that various human individuals realise their co-participation in a vast common object-matter of knowledge. Thought is a legitimate object-matter for ulterior thought, and must be analysed in any theory of knowledge. Philosophy is especially concerned with those fundamental modes of being, knowing, and relationship which are referred to by all sciences or by important groups of sciences, or which cause the divisions between the great departments of science. Modern philosophy in general recognises that knowledge of physical reality cannot be direct. The present article would suggest a somewhat new way of approaching the problem. The real question is, how ideas which are essentially contemplative and which shape themselves through predicative thought, can be a means of knowing experience which is not predicative or contemplative. Discursive contemplation must be brought into relation to actual perception. Though the first object-matter of philosophy is reality at large, this can be approached only through the processes of scientific thinking, which belongs to the second object-matter of philosophy—the human microcosm, whose outer aspect is the *Body of Humanity* and whose inner aspect is the *Mind of Humanity*.

ELLEN B. ARMSTRONG.

Mutation Concepts in Relation to Organic Structure. R. RUGGLES GATES. The Monist, XXV, 4, pp. 531–555.

The idea of discontinuity in variation has steadily grown in importance since 1900; and we can now analyse the nature of mutation. *Œnothera lata* is a mutant from *O. Lamarckiana*. It has 15 instead of 14 chromosomes in its nuclei; this is because its germ cell, when formed, receives an additional chromosome above its normal 7. This extra chromosome appears in the fertilized egg and is passed on by cell division (mitosis) to every cell in the organism. The mutation is, therefore, a cell change propagated by mitosis, and the peculiarities of *lata* result from the fact that every nucleus contains an extra chromosome. In the same way all other mutations of *Œnothera* result from different kinds of cell change. In order to be completely inherited the variation must arise in the nucleus of some cell in the germ track of the organism, and in the new organism the change dates from the fertilized egg. Some of these nuclear changes are morphological, others are chemical. This implies that there is abundant material for divergent and multifarious evolution. It also shows that the hypothesis, based on Mendelian experimentation with hybrids, that mutation is due to the presence or absence of some factor in the germ plasm, is inadequate. The author's view implies that in the origin of any pair of Mendelian characters, we do not have a mere dropping out of some factor of the germ plasm, giving the negative or recessive type, but a modification of the positive character to produce the negative, and *vice versa*. The symbols of the

presence-absence hypothesis are of value in dealing with the inheritance of Mendelian characters, but we must modify the terminology when dealing with the *origin* of these character-differences. In reference, now, to the evolutionism of Bergson, the author is inclined to accept the criticisms of Bergson's metaphysics and epistemology offered by Bertrand Russel. Bergson is correct in his insistence upon phylogenetic divergence and occasional developments. He is also correct in his view that there is no predetermined course of evolution, if this means that the particular directions of various phylogenies are narrowly limited by conditions of the earth's surface. Bergson asks how we can explain the development of the eye in mollusks and vertebrates from purely fortuitous circumstances. But he increases the difficulty by assuming that inherited variations arise independently and simultaneously in different parts of the organism. Our view implies that the variations are all expressions of an original change in the fertilized egg. He finds difficulty in such variations being considered complementary. But one organ may influence and even produce another organ, as in the case of the tadpole's skin, which, when grafted over the developing optic vescicle, becomes a lens. Bergson asks how the small variations could have been preserved and accumulated. This question assumes that the various stages in the perfecting of an organ are in themselves of no service to the organism. The important fact that apparently new organs are often a remoulding of old organs must not be forgotten. But the changes must be correlated and must be such as to make survival and evolution possible, to be inherited at all. Some changes are advantageous, some bizarre, and some harmful. Let us now consider parallel development, as in the case of the molluscan and vertebrate eye. There are several types of eyes among the invertebrates, of which only one type is parallel to the vertebrate eye. The mollusks have frequently very many eyes, and these of different types, in the same organism. Bergson selects this complex case, and declares that science cannot explain it; the scientist points to simpler cases as affording a clue for the explanation. Thus wings have been evolved many times independently. Bergson finds a difficulty for science in the case of complex instincts, such as the instinct of the beetle Sitaris. But every variation implies a basis in the fertilized egg and is effective throughout the whole ontogeny. Every ontogenetic stage is modified by this initial change. This is clearly the case with structural modifications, and also applies to instincts, as these latter must have a structural foundation. No doubt it is hard to understand the transmission of complex instincts on the basis of germ-plasm, but this is no harder to conceive than the hereditary transmission of intellectual differences in man.

W. CURTIS SWABEY.

The Ethics of the Family. JAMES HAYDEN TUFTS. Int. J. E., Vol. XXVI, No. 2, pp. 223–240.

That the negative family morality of the past, with its command, 'Thou shalt not,' has failed, is proved by the present decreasing birthrate among the educated classes, the prevalence of divorce, illegitimacy and kindred evils.

A new positive family ethics must be formed, taking account, not only of the changing economic and social conditions, but of four new values: woman's freedom and development, the child, sex and motherhood, and a sound stock for national life. If the general form of family life is to remain—and it doubtless will remain—it must emphasize its positive values. The needed emphasis varies in the case of the middle and working class family. The former tend to marry too late and to have too few children; for them the social significance of the family for the community should be emphasized. The latter tend to have too many children and to fail to realize domestic, parental responsibility; for them the values of health and opportunity for mothers and children should be emphasized, and the level of intelligence raised. Will the new ethics favor a closer economic unit or a greater economic independence of the woman? Again the answer is not the same for the middle and working classes. For the former no general rules seem necessary, the answer depending on the woman's ability, taste, and the number and age of the children. For the latter, the kind of occupation necessarily pursued would hardly make work without the home desirable. Another question the new family ethics must face is that of public care versus home provision for children. The tendency is now toward public care; but children cannot dispense with parents, nor can parents afford to lose their close association with children. Present evils of family life can in time be abolished. The new family ethics may set as its ideal higher standards of fitness for marriage, of equality, fidelity, and affection in marriage, and of joy in children. It may magnify both the mission of the soul to refine the sense, and that of the sense to refine the soul. For the family will not thrive by denying either mind or body, but only by uniting both.

GERTRUDE Q. BAKER.

Psychology of Animism. CARVETH READ. Br. J. Ps., VIII, I, pp. 1–33.

Animism includes: (1) Hyperphysical Animism—attributing natural occurrences to the action of conscious spirits separable from the body; (2) Psychological Animism—attributing to both animate and inanimate things voluntary, purposive action, and a consciousness like our own inseparable from the body; and (3) Animatism—attributing to inanimate things some vague, partial form of consciousness. Animatism is a primitive, necessary, spontaneous illusion with savages; but Psychological Animism is a specialized temporary attitude or acquired way of imagining or of dealing with things. Conscious agency is attributed to non-human things only when they are injurious, dangerous, noisy, extraordinary, or when they seem to move spontaneously or are connected with totemism, magic or rites. Hyperphysical Animism probably arose from belief in human ghosts, a belief suggested perhaps by shadows, reflections, dreams, and hallucinations, and explaining sleep, fainting, epilepsy, sickness and death. Some savages confuse dreams with their waking experience or regard them as omens of good or revelations of this or another world. The appearance of the dead in dreams gives rise to the belief in their continued existence or immortality. The belief in ghosts is universal among savages and

is the first and most persistent motive in literature. Yet savages assign ghosts to non-human things only when there is a special reason for doing so, *e. g.*, when something is widely feared or loved or is connected with burial rites or is needed in the mythological explanations of the nature of the spirit-world. The original inhabitants of the invisible world were probably ghosts; but in time spirits thought never to have been incarnated take their place beside them, perhaps because their incarnation has been forgotten, or deliberately denied to enhance their dignity, or has become inconsistent with some mythical interpretation of their nature. Sometimes, however, spirits that have never been incarnate are imagined after the analogy of ghosts under the influence of language structure or for explanatory purposes in myths or in connection with totemism, nature worship or the personification of qualities and abstract ideas. Ghosts and spirits are imagined after the analogy of men, though variously by different tribes, because of their connection with the body, of their appearance in dreams, of their manipulation by sorcerers and story-tellers, and of the difficulty of imagining them otherwise than as men. Spirits marry and kill, and mix in human affairs. They have bodies composed of an invisible material 'soul-stuff,' the substance of all things in shadow-land. They live on spirits of an animatistic sort of consciousness. The conception of 'soul-stuff' develops into the metaphysical conception of 'substance' or into that of a 'world-soul.' With a belief in transmigration, or a mystical aversion to sensuosity or metaphysical refinements on the distinction between matter and mind, comes the notion of a pure spirit. Some attribute a natural and others a divine origin and destiny to souls. Their dwelling place and fortunes hereafter are determined by their age, rank, nature, or manner of death. The chief motive in man's behavior towards ghosts and treatment of them is fear, which often fills his life with terror, objectless suspicion, and a sense of helplessness, and which prompts to migration, propitiatory rites, or painful and disgusting practises leading to the destruction of family, tribesmen, and self. Affection prompts to rites, lamentations, and the cherishing of relics. There is also operative the economic motive of securing the aid of spirits in attempts to attain food, trade, riches, power, or the object of revenge or love. A host of other motives play a part as Animism develops. Since edifices of thought presuppose as models edifices of matter, or in fact, the development of Animism requires (1) the rise of manual occupations educating constructive ability; (2) the development of social and political organization; (3) the means of recording advances made; (4) an educated, thinking, leisure class to introduce order and consistency into the chaos of existing ideas. The evolution of Animism takes the form of a differentiation in the character, power, and rank of spirits, and at the same time, a closer unity into families and polities analogous to those of men. At this point Animism merges into religion. Dynastic and priestly ambitions enter in, representing the interest of society in order. A sophisticated Animism is imposed upon the people by authority, suggestion, or deception, the end supposedly justifying the means. Vague beliefs are replaced by reflected tenets; fear of ghosts, by awe, attachment,

duty, or loyalty to the gods. But the rise of Positivism and democracy and the inability of the reflective mind to make the existence of evil and responsibility compatible with Theism contribute to the dissolution of Animism, and the power that comprehends all powers ceases to be an object, and becomes the immanence of all things good and evil.

RAYMOND P. HAWES.

Lotze's Relation to Idealism. E. E. THOMAS. Mind, N. S., 96, pp. 481–497.

Lotze holds that there is an order of validity independent of the order of existence, a distinction leading him towards idealism. (1) In this phase of his thought he makes the unity of order prior to that of existence. The connections of things follow an æsthetic necessity grounded in the nature of them. The nature of things lives but is not exhausted in their existence. Validity then finds reality in eternal truth. Change, existence, and truth he conceives as bound together in an essential unity. (2) But he tends also to depart from idealism and to regard personality as the unifying medium. (*a*) On the one hand he maintains that the unity and meaning of existence consist in the fact that all things are parts or states of a single being. But meaning does not appear apart from consciousness. (*b*) So on the other hand he holds that the personality of the world as a whole involves the existence and interplay of lesser personalities. These in their activity seek to bring a unity of objective experience into their lives. This is the essence of moral activity. which takes place with reference to what is universally and objectively good. Lotze identifies this objective good with the metaphysical unity of the universe, and holds that this whole, since it is active, and pervaded by goodness, must be a person. But the activity of the whole cannot be in order to bring new experience into its life, and so must consist in the ordering anew of content already there. So Lotze tries to show its purposive activity to be a form of Becoming, a maintaining of self-identity. This activity he sometimes attributes to the individuals, sometimes to the whole as such. He wants the end to be, however, not only self-maintainance, but positive Beauty in the form of an ever-developing order. This forces him to read a causal connection into the events of history. Thus ultimate reality turns out to be not a system, but a pluralism. Lotze then assumes a Divine Being and an order of spirits cooperating for a common experience of happiness. But this presupposes a division of the universe into a material and a spiritual world, and gives a false distinction between feeling and content.

MARION D. CRANE.

Nietzsche on the Problem of Reality. W. M. SALTER. Mind, No. 96, pp. 441–463.

The essential logic of Nietzsche's procedure in the problem of reality may be summarised under four headings. (1) *The world is not real.* It is merely our creation in response to stimuli. We do not even know our own bodies in their real nature. The molecules and atoms of science are no more real; they are

only what we should see and handle if we had finer senses. Even in the psychological world, Nietzsche—though he does not deny its reality—finds elements which are purely imagined. (2) *We make the world real.* Life needs certain things upon which to fasten itself. "We project our conditions of maintenance, and turn them into predicates of existence." Practical need plays an important part also in determining our beliefs in general. It is this—not theory—which makes our common notions of causality, of being and becoming, etc. Even values are of our making. A great part of our belief and knowledge, then, has nothing to do with truth. (3) *Is there any reality?* His very language concerning illusion, truth, error, indicates a reality which is ultimate; again, the stimuli which produce our sensations, Nietzsche regards as *not* self-generated. We do not know the world from which they come, but we 'receive' them. But reality is not the world of science,—atoms and forces; it is not 'things-in-themselves,' out of relation; and most emphatically it is not a pure and changeless being. Nietzsche can really give no content to objective reality. What he does is to view the problem now from a new view point. (4) *Reality as power and will to power.* From our fellow-men we get the notion of realities outside of us. Again, distinguishing between true and false in the outside world is perhaps impossible, but putting up an end and trying to make things go that way is what every strong man does. Finding the will to power basal in himself, Nietzsche considers it thus also in other men. Then, may not the world in its real nature be made up of centres of power struggling with each other?—This construction Nietzsche offers purely as an hypothesis. The will to power is with him primarily an analysis or interpretation of reality. The notion of power is not merely physical, but includes the instinct of power behind *mental* operations and in the various *moralities* of men. The view may be described as Pluralistic Voluntarism. Physical motion, the forces and actions of physics and chemistry, are to be explained as the action of will upon will everywhere. The central life-instinct is not self-preservation merely, but this will to power, which means not only to dominate, but to dominate by incorporating. When the living substance takes more than it can control, it divides itself; but there is no altruism in the process. Propagation, then, is secondary and derived. Whatever does not command must obey; this is the real distinction between means and end in an organism. Degeneration and death may mean actual progress. The mass of men sacrificed to the making of a single, higher, stronger species of men would be an advance. This relation of controller and controlled in any form of organic life involves Nietzsche's order of rank, which plays so important a part in his social speculations. The whole gamut of things he interprets in terms of power and will to power.

ELLEN B. ARMSTRONG.

Über die wahre Bestimmung der Geschichtsschreibung der Philosophie. DR. DAVID EINHORN, Ar. f. G. Ph., XXII, 1, pp. 34–42.

During the nineteenth century several conceptions of the history of philosophy were current, of which two especially interest us. The first of these

views the course of philosophical history as the self-developing of an over-individual whole. It is a philosophy of the history of philosophy. The second view questions what results are attained by means of history toward the understanding of the philosophers. Back of this question lies the conviction that history detracts from rather than adds to our comprehension of the philosopher. Schopenhauer's opposition to the history of philosophy is typical. We should, he believes, go directly to the philosophers, and not allow somebody else to chew our food for us. His arguments, although clever enough, are prejudiced. Now Karl Joel prophesies that the history of philosophy as a science will ultimately destroy itself, by becoming more and more lost in the minute intracacies of philology. It appears, rather, that we are approaching the beginning of a new epoch, which will require a new method in the writing of the history of philosophy. What that method will be is a further question.

D. T. HOWARD.

The Religious Implications of Bergson's Philosophy regarding Intuition and the Primacy of Spirit. L. H. MILLER. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., XII, 23, pp. 617–632.

Bergson's philosophy is a reaction against intellectualism and determinism in science and philosophy, which influences he attributes to the employment of the method of physics, mathematics, or pure logic beyond its legitimate sphere of application. His own method is that of biology and psychology; hence he emphasizes the primacy of spirit in the universe, of the free, creative activity of God and the human soul. The charges of materialism urged against Bergson are without foundation. While admitting the part played by matter in the development of consciousness, and attempting to bring mind and matter together, he holds that mind is neither derived from matter nor explainable by matter. Rather, mind and matter spring from one great spiritual source, the *elan vital* or God, a supra-consciousness, very probably a personality, a cosmic soul struggling against mechanism and matter and attempting to realize itself in a creative process of evolution, of which organic, psychical, and social systems are but results, servants, or manifestations, and of which the goal is the freedom and personality found in man. Materialism is refuted by the fact that matter, though known only in part, is known directly or is as it is perceived; hence, it cannot create consciousness; hence, the soul is an independent spiritual reality. The soul is pure memory, an indivisible continuity, an unconscious psychic state, choosing, creating, retaining all that is significant in its past, powerful over matter, and probably surviving matter as a distinct personality of a higher form of existence, for which it has been prepared by its passage though matter. If we can bring God and the soul together as independent spiritual realities, religion is assured, for religion is the feeling of not being alone in the world, the sense of a relationship between the individual and the spiritual source of life. The medium of communication and mutual giving of God and man is intuition. Intuition is a direct apprehension, an inner, mystical vision, instinct become self-conscious. It alone is the organ

of discovery, progress, and adequate knowledge of the *elan vital*. Therefore it is more fundamental than intellect, dialectic, symbolism, science, and philosophy, which, however, are absolutely necessary for practical purposes, such as collating, analysing, applying, exposing false philosophies, presenting, defending, and verifying intuition. Bergson's philosophy is not opposed to science and the intellect; it is not a return to empty emotionalism or blind animal instinct. Intuition supplements science and must spring out of and be tested by facts. It is like the experience of a man who after long study and investigation and wide and intimate knowledge of fact, puts himself at the heart of his subject by a supreme act of concentrated sympathy and imagination. Consequently, Bergson's mysticism escapes the weaknesses of the older mysticisms: their vagaries, self-centeredness, otherworldliness, obscurity and unethical or anti-ethical tendencies. It is a mysticism with a scientific filling, a subjective ecstasy tempered by objective science and historical fact. It leads to a religious, social, ethics, in which, however, the choice of the individual plays an all-important part. It is compatible with the religious and ethical doctrines of Christianity and with a theistic interpretation of life.

RAYMOND P. HAWES.

Sur la Mémoire affective. LOUIS WEBER. Rev. de Mét., xxii, 6, 794–813.

Although memory is usually of events, beings, objects, images, and ideas, and not of emotion, the author thinks there is evidence of affective memory. In its typical form, the affective precedes the intellectual element, and so can be distinguished from an original emotion called up by the recollection of past events. The most interesting affective memories are not those of intense and epoch-making emotions, whose associated ideas are distinct, but of states as little representative as possible. Th. Ribot gives as an instance the faint reverberation of emotion aroused by passing a certain house,—a confused feeling-state brought to memory by a sensation or group of sensations, and afterward related to its proper intellectual setting. M. Piéron notes the power of an odor, definite and yet undefined, to do this. At the moment, the experience feels old, and foreign to actual present existence; it is fugitive and unstable. These are obviously the characteristics, not of a new state, but of a feeling remembered. States of feeling which reappear in this manner belong usually, as M. Piéron points out, to the period of puberty. He thinks such experiences practically universal, but difficult to report in psychological language. They should not, perhaps, be called emotions, for they are pure and simple 'manners of being,'—the revival of kinæsthetic sensations which formerly belonged to the 'me.' The author relates various personal experiences of kinæsthetic memory, when odors, or total environmental conditions, brought up vivid recollections of the youthful 'me,' superimposed on the 'hard,' grown-up 'me,' and made more vivid by contrast with it. These experiences are without apparent motives, but not without real causes, physical factors external and internal, which produce their effects involuntarily. The total influence of environment awakes affective recollections more surely

than any unique perception. It is evident, however, that external conditions are not sufficient by themselves to cause recollections of this sort, since they are comparatively rare. Internal conditions must also be present. The author has been in good health of mind and body whenever he has had such experiences. This is an argument against their being cases of paramnesia or false memory, which is usually concident with fatigue. A change in the rhythm of existence, a return, for instance, to the simple living conditions of childhood and youth, would seem likely to evoke these kinæsthetic memories. Perhaps they make up part of the charm of convalescence. Changes of season are also favorable to them, especially the first breath of spring. Visceral sensations are undoubtedly important factors in these experiences. Indeed some theorists declare these sensations to be the basis of all emotion. Probably the glands with internal secretions play an obscure but significant rôle. Perhaps the tendency of old age to recollections back of the age of puberty is connected with affective states induced by the atrophy of the sexual glands. Kinæsthetic memories are not images, but states of being. The affective memory seems entirely useless, but as an example of memory it is, in highly typical instances, perfect, far exceeding in vivacity the ordinary memory of perceptions and representations. It is indeed the ephemeral resurrection of an entire being. We may suppose, however, that in a weakened form these kinæsthetic memories are constantly present to the subconscious mind, and afford a basis for our feeling of self-identity. If this be true, the intellectual memory would be secondary in importance to the affective. The immortality of the soul is indeed a cold invention of spiritualism. It is easy to understand why theologians believe in the resurrection of the body. But the ultimate solidarity between the physico-chemical life of our organisms and the psychical function of our higher nervous centres complicates the notion of psycho-physical parallelism. It can therefore be considered a legitimate postulate, but not a principle of explanation.

MARION D. CRANE.

Die Philosophie des "es ist." CHRISTOPH SCHWANKTE. Ar. f. sys. Ph., XXI, 2, pp. 197–214.

The present paper deals with the relation between consciousness and physical processes, and offers a simple solution of the problem. The natural scientist, working from the side of brain structure, has difficulty in finding a place for consciousness, which is not capable of measurement. We approach the problem from another angle. All scientific propositions answer the questions,—what is? where is? how is? why is?,—and can be cast into the form "It is. . . ." The question as to the meaning of "It is" is anterior to and independent of any scientific doctrines. "It is" means that "*man hat festgestellt*," that it is affirmed, or posited. The human consciousness is the absolute subject of all possible affirmations and existential propositions. There are three methods of affirming existential propositions, the natural scientific, the psychological, and the evaluating methods. The first works through absolute likenesses

and measurable quantities. Its ideal goal is to reduce the world to a physico-chemical system and man to a machine. The second method of affirming existential propositions, the psychological, works with what is not measurable, but it seeks psychic uniformities. Both methods can be applied to human and animal behavior. The third method, the evaluating method, affirms truth or falsity, goodness and badness, etc. This third method applies also to human conduct. There is no causal connection between the psychic and physical systems, for each is a series of existential propositions resulting from the application of its own method. Different individuals arrive at identical existential propositions, because they have the same sense-impressions and the same methods of affirmation. Sense-impressions are ultimately given facts which we must assume but cannot explain. The natural scientific method of judging leaves values out of account, but involves them, as its results themselves must be either true or false. From the point of view of the natural scientific method, man is a machine, from that of the psychological method he is a 'psyche' and from that of the evaluating method he is free. This freedom renders it impossible that the natural scientific method should ever attain its goal. The general form of moral value in human conduct is that that is good which opens the way to unlimited self-repetition and to increase of activity. Thus in the relations of the sexes that is sound which makes sound offspring possible. In industry that is a 'value' which leads to the production of higher values. In the realm of law we find that what is valuable is what is useful for the preservation and advancement of the community as a whole. In science, what is valuable or true, is what can be applied in all times and in all places, and can be carried forward. In relation to the morality of social groups, that is moral which can be done and continued by all members of the group. This general rule does not apply in art, however, where the judgment of value is immediate. Art is the free play of our possibilities. As we all have the same possibilities, the æsthetic judgment has a claim to universality. In religion we are aware of our possibilities, or spiritual powers, in themselves. God is not the creator of the world. The divine in us is the sum of our possibilities, and from this we can form an idea of God, as an 'Idea of Practical Reason.' From our possibilities there flow social relationships, and thus God is the source of love. And there are truly religious deeds, as there are works of art, which call forth our powers most deeply.

W. CURTIS SWABEY.

NOTES.

By the death of Professor Alexander Thomas Ormond on the seventeenth of last December American philosophy lost one of its distinguished representatives and teachers. Professor Ormond was born in Pennsylvania in 1847, and was graduated from Princeton University in 1877. He was for three years (1880–1883) professor of philosophy in the University of Minnesota. From 1883–1913 his philosophical activities were associated with the chair of philosophy which he occupied in Princeton. In the summer of 1913 he accepted the presidency of Grove City College. Among his writings may be mentioned *Basal Concepts in Philosophy*, 1894; *Foundations of Knowledge*, 1900; *Concepts of Philosophy*, 1906.

As a philosophical teacher, Professor Ormond was long a dominating influence in the intellectual life of Princeton. He believed that philosophy was not only a doctrine but a life; and throughout all his teaching one felt the vitality of the process by which he always sought to make his theories real expressions of living experience. Students who were in any sense serious-minded men and who had come to philosophy not merely "to talk about it but to know its power" found in him—in the frank and unclouded genuineness of his guileless personality and in his vital and profound grasp of the living issues of thought and life—an inspiring companion and guide. As James McCosh had influenced him, so he influenced them. He became "the beloved teacher and friend, who by example and precept brought his pupils to live in the presence of the great Reality."

He was "a square-set man and honest"—a man who had seen the divine vision and who, through the transparent simplicity and lovableness of his life, gave to all those associated with him in the search for truth an example which can never be forgotten.

ROGER B. C. JOHNSON.

Mr. Bertrand Russell has accepted a call to Harvard University. He will lecture next year on Logic and Ethics.

The review of Aliotta's book, *The Idealistic Reaction Against Science*, which appeared in the January number of the Review, was written by Mr. Joshua C. Gregory, and not by Joshua C. Reynolds, as printed.

We give below a list of articles in current philosophical magazines.

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY, XXVII, 1: *Josephine Nash Curtis*, Duration and the Temporal Judgment; *Frederick Lyman Wells*, On the Psycho-Motor Mechanisms of Typewriting; *Walter B. Swift*, Some Developmental Psychology in Lower Animals and in Man and its Contribution to Certain Theories of Adult Mental Tests; *Harold E. Burrt*, Factors which Influence the Arousal of the Primary Visual Memory Image; *Lucile Dooley*, A Study in Correlation of Normal Complexes by Means of the Association Method.

THE HIBBERT JOURNAL, XIV, 2: *Count Goblet D'Alviella*, On Some Moral Aspects and Issues of the Present War; *Sir Frederick Pollock*, The "Fight for Right" Movement; *J. W. Diggle*, Against Departmental Religion; *A. S. Pringle-Pattison*, Mr. Balfour's "Theism and Humanism"; *Charles A. Mercier*, Vitalism; *George T. Ladd*, The Human Mind *versus* the German Mind; *M. E. Robinson*, The Definite Failure of Christianity, and How it might be Retrieved; *William Adams Brown*, Is Christianity Practicable? *E. Armitage*, The Incompetence of the Mere Scholar to Interpret Christianity; *Charles Hargrove*, The Warlike Contest of the Gospels; *C. R. Ashbee*, Quality *versus* Quantity as the Standard of Industry and Life; *J. Y. Simpson*, Religion in Russia To-Day; *R. H. Law*, Nationalism and Cosmopolitanism.

THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, XXVI, 2: *James Parker Hall*, The Force of Precedents in International Law; *Amos S. Hershey*, Neutrality and International Law; *Harold Chapman Brown*, Human Nature and the State; *G. A. Johnston*, Morals and Manners; *Elsie Clews Parsons*, The Interdependence of Family Relationships; *James H. Tufts*, Ethics of the Family; *C. D. Broad*, The Prevention of War; *Homer Blosser Reed*, Ethics of Competition.

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS, XIII, 1: *Howard C. Warren*, A Study of Purpose.

XIII, 2: *Howard C. Warren*, A Study of Purpose, II.

THE MONIST, XXVI, 1: *Raffaello Piccoli*, Carlo Michelstaedter; *Philip E. B. Jourdain*, The Philosophy of Mr. B*rtr*nd R*ss*ll; *A. H. Godbey*, The Hebrew Tithe; *Theodore Schroeder*, Intellectual Evolution and Pragmatism; *Julius J. Price*, The Jews of China; *Emanuel George Frank*, The Pilgrimage (A Poem).

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN, XII, 12: General Reviews and Summaries; *J. H. Leuba*, Social Psychology; *W. H. R. Rivers*, Social Customs and Organization; *A. L. Kellogg*, Crime and Sociology; *J. H. Leuba*, Religious Psychology; *G. A. Coe*, Recent Publications on Mysticism; *J. H. Leuba*, The Task and the Method of Psychology in Theology.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW, XXIII, 1: *Robert MacDougall*, The Self and Mental Phenomena; *J. Arthur Harris*, On the Influence of Previous Experience on Personal Equation and Steadiness of Judgment in the Estimation of the Number of Objects in Moderately Large Samples; *Knight Dunlap*, Thought-Content and Feeling; *Percy W. Cobb*, Photometric Considerations pertaining to Visual Stimuli.

THE BRITISH JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY, VIII, 1: *Carveth Read*, Psychology of Animism; *Ernest Jones*, The Theory of Repression in its Relation to Memory; *G. H. Thomson* and *F. W. Smith*, The Recognition Vocabularies of Children; *G. H. Thomson* and *J. R. Thomson*, Outlines of a Method for the Quantitative Analysis of Writing Vocabularies; *N. Carey*; Factors in the Mental Processes of School Children. II; On the Nature of Specific Mental Factors; *George H. Miles*, The Formation of Projected Visual Images by Intermittent Retinal Stimulation. II; Apparatus, Procedure, and Results.

REVUE DE MÉTAPHYSIQUE ET DE MORALE, XXII, 6: *V. Basch*, La Philos-

ophie et la Littérature classiques de l'Allemagne et les Doctrines pangermanistes; *L. Weber*, Sur la Mémoire affective; *P. Boutroux*, La signification historique de la "Géométrie" de Descartes; *H. Höffding*, Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse; *Th. Ruyssen*, La Force et Le Droit.

REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE, XL, 12: *A. Lalande*, Le Pancalisme; *L. Dauriac*, La forme et la penseé musicales; *G. Fonsegrive*, De la nature et de la valeur des explications (*dernier article*).

XLI, 1: *Y. Delage*, Portée philosophique et valeur morale du rêve; *F. Paulhan;* La valeur humaine de la vérité; *H. Piéron*, L'objectivism psychologique et la docrine dualiste.

ARCHIV FÜR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE, XXIX, 1: *W. Sauge*, Briefe von K. Rosenkranz an M. Schasler; *Arthur Goldstein*, Der Widerspruch im Wesen des Sittlichen und Sozialen; *David Einhorn*, Über die wahre Bestimmung der Geschichtsschreibung der Philosophie; *Otto Ziller*, Gustav Schilling. Sein Leben und Würdigung seiner Philosophie; *Paul Feldkeller*, Materialistische und Idealistische Kriegsphilosophie; *Joh. Zahlfleisch*, Ein Versehen Vaihingers bezüglich Schein und Erscheinung.

VIERTELJAHRSSCHRIFT FÜR WISSENSCHAFTLICHE PHILOSOPHIE UND SOZIOLOGIE, XXXIX, 4: *F. Müller-Lyer*, Soziologie des bevölkerungswesens; *Otto von der Pfordten*, Der Erkenntniswerth der Mathematik. II.

ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PSYCHOLOGIE, 73, 5 u. 6: *A. Gelb*, Bibliographie der deutschen und ausländischen Literatur des Jahres 1914 über Psychologie, ihre Hilfswissenschaften u. Grenzgebiete mit Unterstützung von Prof. H. C. Warren.

RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA, VII, 2: *R. Ardigò*, La ragione scientifica del dovere; *G. Folchieri*, Legge e libertà; *F. Albeggiani*, L'edonismo Socratico del dialago "Il Protagora"; *F. Consentini*, L'"Université Nouvelle" di Bruxelles e la filosofia giuridico-sociale nel Belgio; *P. F. Nicoli*, L'hegelismo di Giuseppe Ferrari; *A. Gazzolo*, Verità e unita nelle teorie scientifiche; *G. N. De Conciliis*, La frode alla legge e la sentenza di Porzia.

VII, 3: *G. Zuccante*, Aristotele nella Storia della Coltura; *G. Marchesini*, La disciplina morale della potenze; *E. Troilo*, Sul concetto di Storia della Filosofia; *M. Losacco*, Proclo e i suoi Elementi di teologia; *G. Tucci*, Un filosofo apologista cinese del sec. IX.

VII, 4: *G. Tarrozi*, L'ettica induttiva e la scienza; *G. Fano*, Sui fondamenti della geometria; *G. Maggiore*, La Religione di Fichte; *M. Maresca*, Genesi e dissoluzione logica della Pedagogia scientifica; *F. Albeggiani*, Il Sistema filosofico di C. Guastella.

REVISTA DE FILOSOFIA, I, 6: *Gregorio Aróz Alfaro*, Orientación social de los estudios universitarios; *Ernesto Quesada*, La exégesis testamentaria y la critica filosófica; *Cristóbal M. Hicken*, Eduardo L. Holmberg y las doctrinas evolucionistas; *Maximio S. Victoria*, Las doctrinas educacionales de Augusto Comte; *Raquel Camaña*, Función social del egoísmo; *Salvador Debenedetti*, Sobre la formación de una raza argentina; *José Oliva*, Orientación de la enseñanza de la piscología; *Eduardo Acevedo*, El sentimiento de lo cómico en el carácter argentino; *Julio Barreda Lynch*, Las doctrinas morales de Augusto Bunge; *José Ingenieros*, La formación de una raza argentina.